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Abstract 
Shifts in development theory turned attention to the role Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) could play in donor development policy. The heightened 
interest in NGOs was accompanied by an increased availability of funds and presaged 
a significant growth in the size of the NGO sector. This expanded role had 
repercussions on both their internal organisation and their relations with other players 
in the aid arena. However, in the 1990s, the financial market for development co-
operation became more competitive due to the changes in the former communist 
countries and the embrace of neo-liberal principles. Consequently, NGOs were 
criticised for their lack of professionalism and poor accountability, and found 
themselves subject to donor conditionality and the assimilation of the language, 
values and systems of donors. 
DonorlNGO relations are examined using the European Community (EC) and the 
position of European NGOs in the EC's Development Co-operation Policy. Insight 
into the relationship is gained by a focus on the evolution of relations between the 
European Commission, NGOs, and their representative body, CLONG, the Liaison 
Committee of the Development NGOs to the European Union. This thesis has 
demonstrated that over time the EC policy towards NGOs has reflected the imbalance 
of power and authority in the relationship, as NGOs were drawn in to play a more 
constrained and conditional role in EC policy. CLONG has suffered as a result of its 
position at the interface between the European Commission and European NGOs, and 
its financial dependence on the Commission. The practical application of EC policy to 
a particular area is examined with a focus on the SADC(C) region. Evidence has 
shown that EC policy has been influenced by the position of South Africa, a situation 
reflected in the cofinanced activities of UK NGOs. While the EC policy has been 
influential, local needs and NGO priorities have also driven UK NGO projects. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Aims and Objectives 
Non-Governmental Organisations exist in civil society between donors and recipients 
(Fowler, 1996). Since the 1960s there has been a significant rise in the number of 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in existence (Riddell & Robinson, 1995), 
such that the tenn now covers a wide spectrum of organisations (Vakil, 1997) and has 
led to an accompanying increase of interest in their activities (Tvedt, 1998). It is now 
not uncommon for representatives of NGOs to be present at international conferences 
and to produce valued comments and opinions on a wide range of issues (Van Rooy, 
1997). They have achieved a recognised position in civil society in the North and are 
emerging in increasing numbers and gaining in importance in the South. The 
heightened interest in NGOs has meant that over time they have found themselves to 
be gradually incorporated into development co-operation policy, tiling on a number 
of roles. This has resulted in a position of close proximity to northern donors funding 
projects in developing countries in the South. 
A vast theoretical discussion has thus been built up concerning the expansion of the 
NGO sector, and the subsequent repercussions for them. However gaps can be 
identified in the analytical and investigative literature of NGO/donor relations, 
particularly with respect to the possible tensions between them, which have developed 
as they endeavoured to respond to their changing environment. The thesis seeks to fill 
the gap by researching into donorlNGO relations in the European Union over time. 
The focus is therefore on the European Communityl as a northern donor channelling 
'. The tenn European Conununity is used throughout the thesis rather than the European Union, to 
signify its role as a multilateral donor. 
I 
funds through northern (European) NGOs2 to Developing countries under the 
European Community's Development Co-operation policy. 
Initially there is a need to establish an understanding of the position, function and 
characteristics of NGOs, and the extent to which these have changed over time in 
response to shifts in development theory, and the pressure brought to bear by both 
donors and Southern NGOs. Once an appreciation ofthe dynamics ofNGOs' role and 
the significance of donorlNGO relations has been established, attention will turn to 
trace the progression of European Community Development Co-operation policy over 
time and its impact on the role of European NGOs, and relate the findings to the 
academic discourse. Of special interest is the B7-6000 budget line, to which European 
NGOs3 have sole right of application and through which the European Commission 
co-finances development projects in the South. This is an example of a demand-led 
budget line, whereby the use to which funds are put is determined by the project 
proposals emanating from European NGOs. This then begs the questions: to what 
extent is the use of the line freely determined by the NGOs or to what degree is it 
under the influence ofthe donor's agenda, and, hence, are the NGOs able to shape the 
direction and detail of the European Community's policy, or do they merely act out a 
passive role predetermined by the European Commission. Therefore in addition to 
their role within the policy, their participation in the formation of policy will be 
appraised. Consideration of the power and influence exerted by both NGOs, as a 
sector in European civil society, and by the Liaison Committee of the European 
NOOs (CLONO)4, representing the interests of European NGOs, will be examined 
2 The research is concerned with the position of Non-Governmental Development Organisations 
(NGDOs). However, as the term did not appear in EC documents until 1995, for consisteucy, it was 
considered appropriate to use the term NGO. 
3 That is European NGDOs. 
4 The Liaison Committee of the European NGOs is normally known by its French pseudonym CLONG 
and will be referred to as such hereafter. 
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and evaluated. This line of research will also examine the dynamics of relations 
between the European Commission and European NGOs, and the European 
Commission and CLONG, and the extent to which the term 'partnership' can be 
applied. 
As a further refinement to narrow down the line of research and provide a focus for 
the illustration of the European Community policy in practice, the SADqC)5 region 
has been chosen for a number of reasons but particularly because it came into 
existence after the emergence of the B7-6000 budget line and therefore offers the 
opportunity to trace developments in the use made of the line. The region is important 
to the European Community for a number of reasons, not least because of the 
economic interests in the area's resources, but also the desire to contain the power of 
South Africa, to fight against apartheid, and the goal to promote a similar model of 
regional coherence as its own. There have been significant changes in the region, 
which have impacted on the degree to which the European Community has channelled 
funds through European NGOs into the region. While new region-specific budget 
lines have appeared and disappeared the B7-6000 budget line has continued to 
provide a financial source for co-financed projects in the SADqC) region. Therefore 
an analysis of the application offunds from the B7-6000 budget line will provide an 
in depth look at the NGOs' response to conditions and problems in the region. A 
decision was made to focus on the use of the B7-6000 budget line by UK NGOs in the 
SADqC) region, justified on the basis that the UK had a significant presence in the 
region due to historical and cultural links. It is, therefore, expected that UK NGOS 
5 The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was first held in 1980, but 
subsequently became known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. 
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will have developed considerable associations with the people on the basis of their 
struggle against the apartheid regime and their classification as poor countries. 
In summary, therefore, this thesis will 
• Provide an understanding of the changing enviromnent of development NGOs 
overtime 
• Examine the evolution of European Development Co-operation policy and the 
role ofNG(D)Os within that framework 
• Establish the relative positions of the European Commission, European 
NG(D)Os and CLONG in the process of decision-making, policy design and 
implementation in the sphere ofEC DeVelopment Co-operation policy 
• Analyse the application ofEC policy to the SAD(C)C region 
• Review the use of the B7-6000 budget line in the SAD(C)C region by UK 
NG(D)Os. 
An outline Methodology 
Research into relations between the European Commission and European NGOs and 
CLONG relies heavily on the ability to obtain sufficient and continuous 
documentation of relevant matters from the European Commission itself or from other 
organisations, which are often funded by the European Commission. The bi-monthly 
publication of the ACP-EU Courier, as its title suggests provides infonnation about 
the ACP group of countries, which includes the SADC(C) countries, and is funded by 
the European Commission. In addition, all matters concerning the European 
Community's Development Co-operation Policy towards the ACP group, as well as 
infonnation regarding the European Commission and its relations with and policy 
4 
towards NGOs can be located via the europ a web site- the official web site for the 
European Union. Infonnation concerning CLONG was obtained from a visit to their 
office at SCF London HQ, and from their web site. However as the relations between 
the European Commission and CLONG changed so this ultimately impacted on the 
web-site as at the time CLONG was dependent on funding from the European 
Commission. 
Furthermore, during the period of research, there were times when infonnation was 
difficult to obtain due to changes in presentation policy and administrative structure 
within the European Commission. The annual report and data tables relating to the 
B7-6000 budget line grew in size over the period under review from a single 
document of manageable proportions to eventually include such a large set of data 
tables (a reflection of the growth in the use and funding of the budget line) that the 
data tables were no longer automatically sent to documentation centres and a special 
request had to be made to the European Commission for them. Overtime the 
presentation of annual data became severely delayed (up to two years late) before 
finally becoming impossible to locate even after direct communication with the 
appropriate personnel. On several other occasions the documents were only made 
available in French and therefore needed to be translated into English. From the 
infonnation presented therefore it can be seen that there was a reliance on sources 
dependent upon the European Commission. 
Organisation of the thesis 
The organisation of the thesis and its subsequent chapters will take the following 
approach. In chapter 2, there will be a review of the academic literature sources 
pertinent to the transfonnation of the NOO sector to identify the changes in the role 
5 
and relative position of Northern NGOs, and the subsequent impact on their 
performance and relations, particularly with respect to donors. Chapter 3 will trace the 
transformation of European Community Development Co-operation policy over time 
and the status of European NGOs within that framework. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
evolution of relations between the European Commission, the European NGOs and 
their representative body, CLONG. Once the significance of European NGOs in the 
formation and the structure of the policy are established, the application of the policy 
to a specific case study area - the SADC(C) region - will be discussed. Chapter 5 
identifies the policy stance taken by the European Community to SADC(C), both 
during the period of umest between the European Community and South Africa, and 
the subsequent period of reconciliation between them. In chapter 6 the focus is on the 
use made by the UK NGOs of the B7-6000 budget line, under which the European 
Commission co-finances projects proposed by European NGOs. Finally, chapter 7 
draws some conclusions to the issue of donor-NGO relations as they relate to the 
European situation before identifying areas of possible future research. 
6 
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Chapter 2: The Changing Milieu of the Non-
Governmental Organisations 
The changes in development thinking provide a backdrop to the dynamics and 
performance of the NGO sector. The ongoing debate, over the best way to promote 
economic growth and hence development in the South, has influenced donor 
development co-operation policy. The challenges presented to the NGOs, therefore, 
need to be discussed in the context of political ideological trends as well as the 
economic and social environment. 
This chapter aims to outline the changes in development thinking since the 1960s and 
to provide a review of the literature concerning the subsequent impact on NGOs. Its 
main focus is to identify the factors, which resulted in an increased role for NGOs as 
intermediaries in the flow of financial resources to developing countries, and to assess 
the consequences of the changes on the NGO sector and its relations with other 
players, in particular the donor-NGO relationship. Therefore the objectives of the 
chapter are to: 
(i) review the shifts in development theory and the role for NGOs 
(ii) examine the characteristics of NGOs and the possible impact of their 
enhanced role, and 
(iii) explore their relations with other organisations in the development finance 
sector. 
7 
Shifts in Development Theory 
The shifting emphasis in development theory and development economics has in turn 
determined the role and focus of foreign aid in developing countries. Until the early 
1960s, development theory was dominated by the classical Structuralist approach, 
which favoured direct intervention by the State to overcome the deficiencies of the 
market mechanism 'government as prime mover' (Adelman, 2000:49). Aid flows 
were essentially at inter-state level with a marginal, complementary role for NGOs 
(Tvedt, 1998). Development was to be achieved through the provision of large 
physical infrastructure projects, with a trickle down effect leading to an improvement 
in the income and welfare of the poor (Riddell & Robinson, 1995). By the mid 1970s, 
a growing awareness, that the focus on GNP growth was not generating the economic 
and social development necessary to alleviate the poverty of the masses, resulted in a 
re-examination of the development process. At this stage, the development strategy 
favoured by the World Bank (redistribution with growth) emphasised the reduction of 
poverty through the increase in productivity and efficiency in both the rural and the 
informal urban sectors (Thorbecke, 2000). An alternative basic needs strategy was 
advocated by the !LO, which included minimum standards of living and the provision 
of essential community services (Chambers, 1995; Thorbecke, 2000). Thus by the mid 
1970s, aid from the World Bank and Western governments explicitly targeted the 
poorest people, regions and countries, using the integrated rural development project 
to tackle the root causes of rural poverty (Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Mosley & 
Eeckhout, 2000). It was appreciated that to ensure sustainability required the 
'participation and involvement of the poor' (Thorbecke, 2000:33), and NGOs found 
an increasing role to play in aid distribution as a result of their ability to engage with 
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the now targeted sections of the population in developing countries (Fowler & James, 
1994). 
Increasing criticisms of the state's ability to promote tbe level of development and tbe 
elimination of poverty provided the opportunity for a shift towards tbe neo-classical 
school of economic development. Neo-liberalists felt that the level of state 
intervention was excessive and actually responsible for the failure of the market 
(Colclough & Manor, 1995; Adelman, 2000). Long (1988) questioned the state's 
ability to act independently in the face of the power exerted by the dominant classes. 
He argued that tbe economically and politically weak voice of 'the masses' was 
further constrained by the continued weakness of institutions needed to deal with the 
functioning of a complex society. Therefore, while they were aware of its limitations, 
the Neoliberalists felt that the market resulted in a more efficient allocation of 
resources (Colc1ough & Manor, 1995). There emerged two alternate strategies: one 
where government intervention should be curtailed to allow the markets to set prices 
and the other which supported a continued role for the government but witb an 
emphasis on labour intensive export production (Adelman, 2000). At this stage the 
World Bank was concerned to promote stabilisation in a period of increasing foreign 
debt, witb the endorsement of SAPs (Riddell, 1992). These advocated a reduced role 
for the state, and provided an opportunity for NGOs to concentrate on micro project 
development and target marginalized groups of people (Tvedt, 1998). The position of 
NGOs was furthered by the general crisis in the 'welfare' state and the increasing 
interest paid to private and other sectors to act as service delivery agents (Hewitt, 
1994; Tvedt, 1998; Thorbecke, 2000). NGOs could no longer be simply labeled as 
gap-fillers in service delivery programmes, but were seen as important actors in the 
new alternative model of development (Tvedt, 1998). According to Chambers (1995), 
9 
the decade of the 1980s was seen to be one of structural adjustment without a humau 
face, with the focus on the pursuit of efficiency via the private sector, whereas Hulme 
& Edwards (1997:276) viewed it as a time when the exposure of the 'myth of the 
state' was replaced by the 'myth of the market'. However one contradiction was that 
the successful implementation of SAPs required a strong and significaut government 
presence rather than a minimal one (Thorbecke, 2000). During the 1980s, the progress 
of the development discourse was furthered by au awareness of the role of human 
capital and trade in the growth of developing countries, as well as the emergence of 
the new institutional economics (North, 1990). According to Cameron (2000), NIB 
could help to explain the most complex world of development aud thus was 
vulnerability of the poor to make decisions in a situation of risk aud uncertainty-
, .. .information deficiency models, including bounded rationality (areas of uncertainty 
about opportunities aud lor their unintended outcomes), public goods (concealed 
demaud aud free-rider problems), aud moral hazard (ability to cheat others) 
propositions' (Cameron, 2000:630). 
He observed that NGOs could function as agents of change, path-dependent 
institutions or re-distributors of uncertainty (Cameron, 2000). As agents of chauge, 
NGOs function between the state, the market and civil society, and could be pulled in 
three directions. As path-dependent institutions, the NGOs incur transaction costs, 
which are related to their staffing requirements and mission statement. As re-
distributors of uncertainty, NGOs act to support their target groups in the face of the 
complexities of the institutional arena-
' .. .institutions most willing to challenge aud change the distribution of uncertainty in 
favour of groups of people, who face disproportionate threats to their physical and 
psychological well-being from forces beyond their control.' (Cameron, 2000:634) 
10 
However, although NGOs were in a position to reach the poor, Bratton (1989) queried 
their ability to involve local people in the decision-making procedure. The ending of 
the Cold War presented the opportunity to both 'roll back the state' and pursue the 
promotion of democracy, which manifested itself in a new approach to development 
and a new donor agenda. The Washington Consensus emerged in 1990 as a cluster of 
policy ideas, combining political and economic aspects with roles for both 
competitive markets and the state. 
New Policy Agenda 
The new policy agenda was driven by two basic sets of beliefs relating to neo-Iiberal 
economics and liberal democratic theory. The changing role of government formed 
one of the key components of the 'new policy agenda' of governance, democracy and 
conditionality (Robinson, 1994). Although it was argued that good government draws 
political, economic and social aspects together, the extent of direct state involvement 
in the economy and the provision of social services was to be limited and support was 
given to the idea that NGOs could be a substitute for the state (Tvedt, 1998). NGOs 
were favoured either to cover the deficit in the government's provision of public 
goods or because the population did not trust commercial organizations (contract 
failure) and preferred NGOs (Tvedt, 1998). NGOs were attributed with being able to 
perform a number of functions. The left viewed NGOs as 'an instrument of 
empowerment' and the right as the preferred player to act as a substitute for the state 
(Bratton, 1989:569). They were also acknowledged as 'vehicles for democratisation' 
(Hulme & Edwards, 1997:6). Consequently, in view of the diverse needs of the 
population, there was a significant increase in the number of NGOs (Riddell & 
Robinson, 1995) 
11 
Central to the new policy agenda was the promotion of liberal democracy and the 
development of civil society, since the official agencies' approach to development 
now moved on to the 'myth of the market plus civil society' (Hulme & Edwards, 
1997:277). NGOs were considered to be key actors in civil society and therefore 
found themselves faced with a potentially augmented role. Robinson (1994) argued 
that, although the reduced role of the state could lead to an increased NGO 
involvement in public policy, a weakened state could also result in less resources 
being available and by implication to increased competition between NGOs. 
Politically, NGOs sought to contribute to democratic reform and the empowerment of 
the communities in which they worked, which therefore necessitated that they acted as 
facilitators rather than agents of change (Pearce, 1993). 
The 1990s was a period of aid fatigue with a consequent emphasis on aid 
conditionality. In the early years, the World Bank followed an orthodox approach with 
the emphasis on a period of stabilization accompanied by an appropriate SAP. In 
contrast the 'heterodox' approach, supported by UNICEF incorporated a social 
dimension - adjustment with a human face (Thorbecke, 2000). Thus the World Bank 
and the United Nations began to look more favourably on the role of NGOs in the 
development process as their attention shifted to participation and sustainability 
(World Bank, 1990; Pratt & Stone, 1994). NGOs welcomed the opportunity to 
promote issues, such as women, the enviromnent, grass roots, human rights and trade 
relations, in discussions of the development policy of Western Governments and 
International Organizations (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996). Following on from UN 
conferences, NGOs have been active in exerting pressure and aiming to directly 
influence the shape of international laws and institutions, often through the 
publication of independent reports (Princen & Finger, 1994). 
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At the end of the twentieth century, the international awareness of country-specific 
problems (e.g. financial crises) pointed to the need for a re-evaluation of the role of 
the government, which led to the 'revisionist' school of economic development 
(Adelman, 2000). This post-Washington Consensus approach supported a dynamic, 
flexible, interactive mix of state and market functions (Adelman, 2000). The emphasis 
was that governments must play a strategic role in economic development. 
As a result of the shift in development thinking, NGOs were identified as key players 
in the development process. This prompts the discussion of a number of issues: the 
main characteristics of NGOs; their classification; the repercussions for their internal 
affairs of their increasing responsibilities; the changing nature of their relationships 
with other organisations in the development finance sector; and, the possibility of 
problems in their relations with the South. Therefore attention will now turn to 
identifying and commenting on these issues. 
The main characteristics ofNGOs 
NGOs have been attributed with special characteristics, which make them suitable for 
the new approach to development. It has been argued that in contrast to the state, 
NGOs act quickly and flexibly (Smith, 1987; Bratton, 1989), are closer to those in 
need (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), are better placed to target the poorest (Fowler & 
James, 1994), are able to avoid bureaucracy, inequality, inefficiency and corruption 
associated with the state (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), have well motivated field staff 
and a low cost management style (Bratton, 1989) and, are innovative and recognized 
as a significant factor in civil society (Smillie, 1997). Korten (1987) contends that 
13 
they are an important catalyst in micro-policy reforms. Equally they are not 
constrained by commercial objectives and are able to set a lower threshold to the 
poor's access to the services they need and thus achieve a deeper poverty reach 
(Fowler & James, 1994). On the basis of these qualities, it is thought that NGOs have 
a higher level of efficiency in their operations, are more cost effective and have a 
significant impact on development (Pratt & Stone, 1994). Farrington and Bebbington 
(1993) argue that, as NGOs are contracted to a project, they do not represent a 
recurrent cost for governments and posit that donors are able to gain a subsidy by 
taking advantage of the NGOs' situation. However despite these positive qualities 
accredited to NGOs, it has been suggested that the case for an increase in importance 
of NGOs rests on ideological grounds rather than empirical evidence (Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Riddell & Robinson, 1995). 
The focus on NGOs has also identified some deficiencies both in their impact and 
their internal organization. Annis (1987) suggests that 
small scale meant 
politically independent meant 
low cost meant 
innovative meant 
insignificant 
powerless 
underfinancedlpoor quality 
temporary/unsustainable. 
It is felt that their micro projects maybe effective but are also inefficient, and, with the 
infrequency of research and evaluation, little can be systematically learnt from their 
experience (Smith, 1987; Bratton; 1989). Further criticism suggests that their impact 
is not only transitory but also highly localized (Edwards & Hulme, 1992) with 
projects seen as discrete and isolated (Smith, 1987; Twose, 1987; Bratton, 1989). 
Their internal organization is said to be based on unclear management principles and 
suffers from a shortage of skilled managers (Bratton, 1989). As the development focus 
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moves away from the micro-level, the challenge of pursuing meso-Ievel strategies 
calls into question NGOs' technical competency and professionalism. In order to 
improve their strategic and managerial decisions, it is suggested that NGOs need to 
employ professional personnel, but this could result in them losing links with their 
voluntary base (Korten, 1987). With the increased flow of official funding through 
NGOs, criticism has been leveled at them for apparently attaching more importance to 
their relations with the state and the enhancement of their own technical capacity, than 
the improvement of their relations with the local community (Pearce, 1993; Smillie, 
1995). A further criticism insinuated that poor co-ordination, between NGOs, or 
NGOs and governments, has had a tendency to limit the potential impact of their 
activities (Robinson, 1992; Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995). 
Overall then, opinions are divided regarding the evaluation of the character of NGOs. 
On the one hand, their localized micro-projects are lauded as able to achieve a greater 
impact, with their people and situation specific approach, but, on the other hand, 
criticism focuses on their potential inefficiency and the lack of ability to duplicate, 
evaluate and learn from the experience. 
Classification ofNGOs 
The focus on NGOs as key players in the development process has led to attempts to 
develop a classification framework in order to facilitate the analysis and improve the 
performance of the NGO sector. One area of confusion concerns the question of what 
constitutes an NGO. Vakil (1997) identifies an 'alphabet soup' of names which adds 
to the confusion 
'BINGOs 
CBOs 
big international nongovernmental organisation 
community-based organisations 
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CB-NGOs 
DOs 
DONGOs 
GONGOs 
GROs 
GRSOs 
IDCls 
INGOs 
NGDOs 
NNGOs 
POs 
PSCs 
QUANGOs 
SCOs 
SNGOs 
WCOs 
community-based nongovernmental organisations 
development organisations 
donor nongovernmental organisations 
government nongovernmental organisations 
grassroots organisations 
grassroots support organisations 
international development co-operation organisations 
international nongovernmental organisations 
nongovernmental development organisations 
northern nongovernmental organisations 
people's organisations 
public service contractors 
quasi-nongovernmental organisations 
social change organisations 
support nongovernmental organisations 
welfare church organisations' (Vakil 1997:2060). 
There is agreement that these organisations are both private and self-governing but 
conflict over whether they are non-profitable or not-for profit (Weiss & Gordenker, 
1996; Vakil, 1997). The confusion is embedded in the multi-faceted nature ofNGOs, 
and the fact that they have been examined by different single disciplines, often in 
isolation. 
Despite the limited success in reaching an acceptable definition of an NGO, 
academics have attempted to determine a simple system of classification, which could 
relate to the evolution of activities, engaged in by NGOs, and would correspond to the 
change in the focus from development aid to development co-operation. Korten 
(1987) identifies three generations ofNGO activities. First generation activities focus 
on relief and welfare with a concentration on the individual/family and use images of 
starving people and child sponsorship schemes. Second generation activities focus on 
small scale self-reliant local development with, for example, the promotion of 
preventative health care and improvements to farm practices seen as pre-requisites to 
sustainability at the local/village level. Third generation activities emphasise the 
development of sustainable systems at national level with NGOs acting as a catalyst to 
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bring mlcro- and macro-levels together. Korten expects NNGOs to follow a 
progression through the three stages of activities and ultimately to aim to have very 
little direct involvement in overseas operations. He sees their role vis it vis Southern 
NGOs to be essentially supportive, and their main focus to be lobbying and advocacy 
work in the wider environment. In later work, Korten identifies fourth generation 
activities related to 'people's development movements' (Thomas, 1992; Smillie, 1995), 
which have a vision, are driven by social energy and rely on networks. Korten divides 
the NGO sector into voluntary organisations, public service contractors, people's 
organisations and GONGOs (created by government to support public policy). In fact, 
market driven public service contractors emerged because donors placed contracts 
with NGOs rather than with governments. 
Elliott (1987) used a similar approach, by categorising the work ofNGOs as part of a 
spectrum. This extended from welfare, through development, to empowennent and 
training for transformation with the focus on enabling the indigenous NGOs to 
become effective agents of change. He emphasises the political nature of development 
and wants NNGOs to be conspicuous by their absence. However, Vakil (1997) points 
out the difficulty of providing a simple classification of NGOs in the light of their 
'multidimensional nature' and the span of different disciplines discussing the work of 
NGOs. In an effort to achieve a simpler classification than previous authors, Vakil 
(1997) suggests a framework based on organisational attributes, divided into essential 
and contingent categories. Essential descriptors are divided into orientation, which 
includes welfare, development, advocacy, research, networking and development 
education, and the level of operation, which includes international, regional, national 
and community. Contingent descriptors are divided a) the sectoral focus of an NGO 
and b) an evaluation of the attributes of an NGO, which includes accountability, 
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efficiency and participation. Commins (1997) furthered the discussion of the role of 
NGOs by suggesting there was a need for NGOs to move beyond their present aid 
work and focus on reshaping the forces that drive the global economy, while at the 
same time developing new relationships with low-income communities. On the other 
hand, Smillie (1997) points to the rise of the transnational NGO (TNGO) and 
criticises their concentration on short-term emergency work and child sponsorship 
schemes rather than long-term development work with growth, TNGOs are large, with 
the top few monopolising the bulk of the funds available from the general public, 
govennnents and UN agencies. Their resources enable them to immediately respond 
to new funding windows opened by donor agencies (Smillie, 1995). 
In accordance with Korten's model, NGOs' activities are expected to follow a specific 
pattern, moving through an identified spectrum over time, but the reality is less clear-
cut (Dolan, 1992; Thomas, 1992). Some NGOs undertake activities in more than one 
category and therefore the classification is inexact. To support this point, Dolan 
(1992) draws attention to the fact that the public is more responsive to appeals than 
lobbying 
-'the British public continues to hold the view that the problems of the Third World 
can be solved by donations to charity' (Dolan, 1992:209), 
and therefore NNGOs retain that approach even when their other work has moved on. 
Based on empirical evidence, Dolan (1992) posits that advocacy and lobbying 
activities carried out by NGOs should be firmly related to their project experiences. It 
could also be said that the activities of NGOs support the view that NGOs have been 
influenced by development policy and funding sources. Those NGOs that engage in 
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development work have seen their objectives and methods determined by the 
contemporary debate and its associated financial pattern. 
Scaling-up operations 
As a consequence of finding themselves labeled as important key players, NGOs have 
had to confront the task of how to scale up their operations to deal with this 
potentially augmented role. Edwards & Hulme (1992) suggest that scaling up is a term 
used to describe the goal of increasing their impact but not necessarily synonymous 
with an expansion of their size. They see the need for a strong conceptual framework, 
which would help identify the alternatives available to NGOs and enable them to 
make a rational, appropriate and realistic choice of strategy. Drawing on the works of 
several authors (Howes & Sattar, 1992; Klimnahorn & Ireland, 1992; Mitlin & 
Satterthwaite, 1992), Edwards & Hulme (1992) distinguish between three alternative 
strategies available to NGOs, namely additive, which means an increase in size of 
programme or organisation, multiplicative, which means impact through deliberate 
influence, networking, policy and legal reform, or training, and lastly diffusive with 
impact through informal and spontaneous spread. Each of these strategies has 
different implications for the NGOs concerned and their effectiveness would be 
situation specific. They further identify four alternative paths for NGOs to adhere to, 
being organisational growth, working with governments, advocacy in the North, or 
linking grassroots with lobbying and advocacy. They are aware that the strategies are 
not discrete, and Chambers (1992) underlines this by identifying a fifth strategy, 
which he suggests would cut across the above using 'generating, spreading and 
improving approaches and methods' (Chambers, 1992:40) e.g. rapid rural appraisal 
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and participatory rural appraisal. According to Chambers (1992), to realise the 
potential of this strategy requires 
, innovation as normal practice, critical self awareness as personal attitude, sharing as 
institutional culture' (Chambers,1992:47). 
Although NGOs are now armed with an understanding of the alternative strategies 
they can choose between, doubts have been expressed about their ability to scale up, 
given the state oftheir organisational capacity (Dolan, 1992; Robinson, 1992). Carroll 
(1992) posits that NGOs would be unable to continue with their flexible and informal 
approach, although they should be able to remain true to their objectives of poverty 
orientation and participation. Obviously when deciding how to scale up their 
operations, NGOs need to consider the financial aspects of such a move and the 
repercussions on their position in the development arena. A pertinent issue to raise at 
this point, therefore, is their status vis a vis donors. The emergence of Southern NGOs 
(SNGOs) into the international development forum, has to some extent forced 
Northern NGOs (NNGOs)to review their own position, because the level of value-
added by NNGOs has been questioned (Pratt & Stone, 1994). SNGOs are closer to the 
target groups in the South and could become the preferred financial intermediary for 
donors, attempting to reach the poor. The doubts raised about the evolution of their 
(NNGOs) relations with donors and the potential repercussions for NNGOs, concern 
their possible loss of identity, their emergence as a mere conduit for preset donor 
plans, the optional paths available to them and their ability to legitimately represent 
the South. 
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Donors and NGOs 
The increase in official funding through NGOs was justified because they were 
expected to achieve results -'market plus civil society will yield development' 
(Hulme & Edwards, 1997 :277), and has subsequently led to a change in their 
relationship with donors and the emergence of newly ascribed roles. A much-vaunted 
term applied to NGOs has been to describe them as 'magic bullets' (Vivian 1994), 
endowing them with the ability to reach their target irrespective of the direction of 
launch. But this attribute has both auspicious and adverse implications for the roles 
NGOs could play and their relations with donors. 
In order to provide an appreciation of the (political) environment that NGOs could 
find themselves part of, if they developed closer relations with donors, there is a need 
to explain the ground rules of donor policy. According to Hulme & Edwards (1997), 
NGOs need to be aware of the procedures used by donors to influence others' 
behaviour to achieve their objectives, which could obviously be different from those 
advocated by NGOs. It may be easy to identify the official goals of the donor's policy 
but the possibility of a hidden agenda needs to be scrutinised. Donors could exert 
control over the NGOs with the use of persuasion or financial inducement, but may 
resort to coercion. At the same time donors have formal procedures in place to control 
the situation. This could take the form of accounting systems, reporting styles, the 
issue of contracts or the registration of approved organisations. Informally, the donor 
could exert control by the use of patronage, staff exchanges, seminars and the flow of 
information. Farrington & Bebbington (1993) report that the direction, which 
donorlNGO relations could take, would be determined by the preferred role of the 
donor as a funding agency and the consequential impact on NGOs. They distinguish 
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between facilitation, which would allow NGOs to pursue their own agenda, 
constructive influence, where donors would attempt to influence the design of 
programmes, determination, where the donor would set the programme design itself, 
and distortion, a situation where the direction to be followed would be against the 
better instinct of the NGO. Each one of these alternatives has different implications 
forNGOs. 
A number of academics have pointed out that essentially the donor will use the NGO 
to achieve its own ends, and may even corrupt NGOs in the process (Pronk 1998). 
Thus Pratt & Stone (1994) express concern that NGOs would be used as salesmen by 
multilateral agencies, and Hulme & Edwards (1997) posit a change in the relationship 
from partnership to contractor, where NGOs would act as a' franchise state' providing 
social welfare services to 'clients'. With ODAs attempting to improve their 
effectiveness in reaching the grassroots and reducing poverty, Smillie (1997) warns 
NGOs to avoid becoming donor's executing agencies. Edwards (1994) argues that 
donors may even use NGOs to further their own foreign policy. Realising that it 
would be unwise to try to impose their ideas directly on the South, the donor may 
prefer an indirect route using NGOs, which they see as a favoured player from the 
Southern Governments' point of view. In some instances Twose (1987) predicts too 
close a relationship could develop, and is fearful that this could result in them 
becoming 'political stooges' of their governments. In an extreme form, this could 
result in the emergence of a DONGO - a donor led NGO created in response to the 
availability of donor funds (Hodson 1997) or an opportunist NGO (Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996). 
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With the increasing dependence on official funding, NGOs may find that their 
position and integrity is compromised. According to van der Heijden (1987) the 
availability of grants may encourage NGOs to become involved in programmes, 
which are inconsistent with their own objectives and capacities. They may be 
unwilling to criticise governments in their advocacy work and their flexibility will be 
compromised by the need to be accountable to them. He suggests the adoption of a 
consultative mechanism, which would enable NGOs and government representatives 
to meet to identifY ventures suitable for collaboration between the two and attainment 
of acceptable solutions. Tvedt (1998) argues that NGOs and donors will become more 
like each other, sharing the same language style and administrative system, which 
would be determined by the donor (isomorphism). NGOs could therefore find 
themselves increasingly drawn away from their own mission. Expressions of disquiet, 
that the increase in dependence upon official funding would skew the performance, 
distort the accountability, and weaken the legitimacy ofNGOs, have been signaled by 
Edwards & Hulme (1996). They argue that donors are more cornmitted to projects 
with an easily quantifiable goal, and if these are not met, funding may be withdrawn. 
Advocacy work would not be looked upon favourably and NGOs would increasingly 
find themselves unwilling to speak out against donor directives and policy issues. 
Similar concerns about the distribution of funds have been expressed by Pearce 
(1993), who posits that the distribution of funds may favour service providers and 
disadvantage social mobilization organisations, and Elliott (1987), who suggests that 
accountability requirements may reduce the chances of funds being used for 
empowerment due to the associated intangible, long term results. 
Thus, NGOs may find their mission altered, due to their close association with a 
donor. In cases where the NGO is linked to more than one donor, tensions may arise if 
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it is faced with a different set of rules and regulations to abide by for each one 
(Dichter, 1997). Tension may also arise within NGOs, due to the friction between 
their original focus on charity and compassion, and the 1990s focus on enterprise 
development and microfinance projects for the achievement of sustainability. Hulme 
& Edwards (1997:9) pronounced the move to be 'poverty alleviation by promotion' 
rather than by state 'protection', in response to donor demands for financial 
sustainability. 
Not all NGOs have responded to the increased interest and funding opportunities in 
the same way. Hellinger (1987) identifies three options: NGOs could positively 
response to donor demands and guidelines, increase their field operations and thus 
their dependence on official funds; or, they could avoid both official funding and 
large-scale government programmes; or, alternatively NGOs could challenge donors 
to change or adapt their programmes,- an idea supported by Pratt & Stone (1994). 
This idea receives corroboration from the work of Covey (1998), which discusses the 
opportunities available to NGOs to achieve institutional reform of the World Bank. 
She distinguishes between two methods, which could be employed: operational 
collaboration and policy dialogue. The level of operational collaboration could vary 
considerably and could cover any stage of the operations of a funded project. Policy 
dialogue could involve NGOs in policy debate and the exchange of information either 
formally, by means of a specific committee, or informally. Prior to 1989, the level of 
NGO involvement in World Bank affairs was minimal and the NGO role was 
identified as one of co-optation onto pre-established schemes. Since that date the 
degree of involvement has increased but it is difficult to assess the level of direct 
influence. Covey (1998) used the following two-dimensional model to identify the 
alternative relations, which could prevail between the World Bank and NGOs: 
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Figure 2.1 Two-dimeusioual Donor-NGO relations 
co-operation high 
co-optation critical co-operation 
conflict low ________ -+ ___________ .::.co"'nflict high 
dis-engagement conflict 
advocacy 
co-operation low 
(Covey, 1998:108) 
Critical co-operation = ' willingness to work with another institution while 
maintaining independence and critical distance' (Covey, 1998: 1 08). Covey posits that 
when NGOs accept Bank project work they surrender their capacity to be independent 
and engage in conflict. The preferred option would be to engage in critical co-
operation and pursue insider advocacy rather than confrontational advocacy (Covey 
1998). According to Clark (1997), for there to be the chance of a strong collaborative 
relationship to be built up with a donor, donors and NGOs must seek the same 
outcome 
'a healthy relationship is only conceived where both parties share common objectives' 
(Clark, 1997:47). 
As a result of the information presented, the conclusion to be drawn at this stage 
concerning NGO-donor relations is one that firmly supports the view that the power 
and influence is in the hands of the donor. The availability of funding from donors has 
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the ability not only to corrupt (Pronk, 1998) and distort (Hulme & Edwards, 1997) but 
also to encourage the birth of opportunistic NGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). To 
exert a positive influence on donor policies and procedures NGOs need to become 
members of an advisory committee, and thus engage in insider advocacy (Covey, 
1998). The extent to which NGOs are able to exert an influence on the donor and 
enjoy a strong collaborative relationship is dependant on whether the donor has a 
strong positive social agenda (Clark, 1997). For the majority of NGOs the trend 
towards greater dependence on donor funding has become a reality but the 
significance of that move has manifested itself in different ways. Essentially the 
impact can be broken down into the repercussions on the internal organisational 
affairs of NGOs and on their external relations with other players in the development 
paradigm. An attempt will be made to discuss each of these issues in turn, bearing in 
mind that NGOs have felt pressurized to become more professional, and improve their 
accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. The extent to which NGOs 
are affected by donor set systems structure and project procedures depends on whether 
they are viewed as an essential force in the progress of human activity or merely 
acquiescent pawns (Tvedt 1998). 
The Changing Organizational Culture ofNGOs 
In the economic climate of the 1990s, pressure brought to bear on donors to account 
for and improve the impact of their financial commitments to development work, was 
deflected onto the work of NGOs. This has influenced the internal policies and 
procedures used by NGOs, as they were now faced with the need to not only show 
that they could be more professional and accountable, but also possessed the ability to 
protect their market share in an increasingly competitive financial market (Wall ace, 
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1997). In the effort to become more professional, NOOs need to review their staffing 
requirements as different skills and capabilities are required, although it depends on 
where the NGO is in relation to Korten's system of classification. According to 
Thomas (1992), relief and welfare organisations require logistical and specific 
professional competencies, whereas second generation activities require project 
management and support for field staff, but the third generation require strategic 
management and analysis, negotiation and collaboration. The staffing problem for 
NOOs then becomes one of escalating costs (overheads) as its voluntary staff base is 
augmented/replaced by professionals from the market place, needing to be paid a 
going-rate. Smillie (1997) points out that it would be difficult to cover these extra 
costs because they cannot be part of project profiles and it would be dishonest to use 
public campaign monies to foot the bill. 
To ensure a greater focus on efficiency and effectiveness, donors have directed NOOs 
to use the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA), which sets out the aims, objectives, 
inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact (Wallace, 1997). This shows the focus of donors 
to be one of short term, quantifiable results, but that not all the results of NGO 
projects are easily quantifiable (Wallace, 1997), and indicates that issues are being 
viewed from different perspectives -
'while the current talk among donors and UK NOOs is of participation, partnership, 
institution and capacity building, strengthening civil society, sustainability, the project 
management tools ..... have all come out of a different tradition concerned with 
control, rational plauning, measurability, accountability and short term impacts. 
(Wall ace, 1997 :45) 
NOOs have had to learn a new language to assimilate the new ethos, and focus their 
sights on conforming to the system put in place by donors. According to Wallace 
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(1997), SNGOs have complained about the Northem bias of the new procedures and 
the feeling that their position is misrepresented or ignored. SNGOs also feel that 
NNGOs' public fund raising campaigns use images of the 'South', which are 
stereotypical and degrading 
'pornography of poverty' and 'appeal of helplessness' (Smillie 1997). 
This directly relates to the imbalance of power in the relationships and the direction of 
accountability for NGOs. The dilemma for NNGOs is that they are faced with several 
stakeholders, i.e. donors (both public and private), SNGOs, Southern Governments, 
and the 'poorest of the poor'. For the majority ofNNGOs, who have chosen to scale 
up their operations and increase their dependence on donors, their accountability 
invariably relates to donor directives. 
Accountability 
The issue of accountability, therefore, raises questions not only concerning its 
meaning and influence on the workings of the organisation but also the direction of 
accountability and how this might affect the pattern of relationships already in place 
'a reciprocally accountable relationship' (Bebbington & Riddell, 1997: 107). 
Edwards and Hulme (1995) offer a definition of accountability, which includes a 
statement of goals, an appraisal process, transparency of decision-making and 
relationships, plus honest reporting of resources used and achievements. Nevertheless 
there is doubt about who sets the parameters. According to Najam (1996), the study of 
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NGOs' accountability is donor driven and many writers agree that the need to be 
accountable to donors exerts a great deal of influence on the functioning of NGOs 
(Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Edwards, 1994; Smillie, 1995; Najam, 1996). Therefore 
where the emphasis is on upward accountability rather than downward, the aspirations 
of members and beneficiaries take second place (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). 
In order to make better sense of the issue of accountability, several anthors have made 
further distinctions between the different forms it may take. Edwards and Hulme 
(1996 - using Avina's 1993 approach) distinguish between short-term functional 
accountability, where the emphasis is on resources, their use and immediate impact, 
and strategic accountability where NGOs' actions impact on the actions of other 
organisations and the wider environment. In contrast, Kumar & Hudock (1996) 
distinguish between process accountability, which relates to implementation and 
management, and programme accountability, which focuses on the effectiveness with 
which the objectives are achieved. They also posit that NGOs are faced with the task 
of achieving multiple accountability, depending on the number of their stakeholders. 
Each of the approaches has its associated problems but, for Edwards & Hulme (1995), 
interpretative accountability, which involves measuring the impact of effectiveness, is 
particularly difficult in the area of empowerment. It has also been maintained that 
NGOs need to establish the direction of their accountability, for instance, whether this 
is towards their donors, their clients or themselves. Most evidence suggests it is high 
towards donors but low to partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters (Najam, 1996). 
The extra demands placed on NGOs to confonn to accountability procedures have 
affected them in different ways. Smillie (1995) argues that NGOs have responded to 
the opening of extra funding windows by being more compliant towards donor's 
wishes. Disquiet has been expressed that there is very little time available for a 
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reflective analysis of their perfonuance and the pursuit of innovative ideas (Edwards 
& Hulme, 1996). However there is some evidence to suggest that donor funding may 
strengthen some fonus of NGO accountability, as it has called for them to improve 
their reporting and monitoring systems (Bebbington & Riddell, 1997). 
From an SNGO viewpoint, as well as not being actively involved in accountability 
considerations, their transaction costs for concurring with the fiscal and legal 
accountability demands of donors, depend on the number of donors they rely on for 
support. Some NNGOs have attempted to standardise their reporting procedures and 
paperwork, so as to reduce the burden on SNGOs to confonu (Wallace, 1997). The 
issue of accountability for NGOs also affects their legitimacy status. Local legitimacy 
could be lost if the NGOs focus more on the appeasement of donors (Najam, 1996) 
and thus the idea of participation may merely be a sham. It can be seen therefore that 
although NGOs may strive to implement a bottom-up strategy, NGO 'speak' is biased 
towards the North not the South and towards donors more than NGOs (Tvedt, 1998). 
Despite the drive towards greater accountability, NGOs can, apparently, survive in 
spite of their perfonuance (Smillie, 1995) as they do not appear to be answerable all 
the time (Edwards, 1994) and in fact, the 'bottom line' for NGOs is frequently shifting 
(Fowler, 1995). Chambers (1995) argues that the promotion of accountability can be 
seen as part of a public relations exercise and as such the transparency of an NGO 
may be compromised. It may be labeled a 'self-deceiving' NGO, merely filtering the 
infonuation to be publicised. Dichter (1997) suggests that perhaps NGOs are best 
suited to unsustainable, non-subsidised work because the difficulty of measuring the 
results from institutional development and social intenuediation means that financial 
support may be curtailed. 
30 
It seems that what has been developed is a 'system' of measuring the perfonnance of 
NODs, but problems surround the evaluation of the perfonnance. Several authors 
have commented on the fact that NOO evaluation depends upon subjective judgement 
and interpretation but ignores spillover effects, non-tangibles and the longer-tenn 
implications (Biggs & Neame, 1995; Fowler, 1995; Uphoff, 1995). Fowler (1996) 
argues that NGD projects are only one of the factors that change the lives of the poor 
and that the non-project factors are more difficult to quantify-
'socio-economic divisions, power relationships, human motivation, individual and 
collective behaviour, cultural values and local organizational capacity' (Fowler 1996: 
59). 
He identifies two approaches to the assessment ofperfonnance - a scientific approach, 
based on systematic search for observable indicators with agreed baselines, which are 
then compared with other control groups, and an interpretative or contextual approach 
- focused on stakeholders' perception of the degree of success of the project. To gain 
benefit from both methods, Fowler (1996) proposes the use of 'Logical Framework 
Analysis and Objective Oriented Planning' with 'multiple stakeholder negotiation'. 
Stakeholders need to be carefully identified, particularly marginalized groups, in the 
hope that they could become empowered as a result of their engagement in the 
process. A number of authors suggest the use ofRRA (rapid rural appraisal) and PRA 
(participatory rural appraisal) are to be preferred (SmiIlie, 1995; Chambers, 1997). 
Understandably then one area of NOD activity, which has proved difficult to assess 
using accountability criteria, is advocacy and lobbying, but for some NODs this has 
become their chosen path. 
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Advocacy & Lobbying 
Essentially advocacy includes lobbying, campaigning and development education. 
According to Jordan & van Tuijl (1998), it is not necessary to distinguish between 
NGOs because the nature of their activities and their focus on the pursuit of more 
equal power relations, all come under the umbrella term, advocacy. They posit there 
are different forms of NGO relations involved in advocacy work and these can be 
related to accountability. A high level of accountability is associated with those 
campaigns, which are focused and close to the vulnerable groups. However, a low 
accountability level occurs where there are conflicting objectives or competition 
between the NGOs. 
An important landmark III NGO advocacy work occurred at the World Food 
Conference 1974, when for the first time NGOs became an active element in the 
official process (Van Rooy, 1997). As a result of the strategy used by the Canadian 
NGOs, the 'Rome model' was identified as the format to use in future - this was both a 
highly structured approach and involved inclusion into ministerial meetings and 
ensuring the public networking of important information. It was thought to have been 
, an important catalyst for advocacy work' (Van Rooy, 1997 :98) 
and the trend was established for NGOs to engage in more sophisticated and targeted 
work throughout the 1980s (Clark, 1992). At the 1992 Earth Summit (Rio), NGDOs 
felt they made their mark on the proceedings, although generally their success was 
restricted to 
'highly salient, low policy issues' (Van Rooy, 1997:104). 
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According to Wilkinson (1996), little success was gained from the NGO campaigns in 
Europe on the Uruguay Round because they lacked a unifying position, coupled with 
under resourced research and lobbying. 
Empowerment and Civil Society 
The development of a democratic society was a core issue in the New Policy Agenda 
(NPA), and NGOs have been acknowledged as a favoured player in the promotion of 
empowerment and the process of developing civil society in the South. According to 
Thomas (1992) empowerment means the process by which the poorest of the poor 
would take over the direct control oftheir lives. He disputes the idea of there being an 
NGO model for empowerment because he argues that each success could not be 
replicated. The term civil society is difficult to define (Bebbington & Ridden 1995; 
Williams 1996; Blair 1997). Whaites (1996) distinguishes between a Bayarian view of 
civil society, which labels all potential partner groups as 'civil society' organisations, 
and a de Tocquillian perspective, which lays emphasis on the need for groups to cut 
across identities in a heterogeneous enviromnent. Blair (1997) uses a wide definition 
to encompass all associated groups between the individual/family unit and the state, 
but a narrow one to cover only NGOs. Bebbington & Riddell (1995), following 
UNDP definition, include an SNGOs, which aim to represent the interests of a 
particular group. Fowler (1998) considers that for effective change, society needs a 
plurality of organisations, which would focus on what they do best, rather than a 
centralised govermnent, which could be inflexible and bureaucratic. 
The changes to civil society could be brought about either through reform of the 
system, with action focused on the 'enabling enviromnent', or be project based to 
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support specific groups (Blair, 1997). With this move from supply side to demand 
side development activities, Clark (1997) emphasises the need for NGOs to develop 
new skills and partnerships. He suggests that NGOs are a previously neglected but 
important 'vehicle ' for the development of civil society especially where the 
community representatives are weak and unorganised. Pearce (1993) prefers NGOs to 
be seen as 'facilitators' of the development process leading to the empowerment of the 
poor and the development of civil society, rather than agents of change. In addition, 
Vakil (1997) argues that the relationship between NGOs and civil society is a 
complex one and questions whether the NGOs' role is to curtail an authoritarian 
govermnent or to promote a social movement. Some donors have begun to by-pass 
NNGOs and direct funds straight to Southern NGOs. However an intermediary NGO 
could be justified on the grounds that it is inappropriate for Northern govermnents to 
strengthen 'civil society' in another country (Smillie, 1997). 
Despite the increased activity by NGOs in the development of civil society, their 
significance has been questioned (Roper-Renshaw, 1994). It is thought that the 
presence of NGOs is not necessarily indicative of a strong civil society or that the 
funding of NGOs necessarily strengthens civil society. It can be argued that the 
funding ofNGOs can lead to them becoming more accountable to donors, or it may 
favour the growth of powerful NGOs and the elimination of small ones (Bebbington 
and Riddell, 1995). Essentially there is a need for NGOs to engage in work that 
empowers the relatively weak/unorganised sectors, while also transferring skills and 
eventually decision-making powers (K-Njenga, 1996). 
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Discussion of civil society invariably includes some reference to capacity building and 
institutional development. According to James (1994) capacity building involves the 
intervention by an external body intent on improving the ability of an organization to 
achieve its objectives and sustainability, whereas, according to Sahley (1995) 
institutional development which refers to 'changes in the social structure of society'. 
Strategies, which increase their absorptive capacity and enable them to enhance their 
participation in the development process, contribute to the institutional development 
of the NGO sector. Furthermore, Sahley (1995) posits that the need to improve the 
capacity of indigenous NGOs is especially important in the light of their recent rapid 
increase in numbers and their high failure rate. Donors expect programme benefits to 
be sustainable but also, where the focus is on enterprise development, the service 
delivery mechanism itself is expected to be financially self-sustaining. Sahley (1995) 
identifies the need for a change in the approach taken by NNGOs from a directive to a 
facilitative one, which would promote the capacity building and institutional 
development of indigenous NGOs. However NNGOs may see this changing role with 
its intangible results as incompatible with the requirement to be accountable to donor 
organisations and the public. 
Institutional development attempts to encourage the inclusion of the NGO sector in 
socio-economic and political development. To achieve this Sahley (1995) speculates 
that strategies formulated by NNGOs and donors must focus on three levels of 
support: at NGO level NNGOs should be flexible towards funding and administrative 
requirements, while increasing the transparency of their own organization; at meso-
level, they need to promote and support South-South information networks; and at 
macro-level, they ought to work with Southern governments on policies and set up a 
dialogue with the indigenous NGO sector. To enhance capacity building for SNGOs, 
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NNGOs need to avoid imposing change on SNGOs and using the withdrawal of 
financial support as a threat (Sahley, 1995). 
Thus far the review has concentrated on the NGO group as a whole although in some 
sections a distinction has been made between NNGOs and SNGOs. It has also 
emphasised the extent to which NGOs (NNGOs) have been dominated by donor 
policy and procedures. At this point attention will be turned towards the relations 
between NNGOs and other organisations i.e. (synonymous) NNGOs, SNGOs and 
Southern Governments. Much use has been made of the term 'partner' to describe 
these relations. Discussion will, therefore, focus on the idea of partnership before 
moving on to discuss the situation vis a vis other organisations in the development 
field. 
Partnership 
Relationships between the various organisations in the development process are the 
result of accepted development philosophy and the current international policy 
framework. It has been suggested the Northern and Southern NGOs have different 
perspectives of the development process and different concepts of participation 
(Padron, 1987), and that the use of language and terminology of agreements is biased 
towards the North (Smillie, 1995). 
Over time there has been a change in the approach taken to development, from 
working for which involves the transference of financial and human resources from 
the North to the South, to working together, with its focus on the 'exchange of 
cultures and experiences' (Martella and Schunk, 1997). This has been accompanied 
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by a need to review the meaning of the partnership used to describe relations between 
northern and southern organisations. In the 1970s, the term was used to express the 
idea of international solidarity in the development process. By the 1980s, new 
ideological influences and funding practices provided an opportunity for a new 
relationship between the North and the South. According to Fowler (1998) the 
challenge did not emit the same response from all NGOs and he suggests that the 
response by an NGO is the result of their position on the progressive - conservative 
continuum. The new approach includes such methods as progranune funding as 
opposed to project funding, an increased move towards decentralisation, and 
delegation to local partners (Fowler & James, 1994). 
Fowler (1998) suggests that partnership can take place on two levels; one at individual 
NGO worker level and the other at NGO organisation level. While individuals might 
appear to function as partners, there is often greater friction at NGO level and he 
suggests that although responsibilities can be shared in a partnership, authority seldom 
can. For the most part, therefore, it is generally accepted that the relationship between 
the North and the South is unequal, with a bias favouring the North (Fowler, 1991). In 
order to avoid the dominance-exploitation situation, Nyoni (1987) contends that the 
relationship between indigenous NGOs and the international NGOs needs to be based 
on trust and partnership. Thus Fowler (1991) points out that partnership involves 
sharing, a sense of mutuality and equality such that each partner is considered to be of 
equal value. To progress towards a partnership, he further postulates that several 
conditions need to be met. There needs to be a mutual understanding of the 'product', 
which relates to the outcome and the processes involved in achieving that outcome. 
There also needs to be trust between the parties, which requires transparency from 
both parties. Legitimacy is a further requirement, which would be derived from the 
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results achieved for the beneficiaries by the NGOs. Where Northern NGOs are not 
directly operating in the South, they are dependent on their partners for legitimacy. 
Legitimacy can, therefore, be seen as the significant factor that adds weight to the 
Southern NGOs' attempt to redress the imbalance of power in the relationship. 
Despite the fact that current funding trends are seen to be pushing relations towards 
those based on contracts rather than mutual understanding, Fowler (1998) stresses the 
desirability of pursuing authentic partnerships for both political and economic 
reasons. He argues that, contributions are made to the quality of social capital, (i.e. the 
self-willed webs, which bond individuals, groups, communities, societies and other 
fonns of human association) and this in turn, promotes the level of civic strength (i.e. 
citizens ability to engage on more than equal terms with state and market institutions). 
This should promote democracy and socially acceptable development. Economically, 
a relationship based on trust is thought to be more cost-effective, due to the ability of 
the parties to co-ordinate their actions. The use of contractors alters the relationship 
between NGOs and poor people, and is thought to work against the promotion of 
empowerment and the sustainabilityofbenefits. Fowler (1998) therefore contends that 
donors are pushing for a business approach favouring the use of contracts with NGOs 
and retaining their role as financial intermediaries. A more radical role, which he is 
less certain NGOs are willing to take, would be that of facilitators of international co-
operation, allowing indigenous groups to be responsible for their own development. 
Any decision concerning the fonnation of a partnership needs to be clear on why it is 
needed, what organisational adaptations are possible, what is on offer and what is not 
negotiable. The understanding and use of the term 'partnership' is very much the 
product of past experience and even future aspirations, and thus necessitates the need 
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to review the meaning and implications of 'partnership' from both a northern and a 
southern viewpoint. 
NNGOs 
Throughout their history NNGOs have sought partners to be the link between their 
volunteers from the North and the local people in the South. Martella and Schunk 
(1997) identifY three alternative approaches taken by NNGOs in their choice of 
partner. Initially, in the 1960s, churches were the favoured partners due to their strong 
presence in local areas, but the religious criteria affected the number of projects and 
the number of volunteers. Later, in the 1970s, the increasing independence ofNGOs 
instigated the move towards partnership with public institutions, in order to ensure 
sustainability of programmes beyond the end of official aid receipts. Unfortunately, a 
lack of contact with local people resulted in programmes suffering from a lack of 
response to changing social and political events. Thirdly, NGOs in the 1980s 
redirected their efforts towards creating representative local organisations and so 
aided the emergence of a small but dynamic civil society. Not all local organisations 
are seen to be beneficial to development. Some have been criticised as being 
unreliable and run by unscrupulous opportunists, while others show organisational 
weakness and capacity limitations, and place insufficient emphasis on self-criticism 
and reflections on past practices as a basis for learning (Fowler & Jarnes, 1994). 
According to Martella and Schunk (1997), for a development programme to have a 
good chance of success it needs to be planned with a local reliable, authoritative and 
representative partner. Being a member of a heterogeneous group, each NNGO is 
concerned to retain its individual identity, particularly when entering into negotiation 
for a partner. Fowler (1991) posits that NNGOs may seek a 'natural' partner - a 
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mirror image of itself - in an effort to ensure an efficient and productive relationship, 
which will come as a result of a mutual, better understanding. A consequence of this 
approach may be the development of natural territorialism, which may stifle the 
development initiatives, or instances of several similarly focused NGOs competitively 
funding a limited number of SNGOs. The existence of SNGOs, that appear to be 
similar to NNGOs, provides a rationale and legitimacy for NNGOs' involvement in 
development. This may give rise to NNGOs forcing onto their chosen southern 
partner the image, which the NNGO wants to attain, although it might not meet the 
desired criteria itself. Thus SNGOs need to have a strong identity themselves, when 
they enter into partnership negotiations with NNGOs. Partnerships between NNGOs 
and SNGOs do not follow a set pattern. Fowler (1995) has identified three distinct 
types of strategies used by NNGOs towards their Southern partners, namely 
deconcentration where responsibility moves to them but authority does not; 
delegation where both move downwards, and devolution where responsibility and 
authority are transferred to a semi-autonomous organisation. 
SNGOs 
The view that SNGOs have of the 'partnership' relationship is one grounded in the 
history of being the recipient of funds from the North. This imbalance of power, they 
argue, has often led to more time spent in dealing with reports and evaluation 
exercises for the North, than on concentrating on real work (SmiIIie, 1995). SNGOs 
view the relationship as a paternalistic one with unclear priorities, subject to delays in 
decision-making and funding, and a refusal to consider overheads or income-earning 
investments (SmiIIie, 1995). According to Fowler (1998) SNGOs criticise NNGOs for 
operating double standards. They expect transparency from SNGOs, but do not 
40 
present it themselves, they pay little respect to local knowledge, and they do not see 
local partners as equals. SNGOs are unhappy with the change in emphasis of the 
function of NGOs from support for GROs and institutional development, to service 
delivery and contracting (Arellano-Lopez & Petras, 1994). In addition, Nyoni (1987) 
contends that NNGOs are seen as a threat to local initiatives and self-reliance. They 
are more concerned with 'success stories, which could result in the poor confonning 
to the images presented of them by the North. In contrast, Smillie (1995) suggests that 
NNGOs and SNGOs operating in the field of human rights have better relations 
because their focus is not on money or accountability. 
For SNGOs, there are essentially three types of partnership open to them: the receiver 
of funds from the North; an intermediary between the funder and the poor; or an equal 
partner in the development co-operation process (Padron, 1987). SNGOs can provide 
legitimacy for NNGO operations, but the significance ofthe role played by SNGOs in 
development can vary. Moseley-Williams (1994: 50) argues that in Brazil and 
Zimbabwe, SNGOs are viewed as 'important development actors', being both 
courageous and visionary. However, other examples from Africa and Latin America 
suggest that there are 'capital-city havens of sheltered employment for bureaucrats 
retrenched by political change or structural adjustment', which result in a weakening 
ofthe public sector and thus a decline in public services. 
The increasing emphasis on the role of SNGOs in development work has also shown 
up some of their deficiencies. It can be argued that SNGOs are secretive and opaque, 
and succumb to the attraction of the extra funding opportunities, rather than focusing 
on local philanthropic work (Smillie, 1995). This has resulted in a failure to 'do' 
development (Moseley-Williams, 1994). Many SNGOs have shown a lack of 
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professionalism, as a result of their organisational background and capacity problems. 
These problems are compounded by the need to be accountable to several 
stakeholders. Direct donor funding of operations in the South is a contentious issue, 
which has implications for SNGOs, NNGOs and Southern Governments. According 
to Fowler and James (1994), in the late 1980s the crucial role, which SNGOs could 
play in the process of democratisation, achieved recognition with the introduction of 
direct donor funding. But this threw up a number of problems, for example hostility 
from Southern Government and the increasing pressure brought to bear on SNGOs to 
conform to donor criteria. Fowler and James (1994) argued that the close relationship 
with donors compromised the ability ofSNGOs to accomplish poverty alleviation and 
democratic reform. Blair (1997) reports that there is only a rudimentary framework in 
place for exploring the likely consequences of donors promoting development through 
SNGOs or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). As CSOs' primary purpose is to 
influence public policy, the donor's role should be to build and strengthen CSOs, and 
allow them to pursue their own path. 
Southern Governments 
While it might seem inappropriate to consider Southem Governments under the 
heading of partnerships, the extent to which there is a relationship between the two 
should not be undervalued and misjudged. Attention should be paid to both the trends 
in relations and the significance of those relations in the wider context of matters. 
According to Bratton (1989), NGOs and (African) Govemments have found 
themselves in a new, close relationship, which offers the potential for conflict or co-
operation to achieve sustainable development. Edwards & Hulme (1992) argue that 
the potential for conflict or co-operation depends on the type of political regime and 
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the type of NGO activity. Southern Governments are more likely to show hostility 
towards those engaged in empowerment and the promotion of civil society. Archer 
(1994) argues that the NPA opened another way f~rward for relations between 
international NGOs and Southern Governments. Essentially this is one of working 
within government structures usually with line ministries in order to help build 
capacity, foster more appropriate policies and encourage effective implementation in 
the field. The objective is not to replace the state, but to influence the direction of 
policy, or to support existing policy. According to Archer (1994), a strong and 
effective government is considered to be a pre-requisite for the successful 
implementation of the NP A - an enabling state. Furthermore the greater stress on 
transparency and accountability should enlarge the options open to indigenous NGOs 
for dealings with government. However the NP A has allowed different interpretations 
of 'power' for the three main players, and thus poses a dilemma for NGOs of whether 
to strengthen capacity to provide services or regulate them. This may make them 
willing partners where donors attempt to replace the state, but may also lead to a 
variation in quality and coverage of services by the plethera of service providers. 
To develop constructive relationships with Southern governments and promote 'good 
government', Edwards (1994) advocates a model used by SCF-UK, which includes 
both working with government from above (technical and material support for line 
ministries) and working with government from below (grassroots pressure). 
Variations of this two-pronged approach can be used according to the level of 
development of the indigenous 'third sector'. While grassroots pressure is seen as an 
essential component of civil society, a government, which is genuinely committed to 
reform, supportive of dialogue with actors in civil society, and in control of the basic 
minimuim of revenue for state expenditure, is easier to work with (Edwards, 1994). 
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In most post-colonial African states, the number ofNGOs has substantially increased 
(Bratton, 1989; Fowler, 1991). The political tension between the NGOs and the 
Govennnent has been a result of the centralized concentration of power, the 
competition for donor funds, and the poor image African Govennnents have ofNGOs 
' ... diverse and fragmented; ... contribute to haphazard patterns of rural development.' 
'unguided missiles, whose activities do not necessarily contribute to the objectives of 
the national development plan. , (Bratton, 1989:578) 
From the above review of the literature, it can be seen that the changing NGO 
environment nurtured the development of their role (Elliott, 1987; Korten, 1987; 
Smillie, 1997), as the mounting critical opinion of state (top-down) intervention 
tumed attention to focus on bottom-up, inclusive, participatory strategies favoured by 
NGOs to promote sustainable development (Fowler & James, 1994; Pratt & Stone, 
1994). Govennnents, therefore, began to include NGOs in their development policy 
(Huhne & Edwards, 1997). Existing NGOs responded by scaling-up their operations 
but the proliferation of new NGOs increased the heterogeneity of the group (Tvedt, 
1998). Thus the augmented 'official' funding opportunities positively attracted NGOs, 
and, as other sources dried up, they had to decide to what extent they would respond 
to the pressures of changes taking place in the donors' environment. Over time a 
larger number of NGOs were seeking funds from a diminishing, but increasingly 
conditional, financial source (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Concurrently the emergence 
of the indigenous NGO movement in the South caused an identity crisis for northern 
NGOs and forced them to re-examine their rationale, mission and future path (Fowler, 
1998). Their relative position was further undermined by the changing donor 
arrangement of aid provision, which was shifting towards direct engagement with 
SNGOs. 
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The importance of donorlNGO relations has been identified but it has been found that 
not enough research has been undertaken, in detail and over time, on their relations. 
Therefore the focus of this research is to examine the changing relations between the 
European Community and European NGDOs, and to pursue this line of research by 
focusing on OK NGDOs and their work in SADC(C). In keeping with this focus, a 
number of pertinent ideas can be extracted from the literature review. Overtime there 
has been a shift in the contemporary economic/political climate, which resulted in a 
change in development policy from an emphasis on the role of the state to a focus on 
the market. This raises a number of issues namely: the extent to which donor's 
objectives have changed over time; the relationship between the donor's foreign 
policy and development policy; the incorporation of the market focus into their 
development co-operation policy; the extent, level and direction of accountability 
brought into their policies by donors. For NGOs these issues are particularly 
significant as they impact on their internal organization and role in development 
activities. Thus questions are raised about their ability to retain their integrity (Van der 
Heijden, 1987). 
Discussion has also centred on the idea of 'partnership' and the extent to which it is 
applicable to donorlNGO relations, as well as the evolution of the relationship over 
time in the light of the changes in development theory and policy. These issues will be 
examined in subsequent chapters as they relate to the European Community, NGOs 
and the SADC(C) region. 
The documentary sources used as a basis for the subsequent chapters of this research 
include those obtained from the European Commission and the Liaison Committee of 
the European Non-Governmental Organisations (CLONG), either directly or through 
use of their web sites. It proved difficult to obtain all requested/desired documents 
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partly because the central archives were incomplete but also the internal reshuffling at 
the Commission impeded the flow of communications with the general public and the 
presentation of information. The documentation issued by the EC/Commission has 
been included under different headings in the bibliography in accordance with their 
apparent source. The documentation from the Liaison Committee of European NGOs 
is listed under CLONG, as it is usually known by its french name. 
The data relating to the UK NGDO projects cofinanced by the European Commission, 
used as a basis for the examination of European Community policy in practice, are 
available in the annual reports ofthe B7 -6000 budget line. These reports are published 
in retrospect, but have latterly become subject to increasing delay due to the 
bureaucratic problems and changes experienced by the Commission. During the early 
years, the report included the financial tables. However from 1993 onwards, as the 
number of cofinanced projects increased, these tables have only been available in 
response to a specific request to the Commission, and are only published in French. 
Although some raw data (not tabulated according to recipient country) has been 
obtained for 1997 and 1998, it does not include information on the use of block grant 
allocations to projects for those years and therefore the period under analysis will 
extend from 1980 to 1996 (inclusive). The most recent changes at the Commission not 
only disrupted the process of assimilation of information but also introduced new 
procedures concerning the accountability of the Commission to the European public. 
Unfortunately, it appears that, while the degree of transparency to the public has 
increased - in the form of the Annual Report of the European Commission's External 
Assistance-, the detailed information, formerly available on the allocation of funds to 
individual NGDOs and countries, is no longer easily available to the general pUblic. 
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Chapter 3: The European Community's Development 
Co-operation Policy and European NGOs 
This chapter aims to provide an historical review of the Development Co-operation 
policy of the European Community, and the changing role of NGOs within that 
policy. The EC policy initially focused on the ACP group but subsequently extended 
financial aid to other regions of the W orId. However this chapter will concentrate on 
the information relevant to the ACP group, with which the SADC(C) region has been 
most associated. An attempt wi1l be made to evaluate the policy in the light of the 
changes in the contemporary discourse on development, which have been identified in 
the literature review. Attention will then turn to identify and critically examine the 
role ofNGOs, and in particular development NGOs (NGDOs), within the framework 
of EC Development Co-operation policy, before finally focusing on the specific 
budget line for co-financing ofNGDO operations in developing countries - B7-6000, 
which is central to the line of enquiry of this thesis. 
The objectives of this chapter are therefore to: 
i) review the changes in European Community'S Development Co-operation Policy, 
ii) identify the significance ofNGOs within the context of the policy over time, and 
iii) investigate in more detail the B7-6000 budget line available to NGDOs with 
reference to the co-financing of development activities in developing countries 
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EC Development Co-operation Policy 
Development co-operation had no legal status until the Treaty of the European Union 
(Maastricht) 1992 (Hewitt, 1994; Box & Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Usherwood, 
1998). Prior to that time, an association agreement (Art. 131, Treaty of Rome) 
enabled the countries and territories of Africa to receive trade and aid benefits from 
the European Community (Grilli, 1993; OECD, 1996). This approach had been 
promoted by France, who wished to continue commercial relations with its former 
colonies, while sharing any cost with Community members. Discussions between the 
Community members at this time brought to the surface the division between the 
regionalists and the globalists. The former group (France, Belgium, Italy) wished to 
focus development cooperation on those countries with historical links with the 
Community, whereas the globalists (Germany, the Netherlands) preferred a more 
general spread of aid (Grilli, 1993; Box & Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997). Over time the 
shifting balance of power between the two sides has influenced the direction of the 
Community'S aid flows and policy approach, with the upper hand being gained 
according to the relative influence of international organisations and the development 
discourse on the one hand, and specific European Community political and strategic 
decisions on the other. While the regionalist gained the upper hand in the early years, 
the globalists began to exert some, albeit small, influence in the late 1970s (Grilli, 
1993; David, 2000). 
To finance the economic development of the associated territories, the European 
Development Fund (1958) was set up, financed from Member States' budgets and 
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aimed initially at the provision of capital investment projects (Grilli, 1993). With the 
decolonisation of Africa, a change in the association agreement was required 
'freely negotiated agreement among independent states' (Grilli, 1993:20), 
which in turn produced a fonnal institutional structure to reflect the position of 
equality between the Community and the associates. The 'Association' model 
provided a framework for co-operation between equals in a politically neutral 
partnership and was welcomed as a model for North-South relations (Grilli, 1993; 
Arts & Byron, 1997; Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Lister, 1997; David, 2000; Karl, 
2000). Consequently the Yaounde Conventions (I & II) encompassed trade and aid 
relations with the Associated African and Malagasy States, underlining the regional 
approach of Community policy. The Paris Summit (1972) and the accession of the 
UK (1973) further reinforced the position of the regionalists and led to the 
establishment of Lome I, to embrace relations between the Community and the newly 
identified African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group (Grilli, 1993; Usherwood, 
1998). 
In keeping with the industrialisation approach to development, Lome I (1976-1980) 
and Lome II (1980-1985) incorporated the promotion of economic, social and 
industrial development to be achieved through the funding of physical infrastructure, 
industrial production and agricultural programmes. However the perceived failure of 
these two agreements to address the root causes of underdevelopment, led to a change 
in approach (Marantis, 1994). The Pisani Memorandum (1982) had called for a focus 
on the promotion of rural development and support for human resources, with the use 
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of policy dialogue to determine the development path to follow, but did not spell out 
the priorities or methods of implementation (Marantis, 1994; Usherwood, 1998). 
Under Lome III (1986 - 1991), the Community attempted to ensure that the 
development programmes were better integrated into society and so would promote 
self-perpetuating growth (Cox & Koning, 1997). Consequently the focus was put on 
the use of broad integrated rural development programmes to tackle rural poverty, 
with an emphasis on self-reliance, self-sufficiency and food security. Lome III laid 
stress on an awareness of' economic, cultural and social rights' (David, 2000: 12) and 
the need for the full participation of development actors to achieve results (Grilli, 
1993; Marantis, 1994; Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997; Usherwood, 1997; David, 2000). 
Throughout this early period, political and economic neutrality and joint management 
were identified as the key characteristics of the Community model of direct aid (Arts 
& Byron, 1997; David, 2000). However, while Community aid was less political than 
bilateral aid, the Community policies were the result of decisions of the Council of 
Ministers, who represented Member states and their policies. The introduction of 
country aid programmes under Lome I by the Community, presented an opportunity 
to introduce Community development goals into the country strategy, and to ensure 
compatibility with Community sector priorities, e.g. CAP (Grilli, 1993). The 
Commission was thus exerting a covert political influence over the ACPs under Lome 
I and 11 (Rajana, 1982; Grilli, 1993; Crawford, 1996; Lister, 1997). With the formal 
policy dialogue in place (Lome III) the Commission became more assertive in its 
approach and the balance of power between the two 'partners' shifted (Grilli, 1993; 
Crawford, 1996; Arts & Byron, 1997). During the 1980s changes in development 
philosophies, and concern about the legitimacy of development co-operation and the 
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effectiveness of aid flows, had led to a need to reassess development co-operation 
(Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; David, 2000). The World Bank had changed its approach 
from one founded on basic needs to one of Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), but 
for most of the 1980s the Community chose not to follow this lead (Burnell, 1997). 
Essentially this was partly because the Lome agreement did not allow the imposition 
of conditionality, but also due to the division of opinion within the Community 
between those in favour of a NeoliberallMonetarist approach (Belgium, Germany, 
UK) and those preferring a Socialist approach (France, Greece, Italy) (Grilli, 1993). A 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) had been established in 1987 and applied to 
highly indebted African nations, but it did not discriminate on the basis of their 
performance (Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997). 
In the early 1990s a number of factors combined to cause a significant change in the 
Community's approach to development co-operation, especially in relation to the 
ACP group. The level and direction of EC aid became increasingly influenced by 
world events, such as the opening up of Eastern Europe and aid fatigue, as well as the 
need to rationalise external spending (Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Kar1, 2000). The 
poor economic performance of ACPs had led to the conviction that conditions in the 
ACPs were responsible and this was consequently reflected in the introduction of 
overt political (and economic) conditionality, including sanctions and incentives, to 
the dismay ofthe ACPs (Crawford, 1996; Cox, Healey, & Koning, 1997; Kou1aimah-
Gabriel, 1997; Karl, 2000). This was not in keeping with the original 'partnership' 
whereby ACPs could determine their own policy options (Crawford, 1996). Thus 
Lome IV (1990 - 2000) represented an undisguised move away from the original 
principles of partnership and equality to one dominated by the ideology and priorities 
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of the Community. It contained explicit economic and political conditionality, with 
financial assistance related to the adoption of SAPs and 
'respect for and the promotion of all human rights' (Crawford, 1996: 505) 
(Crawford, 1996; Lister, 1997; David, 2000). At this stage the European Community 
was promoting a democratic, market-based model to address the problems of the 
ACPs and advance the drive towards sustainable growth, with the development of the 
private sector and the diversification of the ACP economies, while laying the 
foundations for a move towards regional integration (David, 2000). Rather than 
embrace wholeheartedly the World Bank model for structural assistance, the 
Community elected to tailor its support to individual country needs and ensure the 
inclusion of a social dimension (Courier, 1993b). Consequently Lome IV (1990 -
2000) indicated a widening of the EC's agenda by incorporating a number of 
important issues, such as gender awareness, popUlation concerns and participation, as 
well as environmental protection and sustainability (Riddell, 1992; Courier, 1996; 
European Council, 1999; Desesquelles, 2000). Marantais (1994) suggested it had 
added a human face to structural adjustment. 
Throughout the period between the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of the European 
Union (1992) the Development Co-operation Policy of the European Community had 
grown in an ad hoc way, and was subsequently criticised for being an extensive 
collection of discrete instruments, procedures and principles, with too many vague 
objectives and lacking strategy and focus (OECD, 1996; Box & Koulaimah-Gabriel, 
1997; Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; COM (2000) 212). The proliferation of instruments 
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and the overall lack of coherence were caused by both the internal management of the 
Community Development Co-operation and changing external conditions. The TEV 
attempted to address these criticisms by giving it a legal basis and setting out its 
objectives: 
• 'Sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries 
and more particularly the most disadvantaged 
• Smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into the world 
economy 
• Campaign against poverty in the developing countries TEC Art 130 u I 
• Political: consolidation of democracy in the developing countries within a 
framework of political stability TEC Art l30u 2 
• Consistency with other international organisation's objectives e.g. UN, World 
Bank TEC Art l30u 3' 
(OECD, 1996: 12; Vsherwood, 1998: 216). 
It incorporated social, political and economic elements, but for the first time included 
a reference to the commitment of the European Community to ensure its policy was 
consistent with that of other international organisations. This implied an adherence to 
the policy progression of the Bretton Woods Institutes, and the agreements reached by 
UN International Conferences. A potential source of conflict here was the fact that the 
BWI were the main promoters of Neoliberal reforms, but the EC and the Member 
States were not unanimously agreed on that approach. In fact the Maastricht Treaty 
identified a source of inconsistency between its desire to promote a model of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication, while conforming to the lead 
exerted by the BWI. In addition it had been acknowledged that the Community and 
the Member States together made a significant contribution to total aid flows but the 
overall performance could be improved. A subsequent Commission Communication 
(SEC (92) 915) identified the need to achieve complementarity, co-ordination and 
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coherence between the policies pursued by the Community and Member States, and 
between development co-operation and other Community policies e.g. CAP. The 
TEU set in motion the move towards the framing of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, with the possible inclusion of development co-operation (Hewitt, 1994). 
The Mid Term Review (MTR) of Lome was originally not seen as auguring in any 
fundamental change to the Lome package but was to be merely a review of operations 
to date and affirmation of a new financial protocol. However, the MTR (1995) was 
later identified as a turning point in Community policy, with the explicit inclusion of 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as essential elements of the 
Convention, with violation triggering a suspension clause (Crawford, 1996; Lister, 
1997). According to the Evaluation Report (ICENDPPC, 1999), the European 
Community has played a significant role in the pursuit of democracy and human 
rights in all regions, since that time. The MTR also aligned Lome objectives with the 
Community'S Development Co-operation Policy, which in turn was to be formally 
linked with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Box & Koumaihal-Gabriel, 
1997; David, 2000). This caused concern to be expressed by the ACPs and NGOs 
about the possible impact of this linkage on the future of development co-operation 
(CLONG,1997c). 
The MTR had extended the level of influence and control by the Community over the 
ACP's development programme and presaged a period of consultation and discussion 
as to the future of EU-ACP relations (Crawford, 1996; Arts & Byron, 1997; Raffer, 
1998). The Lome 'partnership' had become 'paternalistic' and 'clientelistic' (Arts & 
Byron, 1997: 76) and had moved on from a relationship based on contractuality and 
54 
partnership to one of conditionality and increased donor power (Raffer, 1998). While 
the Commission appeared to favour a fundamental revision of the partnership 
'the importance that the EU attaches to the co-operation and regional integration 
process for economic as well as political reasons will also influence the shape of the 
new accord' (Conrier, 1997b: 12). 
there were some ACPs who sought to preserve their position vis-a-vis the Community 
(Arts & Byron, 1997). At this point the Community found itself in a position that 
necessitated not only a review of the ethos and detail of its 'partnership' agreement 
with the ACP countries but also, in the light of growing criticisms, a reformulation 
and refocusing of the Community'S aid procedures and instruments. However it was 
proving difficult to formulate a Common Foreign policy, due to the tensions within 
the Community. According to Arts and Byron (1997), on the one hand there was a 
trend towards a global development co-operation policy managed multilaterally 
through the administrative structure of the EU, which would require the EDF to come 
under the EU budget. But this was in conflict with the desire for individual Member 
States to continue to be bilaterally in control of their development co-operation, on the 
grounds oftheir historical links. 
In May 1995 the Council launched an evaluation process in order to improve the 
effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and visibility of the Community'S development 
co-operation policy. The results indicated that there were essentially two main issues, 
namely: Community aid was too complex and fragmented, and, human 
resource/management issues in the Commission needed to be addressed. Each of these 
will be dealt with in turn in subsequent sections, although it is appreciated that the 
administrative issues in the Commission impacted on the development of policy. 
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In the run up to the twenty-first Century, therefore, the Community found itself faced 
with concurrently negotiating a new 'partnership' with the ACPs and attempting to 
establish a more coherent and co-ordinated Development Co-operation policy. It has 
already been established that the 'partnership' between the ACPs and the Community 
was in the process of refonnulation and this received further support from the results 
of the independent evaluations (European Council, 1999). It was recommended that 
the partnership should incorporate an increased responsibility on the part of the 
recipient country 
'partner countries' ownership to be furthered. This relationship needs to be based on 
reciprocal responsibilities' (European Council, 1999: 4) 
and a widening of the levels of participation in the relationship 
'partnership should also be opened up to civil society' (European Council, 1999: 4). 
Nevertheless while the move would increase the role played by the recipient country, 
the elements of donor conditionality were becoming evident, 
'allocations of funds will increasingly take into account objective perfonnance 
criteria as well as needs criteria. But it is to be acknowledged that (the) EU's political 
considerations will also be taken into account' (European Council, 1999: 4). 
In order to generate consultation with those interested in the future of the ACP-EU 
partnership, the Commission issued a Green Paper (1997), entitled 'challenges and 
options for the new partnership'. The Commission hoped that the experience of the 
past 40 years could be used to establish an enlightened replacement for Lome, and 
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thus improve the effectiveness of EC aid (European Commission, 1997; Gomes, 
2000). 
As a result of the consultation process the Commission published guidelines for the 
negotiations, which were to form the basis for the new partnership: 
'strong political dimension; poverty alleviation to be the cornerstone; regionalisation; 
recipient country responsibility; and ACP unity' (CEC, 1997: 3 - 5). 
It was thought that the poor performance of Community aid provisions was not solely 
the fault 0 f the donor 
'The recipient country's institutional environment, and economic and social policy 
have often been a major constraint on the effectiveness of Community co-operation' 
(CEC,1997:7). 
Thus the political situation, the intensity and frequency of civil conflict and the role of 
the state in the recipient countries were considered to be to a certain extent 
responsible for the policy results, and therefore the way forward was to ensure that all 
levels of the population were engaged in the process rather than simply taking a state-
to- state approach (European Commission, 1997a and 1997b; David, 2000). The 
'partnership' now had a clear political dimension, and, according to the Commission, 
should therefore be part of foreign relations under a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (European Commission, 1997a and 1997b). 
The Cotonou agreement (2000: 20 year period) sought to combine development, 
politics and trade, and, by emphasising an integrated approach to poverty reduction, 
incorporated economic, social, and regional co-operation aspects (Azor-Charles, 
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2000; European Commission, 2000a; Karl, 2000). The agreement reflected the 
contemporary view that the drive to alleviate poverty should be underpinned by a 
growth model based on the development of competitiveness and employment in the 
ACPs (Gomes, 2000). Attempts to incorporate the issue of good governance into the 
agreement were met with ACP opposition and eventually it was included but with less 
importance attached to it 
'fundamental element not an essential element' (Morrissey, 2000: 5). 
This move has been met with criticism concerning the shift in the partnership from 
political neutrality to political interference (ECDPM, 2000). The agreement also 
called for a stronger open dialogue between the EU and the ACPs, with the latter 
gaining 'ownership' of their development process (Gomes, 2000; Karl, 2000). The 
emphasis on participation has ensured a place for NGDOs in the development 
process, in addition to the new role they have been assigned in the field of conflict 
prevention and resolution (Azor-Charles, 2000; DesesqueIIes, 2000; KarI, 2000; 
Kinnock, 2000). 
For the first time the agreement included both incentive and coercive clauses in an 
effort to 'guide' the response of the recipient countries. This reflected the 
Community's view that the old style agreement was problematic 
'the principle of partnership has lost its subsistence and been only partly put into 
practice' 
'partnership is limited to day-to-day resource management' (European Commission, 
1997a: VII) 
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and therefore constrained the overall effectiveness of Community policy. The 
Commission was seen to dominate the negotiations 
'partners must agree terms for a new and inherently political contract' (European 
Commission, 1997c: 9). 
By comparison the ACPs were ill-prepared, relied on the Commission for statistical 
data, and thereby took a reactive stance rather than presenting a positive negotiating 
agenda (Lister, 1997). Previous Lome Conventions had treated the ACPs as an 
homogeneous group, but an element of differentiation was included in the new 
agreement. This was partly based on the premise that the development prospects of 
the individual countries could be enhanced if they were members of a regional co-
operation group (European Commission, 1997c). However the Community was also 
aware that the EU-ACP agreement (Lome) was incompatible with the regulations of 
the WTO and therefore required some modification. But in an environment 
increasingly dominated by the global triad, the ACPs were unwilling for the group to 
be fragmented. In the end a compromise was reached with an overall agreement to be 
supported by regional economic partnership agreements (REP As). 
Despite being lauded as a new model for North-South co-operation, the Lome model 
was not used as a general template for the development cooperation policy of the 
Community. Lome Conventions suffered from bureaucratic problems, a decline in 
real value, a consequential lack of significant impact on the development of recipient 
countries and an erosion of the idea of partnership between the two actors (Grilli, 
1993; Arts & Byron, 1997). The 'partnership' concept under Lome had changed from 
a legal contract founded on historical/geographical links to one conditional upon 
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economic and political criteria with a security focus (ICEAlDPPC, 1999). At the same 
time there had been a move to increase the positive input from ACP countries with the 
promotion of policy dialogue and emphasis on their commitment 
'basic condition for an effective partnership is seen as a common view on policy, 
with full responsibility being taken by the recipient partner' (Cox & Healey, 2000: 
123). 
According to David (2000) the new agreement shifted the focus of the (old) ACP-EU 
economic/commercial partnership to address two principle contemporary issues: the 
political environment of development and the impact of globalisation on the ACPs. 
The European Community published its Development Policy (2000) in response to 
the request of the Helsinki Council (1999) for a 
'comprehensive, long-term, sustainable development strategy dovetailing economic, 
social and environmental policies' (COM (2000) 212: 6) 
and to criticism that there was a 'lack of an overall Community strategy ... (and) the 
objectives ... are too numerous, too vague and not ranked in any way' (COM (2000) 
212: 5) 
According to Lister (1997), the slow dispersal of funds, the inadequacies of the 
evaluation process, and the lack of co-ordination between Member States and the 
Community were also significant issues. The Development policy was now to become 
one part of the Community's external policy, which also encompassed both trade and 
external political strategy. Poverty reduction was established as the central objective 
of the policy, to be achieved through six priority areas: 
'the link between trade and development; support for integration and regional co-
operation; support for macro-economic policies; transport; food security and 
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sustainable rural development; the strengthening of institutional capabilities' 
(European Commission, 2001: 6; COM (2000) 212: 25 - 27). 
The Community was using a model for development based on the need to 
'better integrate the economic, trade and political aspects of its development co-
operation' (COM (2000) 212: 32) 
and in particular identified the private sector as 'an engine of growth' (Corn (2000) 
212: 21). Sustainability was to be promoted by the ownership of development by the 
indigenous population, and, to improve the impact of Community development co-
operation, a differentiated approach based on performance criteria as well as needs 
criteria was advocated (European Couricil, 1999; COM (2000) 212). The Community 
policy was required to reflect the initiatives of the OECD, the World Bank and the 
IMF, but also facilitate co-ordination, coherence and complementarity between its 
policy and those of the individual Member States (Christian Aid, 2000; COM (2000) 
212). To improve the effectiveness and co-ordination of aid flows to specific 
countries, Country Strategy papers, to include multi-annual rolling programmes, and 
SWAPs (Sector Wide Approach) were to be used (European Commission, 200 I). The 
statement of the European Community's Development policy also highlighted the 
mainstreaming of cross-cutting themes, namely 
'good governance, human rights and the rule of law, effect on poverty reduction, 
institutional and capacity building, gender equality, environmental' (COM (2000) 
212: 27). 
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Despite the mainstream emphasis, positive future results were not assured as can be 
seen in the case of gender issues, which has suffered from both insufficient staffing 
levels and inadequate evaluation methods (WIDE, 1997). 
The managerial problems of Community policy were a consequence of both the 
management structure and the methods used. Within the Commission, the 
management of EC aid has suffered from the division of responsibilities between 
different Directorates General, namely Directorates-General I, lA, rn, VIII and 
ECHO, which led to problems of co-ordination (DAC, 1996; ICEAlDPPC, 1999). In 
addition D-G VIII was directly accountable to not only the Council of Ministers, as 
were the other Directorates General, but also the Lome Institutions (Cox, Healey, and 
Koning, 1997). The division of responsibilities between DGI and DG VIII 
exacerbated the problem of ensuring the continuum between relief assistance and 
development co-operation (Christian Aid, 2000). Furthermore, staffing levels were 
not sufficient to cope with the administrative procedures, which had proliferated along 
with the increase in the instruments (DAC, 1996; WIDE, 1997; European 
Commission, 2001). The Commission had already acknowledged there was a problem 
'Current administrative procedures are inadequate, as they vary according to the type 
of aid' (Courier, 1985: XVI). 
Some changes had been introduced during the 1990s to improve the effectiveness of 
Community policy. In 1993 the introduction of Project Cycle Management based on 
the Logical Frame Analysis attempted to identify vertical and horizontal linkages and 
the significance of the projects for beneficiaries and participants at each stage 
(Eggars, 1993; OECD, 1996). In 1997, the Commission created the Quality Support 
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Group for ACP programmes. While this has improved evaluation feedback for them, 
it has yet to be extended to other geographic regions, e.g. MED (ICEAlDPPC, 1999). 
Unfortunately, many problems had not been addressed by the end of the century, and 
it has been suggested that the complexities of the system enabled the instruments to 
guide the implementation of policy (Bossuy! & de Belder, 1996; ICEAlDPPC, 1999; 
Christian Aid, 2000; COM (2000) 212). 
The Community had been aware of the need for reform of the organisation of its 
external services, but it subsequently had to accept that the 1998 reorganisation (SCR) 
showed a lack of clarity over the division of responsibilities and a preoccupation with 
procedures (European Commission, 2001). The SCR was then transformed into the 
EuropeAid Co-operation office, set up on 01101/2001 to ensure 
'transparency of activities and management practices' (European Commission, 2001: 
151). 
To increase the effectiveness of the approach a reunification of project cycle 
management was to occur, along with the use of Multi-Annual programming for 
continuity, and a system of Activity-Based Management (COM (2000) 212). 
The review has shown that, although the Community's development co-operation 
policy became more focused and increasingly influenced by political and economic 
considerations, it still suffered from inconsistencies and a lack of focus. The approach 
could be said to reflect the vitality and adaptability of the Community, but it was also 
the result of a number of constraints. The decision-making process of the European 
Union was slow and complex, involving a number of institutions, such as the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. These institutions reflected the 
63 
diverse views of 15 Member States: regionalist or globalist and, Neo-Liberalist or 
Socialist. Member States prefered to retain their own identity- the result of cultural 
and historical differences. Similarly NGOs attempted to influence any policy 
decisions made. Therefore Community decisions were the result of compromises and 
trade-offs between the main players. 
Until the mid 1980s the Community favoured a Structuralist approach, long after the 
BWI had moved on to Structural Adjustment Programmes. However it did include 
NGOs, to provide it with a better poverty reach (Tvedt, 1998). An emphasis on basic 
needs and integrated rural development projects formed the basis of the Community 
approach until the mid-eighties (Riddel1 & Robinson, 1995). In this early period 
Community aid was more focused on the immediate output of projects rather than 
being concerned with the overal1 whole policy approach and impact. By the 1990s, 
the Community was ready to incorporate both SAPs and conditionality clauses into its 
policy, but with the inclusion of a social perspective reflecting the European 
conscience (Marantis, 1994; Chambers, 1995; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Lome IV 
and SASP heralded in an increase in policy dialogue and a shift towards sector-wide 
approach with an appreciation of the wider picture (ICEAlDPPC, 1999). The move to 
embrace the Washington Consensus coincided with the need to produce a Common 
Foreign and Security policy, which would incorporate development policy (Robinson, 
1994). Throughout the period the Community had become more aware of the role to 
be played by NGOs in the development of civil society in both the North and the 
South (Bratton, 1989; Edwards, 1994; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). 
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Development NGOs 
Attention will now turn to examme the relative importance of NGOs in the 
Community's Development Co-operation policy. Over time, the trend away from the 
provision of large physical infrastructure proj ects to a focus on the need to tackle rural 
poverty through the participation of the indigenous the population, has increased the 
opportunities available for NGOs. They are seen to have an essential role to play in 
the fight against poverty- their 'raison d'etre'- particularly in the light of their intimate 
knowledge of marginalized people (COM (97) 427). The European NGOs have a 
function to play in the Community's Development Co-operation policy, partly as a 
result of the provisions of the Lome Conventions, but also in response to the co-
financing opportunities offered by the Commission. 
Regional and National Indicative programmes, drawn up to reflect the features of the 
Lome agreements, are the result of consultations between the Community and the 
individual ACP country. These programmes are implemented through the European 
Development Fund and incorporate locally prepared projects. Opportunities for NGO 
to participate in the RIPs and NIPs may arise from smaller contracts, which are 
considered to be particulary suitable for their approach e.g. grass-roots training, 
community development projects (CLONG, 1998b). In these situations the local EC 
delegation acts as the NGO's interlocutor and is also the stakeholder to whom they are 
financially accountable (CLONG, 1998b). According to CLONG, the conditions for 
financial accountability are tighter when the NGO is 'contracted' to undertake these 
types of projects, than for the projects initiated by the NGOs under the co financing 
schemes (CLONG, 1998b). European NGOs are in competition with local NGOs for 
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the funding of projects under both the Microproject Programmes (Art. 252 & 253) and 
Decentralised co-operation. 
In addition to the funding available through the EDF, there are also opportunities for 
the co financing of NGDO activities from the EU budget, where budget lines may 
have a specific focus, e.g. rehabilitation, food aid, human rights. As a percentage of 
total Community aid, the amount allocated to the co-financing ofNGOs' activities is 
very low (2 - 3 %) in relation to the allocations to programme aid (10%), food aid 
(8%), humanitarian assistance (14%), and project aid (64%) (South Research, 2000: 
91). However it is difficult to fully identify the total amount of aid with which NGOs 
are associated because (as indicated above) they can act as 'contractors' for the 
Commission (Cox & Koning, 1997; Cox & Chapman, 1999). 
'By the mid-nineties, it was estimated that over 14% of the EC development budget 
was managed by NGOs' (South Research, 2000: 92). 
The following Table gives an indication of the level and spectrum of support offered 
to NGOs by the Community for 1994 and 1996. While the co-financing activities of 
NGOs are accounted for in the first two rows, it can be appreciated that they only 
represent approximately one third of the total Community financial contribution to 
NGO projects (COM (1999) 248). 
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Table 3.1 Co-financing Activities of European NGOs 
1994 1996 
1. Cofinancing of development projects in developing countries MECU MECU 
129.7 155 
2. Cofinancing of awareness raising of development issues m 14.5 18.3 
Europe and of the Liaison Committee of development NGOs 
3. Food aid 178.5 111.2 
4. Humanitarian aid (ECHO) 320 301 
5. Rehabilitation programmes in developing countries 42.2 43.8 
6. Rehabilitation programmes in Southem Africa 66.7 14.6 
7. Assistance for refugees and displaced persons 32.2 25.4 
8. Special programme for South Africa 66.7 13.6 
9. Other budget lines accessible to NGOs 17.8 20 
Source: COM (1999) 248: 2; European CommIssIOn, 1995: 26. 
According to the Table 3.1 Humanitarian Aid received the most support from the 
Community in 1994 with Food Aid in second place. This reflected the contemporary 
approach, to meet the basic needs of the popUlation and deal with emergency 
situations on a response basis. In contrast 1996 indicates a change in Community 
policy with the relative decline in allocations to Food Aid and the balance tipped 
towards developments projects. Food aid, which began in 1967, was the first 
instrument not incorporated into the Community's co-operation agreements, and the 
first to be financed from the Community's budget (Cox & Koning, 1997). It includes 
food security projects and emergency Food Aid, both of which can be directed 
through NGOs, as well as programmed Food Aid (Cox & Koning, 1997). Since that 
time, new budget lines have been initiated by the European Parliament - often in 
response to pressure from Northern NGOs- to cover geographic, sectoral and thematic 
issues. Some budget lines combine a geographic and thematic focus e.g. rehabilitation 
activities in Southern Africa. Some budget lines simply focus on a theme e.g. 
decentralised co-operation, drugs, the conservation of tropical forests, AIDS 
(CLONG, 1998a). In keeping with the Community'S new geo-political approach since 
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1989, many ofthese lines are open to Eastern Europe and the former USSR countries 
(Smillie et al., 1996). Essentially those budget lines concerned with women, the 
environment and health were initiated in the 1980s, whereas those focusing on issues 
relating to conflict and political issues appeared in the 1990s (CLONG, 1998a). Thus 
in 1984 there were only 3 budget headings available for NGOs, but by the end of the 
century there were 34 budget lines available to NGOs covering the relief, 
rehabilitation and development spectrum, in addition to the B7-6000 budget line 
(COM (94) 468; South Research, 2000). These 34 budget lines were not exclusively 
available to Northern NGOs but could also be accessed by Southern NGOs, research 
institutions, and private businesses for instance (Smillie et aL, 1996). However the 
ability of Southern NGOs to access the budget lines is constrained, often by the lack 
of awareness of the opportunities available. While the successful project proposals 
conform to the Commission's guidelines and procedures, the Commission can be 
criticised for its lack of consideration of the overall impact of the projects (Smillie et 
aL, 1996). As the number of budget lines available has expanded, the administrative 
burden on the Commission has increased. At the same time it has been suggested that 
NGOs may be aligning their proposals with the criteria laid down by the Commission 
rather than adhering to their own mission (Smillie et aL, 1996). Whereas NGOs from 
the North and the South can access the aforementioned budget lines, only European 
NGOs can access the B7-6000 budget line. It is available to finance both development 
activities in the South and education/awareness projects in the North. 
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The B7-6000 Budget Line: the co-financing of development projects 
in the South 
According to the OECD (1996) the co-financing ofNGDOs' activities under the B7-
6000 budget line was the 
'oldest systematic form of co-operating with NGOs' (OECD, 1996: 45), 
but, as with the Community's Development policy, it did not achieve legal status until 
later (1998), in the interim period being guided by the General Conditions (Council 
Regulation 1658/98). The budget line was initially introduced by the Community in 
response to the need to incorporate a new approach to development issues, which 
would complement its current policy 
'means of diversifying aid strategy and action with a strong poverty focus' (South 
Research, 2000: 23) 
and achieve better results through its ability to reach the poorest groups (COM (75) 
504; Courier, 1995c; OECD, 1996; South Research, 2000). The Community was 
aware that NGOs offered an innovative, flexible approach and more importantly were 
able to attain contact with the grassroots of society, especially where official aid was 
either unavailable or inappropriate (OECD, 1996). 
The original terms of reference gave European NGDOs the 'right of initiative' and 
sole responsibility for the presentation of each proposal under B7 -6000 (Courier, 
1981; COM (83) 297). A proposal was to be the result of the relationship 
('partnership') between a European NGO and a Southern NGO, and in direct response 
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to the needs of the target group in the developing country. It was, therefore, largely 
demand-led, with the European NGOs playing a pro active role and the Community a 
reactive one, with an inability to drive the funds in a preferred direction. By remaining 
exclusively demand-led, the Community has therefore been unable to nurture a 
coherent policy, or respond positively to the evolving development discourse in the 
same way that Member States have been able to (South Research, 2000). Similarly it 
has been argued that the performance of the budget line has not reflected evolutionary 
changes in the NGO sector or in NGO-donor relationships 
'the European system stuck to a 'classic' and uniform project-by-project approach, 
whose intrinsic limits were increasingly known' (South Research, 2000: 33). 
It is now appropriate therefore to review the budget line and, if possible, identify the 
extent to which the Community has attempted to exert control over it. The original 
General Conditions were minimal (9 pages) and reflected the Commission's desire to 
both avoid imposing a heavy administrative burden on NGOs and to set up a flexible 
control system (COM (75) 504). Between 1976 and 1980, a number of suitable 
adjustments were made in response to NGO requests, such as the introduction of 
block grants available to approved experienced NGOs and the increase in the level of 
EC support (%) given to individual projects (COM (79) 112; COM (80) 98). The 
allocation of funds tended to favour those projects, which facilitated the full 
participation of the poor rural community at all stages and laid the foundations for 
their 'auto-development', as well as projects concerning education/training, and 
health (Courier, 1980; COM (SI) 220; Courier, 1986). However the Commission also 
attempted to 'guide' the allocation of funds by focusing attention on particular issues, 
and indicating it would positively favour them in the allocation of funds, thus: 1981-
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Year of the Handicapped; 1981 - 1990 International Drinking Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade (COM (80) 98); 1982 - a focus on small-scale agricultural projects 
to combat hunger (COM (83) 297); and, 1984 - suffering from poverty, disease, 
ignorance and injustice (COM (85) 384). In 1988 the revised General Conditions (49 
pages) identified the main principles for the B7-6000 line to be 
'priority for meeting the basic needs of the worst off; involvement of the 
beneficiaries at all stages; encouragement of self-reliance; ensuring the long-term 
viability of co-financed operations' (SEC (89) 1575: 15). 
Funding allocations were to favour GROs, and directly productive projects, 
generating re-useable funds 
'close attention is now paid to the constitution of financial resources (e.g. revolving 
funds, loans and bank guarantees) which can be reused for other operations' (SEC 
(89) 1575: 15). 
The revision also included simpler, more comprehensive guidelines and, an assurance 
of improved accountability, with the inclusion of three evaluation options (SEC (89) 
1575). NGOs were now increasingly pressurised, by the Commission and the Court of 
Auditors, to improve their accountability and professionalism (COM (94) 468; SEC 
(92) 1921). 
Political considerations began to influence Community policy in the 1990s, with 
preference shown for the pursuit of the democratisation process and the development 
of civil society 
'Council stressed the basically political dimension of fight against poverty' (COM 
(97) 427:12) 
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'Commission continued to prioritise NGO projects, which showed a strong 
commitment to grass roots development' (COM (98) 127:4) (COM (1999) 248; 
Council regulation no. 1658/98). 
The Commission noted that both these developments offered new opportunities for 
NGDOs to replace those projects lost due to political and civil conflicts (COM (92) 
1921). By the mid 1990s, the Commission was promoting the creation of sustainable 
development through the development of the productive resources of the poorer 
sections of society 
'Productive, job-creating and income generating projects occupy an increasingly 
significant place in all projects co-financed in recent years' (COM (97) 427: 8) 
and an awareness of the significance of globalisation for the poorest of the poor 
(COM (94) 468; COM (98) 127; COM (1999) 248). 
The Commission's policy towards NGOs since 1976 can be said to show a shift away 
from the politically neutral stance of the early years, with its concern for the basic 
needs of the disadvantaged, to one that has a political dimension and a focus on the 
development of the private sector and access to productive resources (Corn (98) 127; 
Com (95) 292). There has been a corresponding growing awareness of the impact of 
the aid flows on the different groups in society in the recipient countries (Alien & 
Thomas, 2000). Initially, therefore, the focus was on the poor rural community (Corn 
(80) 98) but this has since widened, to include both rural and urban communities, as 
well as specifically focusing on certain disadvantaged groups such as women, 
children (in particular street children), indigenous people and the disabled (Com (94) 
468; Corn (98) 127). In 1996 the policy approach prioritised support for the 
development of grass roots associations and groups unable to access official 
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development co-operation funding (Com (98) 127; COM (1999) 248). Under pressure 
from NGOs, the EC acknowledged it was essential to support communities 
throughout the whole continuum of need from emergency relief through rehabilitation 
to development, and thus laid an emphasis on 
'a process-led rather than a project-led approach to development' (COM, VIIV505/99: 
2). 
Although the first evaluation of the whole B7-6000 budget line did not take place 
until 25 years after its inception, reports have been presented on specific use made of 
its funds (COM (83) 297). In the 1990s, four evaluation exercises were carried out, 
which were part of a process leading to the review of the General Conditions (COM 
(94) 7). Feedback from these reports noted that, on the positive side, integrated 
development projects were found to increase living conditions and the capacity for 
development (Debuyst, 1994); savings and loans projects were found to be an 
efficient tool which enhanced the knowledge and experience of SNGOs (Dhonte, 
1994); and the vocational training projects had a good completion rate, with urban 
ones more successful than rural (Boulon-Lefevre, 1994). On the negative side, 
criticism highlighted the slow administrative performance of the Commission and its 
burden on NGOs, a lack of policy awareness by NGOs, the inability to measure the 
impact of the projects and, in the case of the savings and loans schemes, a lack of 
focus on the poorest (De Crombrugghe, 1993; Boulon-Lefevre, 1994; Debuyst, 1994; 
Dhonte, 1994). Recommendations from the evaluations included the need to focus on 
long-term development with the use of multi-annual contracts/programmes for 
European NGOs, and improve the sustainability of projects and the quality of the 
partnership between North and South (De Crombrugghe, 1993; Boulon-Lefevre, 
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1994). Funds should be released according to the needs of the project and be 
increased for decentralised co-operation (Boulon-Lefevre, 1994; Dhonte, 1994). It 
was also recommended that Commission procedures should be faster, simpler and 
more transparent (De Crombrugghe, 1993; Boulon-Lefevre, 1994; Debuyst, 1994; 
Dhonte, 1994). 
The current General Conditions (2000) have ensured the protection of the right of 
initiative and NGOs' autonomy. The emphasis has been put on the pursuit of poverty 
alleviation and enhancement of the quality of life, prioritising local partner initiatives 
and project proposals from European NGDO consortia (COMNIIV505/99). For the 
first time, initiatives for the promotion of fair trade and the prevention and resolution 
of conflicts were included (COMNIIV505//99). 
The Management of the B7-6000 Budget Line 
While it had been recognised that there was a problem with the strategy and focus of 
the co-financing line, it was not helped by the management system 
, management is beginning to pose more and more senous problems' (De 
Crombrugghe, 1993: 67). 
According to the recent evaluation report, B7 -6000 has been in crisis mode for past 
two years (South Research, 2000). Although allocations to the budget line increased 
from 2.5mecu (1976) to 200 mecu (1999), the Commission invariably found that 
demand for funding far outstretched supply (European Commission, 2001). Prior to 
1989, appropriations could be switched to finance those proj ects, which would 
otherwise have had to be carried over to the next year, then new rules were 
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introduced, which tenninated this practice (COM (91) 52). The tougher selection 
process introduced, affected both NGDOs' co-operation programmes and their 
relations with SNGOs (Corn (91) 52). 
Table 3.2 A profile of the B7-6000 budget line since 1976 
Year No. No. No. Value No. Mecu Total 
submitted wlr co financed mecu Carryover carryover allocation 
mecu 
1976 121 nla 76 2.5 nla nla 2.5 
1978 >200 nla 176 12.0 nla nla 4.0 
1979 240 50 152 11.95 38 nla 12.5 
1980 367 nla 181 nla 119 nla 14.0 
1981 359 67 164 13.5 128 11.0 14.0 
1982 458 85 262 25.5 111 14.0 28.0 
1983 439 98 214 23.7 127 15.7 31.2 
1984 483 92 271 31.2 120 17.4 35.0 
1985 505 93 315 38.6 97 12.8 35.0 
1986 614 73 293 40.1 248 34.8 46.0 
1987 905 164 423 56.6 318 53.0 62.8 
1988 858 137 451 71.2 270 50.2 80.0 
1989 1009 278 546 79.0 185 38.8 80.0 
1990 824 133 450 79.4 241 48.6 90.2 
1991 847 112 501 93.4 234 56.9 104.6 
1992 956 167 484 98.0 305 83.5 110.0 
1993 1018 192 582 120.8 244 103.0 135.6 
1994 1205 307 599 129.7 299 140.6 145.0 
1995 1127 254 601 139.9 272 66.4 174.0 
1996 1254 179 645 155.0 430 nla 174.0 
1997 1199 138 596 150.0 465 nla 170.0 
Refs: Budget reports for appropnate years. 
A profile of the B7-6000 budget line is shown in Table 3.2. It can be seen from the 
Table that the increased number of proposals is associated with an increased number 
withdrawnlrejected or carried over, although the acceptance rate remains at 
approximately 50%. In 1989 those withdrawn/rejected (278) were greater than those 
carried over (185) as also in 1994 (307) withdrawnlrejected and (299) carryover. The 
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fonner group was often due to inappropriate paper work and the latter exacerbated the 
workload for the subsequent year. Project submissions from NGOs applying for 
funding for the first time, small NGOs and those from new ED Member States have 
been favoured (Corn (84) 252; SEC/9112263; Corn (94) 468), and in order to improve 
quality of submissions and reduce the Commission's workload, the Co-financing 
Support Programme (CSP) was introduced in 1997 (tenninated 1999). However the 
institutional refonn of Community aid did not provide a clear division of 
responsibilities and further confused matters (European Commission, 2001). 
Consequently, it was noted that the length of time taken to deal with a proposal was 
still on average 13.5 months, with a backlog of 980 proposals (South Research, 2000). 
The new General conditions (2000) have established a change in the nature ofthe B7-
6000 line and its management to one focused on the process of development, and thus 
introduced programme funding, institutional dialogue, and a broader, long-tenn view 
(COMNIII/S05/99; South Research, 2000). Crucially it is felt that the demand-led 
nature of the B7 -6000 line does not fit well into the Community's desire for a more 
coherent, co-ordinated aid policy, with the promotion of sustainability (South 
Research, 2000). 
The position of European NGOs within the Community'S Development Co-operation 
policy can be differentiated according to the type of activity they undertake. NGO 
activities under the EDP/Lome Conventions are essentially of a contractual nature, 
with the donor in full control of the project proposals and the standard of 
accountability and reporting styles (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Where they carry out 
the humanitarian and emergency operations, the NGOs can be said to be acting as 
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executing agencies (Smillie, 1997). However under the B7-6000 budget line the 
NGOs have the ability to initiate the projects, and produce proposals, which correlate 
with needs identified by the local people. But, this has been identified as a problem 
for the Commission, because it produces a disparate scatter of projects, which may 
not conform to the Community's overall policy. The Commission has been criticised 
for the lax approach it has taken to Development policy, and consequently it has 
attempted to tighten up its approach and draw it into line with its Foreign policy 
(Hulme & Edwards, 1997). While the Commission has not withdrawn the right of 
initiative from the NGOs, it has attempted to constrain them by a move towards the 
use of progrannnes and the gradual tightening up of procedures. Whereas earlier the 
Commission was concerned with the allocation of funds and the immediate impact of 
the project, it is now more concerned with the bigger picture. These changes 
instigated by the Commission can be identified as a move from short-term functional 
accountability to strategic accountability (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), also supported 
by Kumar & Hudock (1996) as a move from process to programme accountability. As 
the EC has changed its approach to include the focus on the market, evidence suggests 
that the NGOs are aiding the alleviation of poverty by promotion (Hulme & Edwards, 
1997). While pressure has been exerted on NGOs to conform to the EC policy 
(Carroll, 1992), they have fought to retain their informal and participatory approach to 
project initiation. 
Conclusion: 
The focus, format and evolution of Community policy have been and still are 
determined by a number of variables. Within the European Union, it has proved 
difficult to gain a consensus of opinion from Member States, with such diverse 
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historical and cultural backgrounds. Without a finn framework in place, the policy 
grew to become a fragmented, disparate collection of procedures and ins1ruments. The 
Commission was also subject to pressure by European NGOs to promote an approach 
to poverty alleviation, which is both participatory and sustainable. Externally the 
Community has been subject to pressure from the UN (backed by European NGOs) to 
incorporate its targets into Community policy. Meanwhile the policy stance of the 
World Bank and the IMF, which promotes the focus on the market and competition to 
reduce poverty, gained Community support, although in a fonn modified by Member 
States and NGOs. Consultation between the two (the Community and NGOs) does not 
always achieve a policy change desired by the NGOs. The Community has its own 
agenda regarding the CFSP, and, as this has gained increasing support from the 
Member States, it seems to have been promoted over development co-operation 
(Edwards,1994). It has responded to some of the requests put forward by the NGOs 
but in turn has imposed bureaucratic constraints e.g. accountability, slow 
administration of request si funding (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). 
In dealing with the Commission, European NGOs have felt that the division of 
responsibilities of the management of EC aid has led to differences in 
interpretation and implementation, due in part to the lack of official dialogue 
between the various sections (Cox, Healey, and Koning, 1997; Koulaimah -
GabrieI1997). Throughout the period, the relations between the Commission and 
the European NGOs have obviously been a significant factor in the changing role 
of NGOs in the Community's Development Co-operation policy. Therefore the 
next chapter will investigate the evolving relations between the Commission, the 
European NGDOs and the NGDO-EU Liaison Committee (CLONG). 
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Chapter 4 : 
The Evolution of relations between the European 
Commission and European development NGOs 
The relationship between the European Commission and European NGOs has 
evolved over time in response to changes in the international enviromnent and in 
the current philosophy of the players in the development/aid arena. An 
examination of the relationship between the European Commission and European 
development NGOs will focus on why the relationship was needed, how it has 
evolved and the extent to which adaptations have had to be made and by whom. 
Consideration of the increasing dependence of NGOs on EC funding begs the 
question as to whether this has in any way constrained their activities or whether 
the relationship with the Commission has enabled them to influence the direction 
and detail of EC Development Co-operation policy. An attempt will be made, 
therefore, to identify the extent to which European NGOs are positive 
stakeholders in the development cooperation policy of the European Community 
(EC) or merely act as acquiescent pawns (Tvedt, 1998). 
In order to examine the changing relationship between the Commission and 
European NGOs, the time period under review, namely 1976 to 2002, will be 
divided into 3 sections. The justification for this division relates to the 
development of the relationship from its fledging state in the 1970s, through a 
period of increasing maturity and cooperation in the 1980s, to the time when 
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events have combined to cause increasing tension between the two - the 1990s 
and into the twenty-first century. 
This chapter will therefore: 
(i) examine the evolution of relations between the European Commission 
and European NGOs, and 
(ii) critically discuss the significant results in the light of the academic 
discourse identified in the literature review. 
The Early Years: 1975 - 1979 
The formal relationship, between the Commission and European NGOs involved 
in development activities, began in 1976, partly as a result of the positive 
experiences enjoyed by the Commission when using NGOs as 'intermediaries' to 
distribute its emergency food aid (Corn (75) 504). The Commission saw the 
possibility of extending the role of NGOs and using their experience and 
particular characteristics to improve EC Development Policy 
'to widen the vision and scope of their (the Community's) development policy' 
(Corn (75) 504:6). 
With their unique approach, NGOs had shown an ability to reach those people 
who were beyond the sphere of the activities of official bodies in Developing 
Countries-
'NGOs are seen as vehicles by which official aid can reach the poorest and the 
most marginalized people' (Cox & Koning, 1997:38) 
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and the Commission considered their actions to be both complementary and 
supplementary to official development aid (Corn (75) 504). The general 
conditions regulating the use of the co-financing budget line were drawn up as a 
result of discussions between the Commission, NGO representatives and the 
Member States (Corn (77) 83). However, once these were in place, some 
shortcomings became obvious, and modifications were made to the general 
conditions in direct response to requests from the NGOs (Corn (77) 83; Corn (79) 
112). Similarly, as it became apparent that some potential projects were too small 
to be included in the system as it stood, block grants were introduced wherever the 
Commission had confidence in the NGO's ability to use the funds wisely (Corn 
(79) 112; Corn (80) 98; Courier, 1980). 
The Commission saw its own role to be one offering financial security to NGOs, 
acting as coordinator of NGO projects in the Developing Countries, and 
attempting to increase efficiency through the elimination of unnecessary 
duplication (Corn (77) 83). This initial phase in the relationship, was viewed by 
the Commission as essentially a period of adjustment, when both sides were 
responding to present challenges, and anticipated that relations would continue to 
progress in the future -
'(relations had) evolved in a dynamic, positive and varied way' (Corn (79) 112: 13) 
'the collaboration with the NGOs will be required to assume new dimensions' 
(Corn (78) 75:7). 
The establishment of the EEC-NGO Liaison Committee (CLONG) in January 
1976 was a further attempt to promote relations between the Commission and 
European NGOs (Corn (77) 83). This forum was set up to enhance collaborative 
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ventures and the exchange of views, both within the European NGO movement 
and, between its representatives and the Commission (Bossuy! & de Belder, 
1996). Initially CLONG was a small, voluntary group, representing a limited 
number of NGOs, who were thus able to develop personal relations with the 
Commission and so exert some influence on EC matters -
' .. allowed (CLONG) to become a respected interlocutor and to exercise a discrete 
but efficient influence on both general policy issues ... and thorny questions' 
(Bossuy! & de Belder, 1996:3). 
However, while appreciating the role of CLONG, the Commission felt there was a 
need to reach out to the wider NGO audience, and a series of events led to the 
transformation of CLONG. In 1978, CLONG gained legal status under Belgium 
law, lost its independence and became financially dependent on the Commission, 
who initiated the establishment of an Annual Assembly (Corn (79) 112; Corn (80) 
98). Consequently, the role played by CLONG began to develop and it was invited 
to take part in discussions on development matters not only with the Commission 
but also representatives of Member States' Governments and the European 
Parliament's Committee on Development and Co-operation (Corn (78) 75; Corn 
(79) 112; Corn (SI) 220). It had thus gained an enhanced role, namely to represent 
the views of European NGOs to the wider group of institutions, take an active part 
in the discussions, and report back to European NGOs on the issues and 
agreements that had been achieved. The Annual Assembly, with attendance 
deemed to be by invitation only, developed as a forum for the discussion of issues 
between its European members, and with their partners in the South (Corn (S2) 
157). 
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By the end of the 1970s, the Commission indicated its positive view of the role 
played by NGOs, when it identified them as being 
'an established part of its overall development policy' (Corn (80) 98:8), 
and by commenting on their performance, which showed 'dedication and 
motivation' and an ability to undertake a 'catalytic role' (Corn (80) 98:9). Their 
role had been transformed from one of being a neutral link or messenger between 
the European Community and the people of the Developing countries to one 
where they had gained recognition for their capacity to make things happen. This 
confirmed that their ability to enhance the performance of the donor's (EC's) 
policy had been recognized (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). 
The Commission also acknowledged its respect for the experience of the NGOs, 
when the regulations controlling the allocation of funds, initially set by mutual 
agreement, were later amended as the result of the practical experience of the 
NGOs. Furthermore, by endorsing the distribution of block grants to specific 
NGOs, the Commission was indicating its trust in NGOs' ability to use funds 
wisely, based on mutual experience over a three-year period. In offering its 
financial support for the activities of the NGOs, the Community was keen to 
identify the significance of its own contribution to the co-financed projects. This 
proved to be no easy task because the inadequacies of NGO accounting systems 
made such identification difficult and by the end of the decade, NGOs were under 
pressure from both the European Parliament and the Commission to improve their 
accounting practices (Corn (80) 98). Subsequently, despite indicating that the 
Commission would not interfere but only offer financial support, some pressure 
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began to be exerted on the NGOs by the Commission. In retrospect therefore, this 
period in the 1970s represented a time during which the NGOs and the 
Commission began to feel their way in the new relationship, and attempted to test 
and extend the boundaries. 
Strengthening of the Relationship: 1980 -1989 
At the start of the decade, the position of NGOs in the EC's Development Co-
operation Policy had been secured -
'a firmly established part of its overall development policy' (Com(81)220) 
'an essential feature of Community Development Policy' (Courier, 1991 :66) 
'adding a further dimension to the European Community's development policy 
(Corn (83) 297:1). 
Attention therefore turned to reflect on what constituted the conditions necessary 
for successful co-operation between the Commission and the NGOs. According to 
the Commission, these were identified as 
'mutual comprehension and trust with each side recognising the other's viewpoint 
and avoiding unilateral imposition of conditions' (Corn (81) 220:5). 
A review of the period will ascertain as to whether these conditions ensued or 
whether the trend towards the imposition of some control and influence over the 
activities ofthe NGOs begun in the previous decade continued. In the early 1980s, 
the Commission's trust in NGOs was based on the recognition of their ability to 
respond quickly to changing circumstances -
'adaptation to changing economic and political conditions and their very flexible 
working methods' (Corn (81) 220:7). 
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It saw a role for NGDs to act as a 'catalyst for change' in developing countries, 
thereby enabling the indigenous people to extract themselves from their 'state of 
poverty and oppression' (Corn (81) 220:7). Evidence supported the view that 
NGDs were able to reach the desired sections of the population on a scale that 
could not be matched by the ED or national governments -
'able to rely on the multifarious and competent network of your organisations' 
(Courier, 1985 : xiv), 
These communities are often the voiceless and most helpless ones, those least 
likely to be able to communicate their needs and achieve an official response 
(Corn (81) 220:7). 
As a consequence of the favourable climate of opinion, 1982 was an important 
date in the deVelopment of relations between the Commission and European 
NGDs-
'unprecedented stepping up ofEEC-NGO co-operation (and) a marked extension 
of co-financing operations' (Courier, 1983 p vii). 
The Commission marked the occasion by reiterating that the NGOs had the 
exclusive right of initiating the presentation of projects, and at the same time 
instigated a study into the work of NGDs to identify the 'NGD formula' (Corn 
(83) 297; Corn (85) 348), which it hoped to use as a template for its own 
activities. However it soon realized that it was not possible to replicate the 
approach for use with large-scale projects (Courier, 1987; Corn (91) 52; Sec (91) 
2263) and instead reached the conclusion that collaboration with NGDs was a 
more feasible alternative approach to take-
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'Commission plans to intensify and extend its joint action with NGOs In 
development sphere' (Com (91) 52:27). 
Of particular value to the Commission was the contribution it felt NGOs could 
make in the sphere of cultural understanding and exchange, which could 
positively impact on development co-operation activities-
'NGOs have been able to avoid many mistaken concepts and errors of the types 
of development co-operation embarked upon by official donors' (Reithinger, 
1987: 72). 
It was obvious that the NGOs had a different perspective of the issues- 'new 
initiatives, ideas and concepts' (Com (91) 52:26), and the Commission was keen 
to seek out their opinion, based as it invariably was on first-hand experience. The 
Commission was interested, therefore, in encouraging NGOs to seek out 
innovative responses to difficult problems-
'NGOs must be pathfinders for their governments' J. Delors (Courier, 1986:14). 
Furthermore, NGOs were also valued for their contribution to critical discussion 
of EC policy. Jacques Delors pointed out that NGOs had a role to play in 
providing positive criticism of governmental authority work (Courier, 1986), and 
according to DG Foley 
'NGOs' criticism of the EEC's policy on food aid was useful' (Courier, 1986:15). 
This critical role received further support in the Ulburgh Report, although hope 
was expressed that this would not adversely affect the flow of funds to NGO 
projects (Courier, 1986). In further recognition of the experience of NGOs and in 
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keeping with its policy dialogue approach, the Commission embarked upon the 
regular exchange of ideas with NGOs, in the conviction that it could achieve 
beneficial returns-
'a useful and necessary complement to their dialogue with ACP partners' 
(Courier, 1987:76). 
NGOs were not only recognized for the role they could play in development 
activities in the South but were also beginning to respond to the need to be 
proactive in the North. Both the Ulburgh Report and CLONG pointed out that 
there was a role for NGOs to play in Europe in promoting an awareness of 
development issues through initiating debates on topical issues and the 
dissemination of information (European Parliament, 1986; Courier, 1987). 
As a result of the positive attitude towards NGOs, they found themselves to be the 
privileged recipients for development funding. This was not without critical comment 
from the Commission, however, with a warning for NGOs from DG Pisani that too 
rapid a rate of expansion could jeopardize their level of efficiency and degree of 
flexibility (Courier, 1983). Disquiet was also expressed that, projects run by NGOs in 
the field of development lacked co-ordination and often did not achieve the best 
returns, despite the identification of a financial multiplier of between 2.4 and 3 (Corn 
(81) 220; Corn (82) 157; Corn (83) 297; Corn (84) 252; Corn (85) 348). At the same 
time, however, the Commission was aware that not all returns were numerically 
calculable (Courier, 1986). Following on from this line of criticism, the Ulburgh 
Report (European Parliament, 1986) called for tighter financial control and 
accountability both by the EU and the NGOs, as well as better co-ordination of 
activities in specific regions. In response the Commission proposed the introduction 
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of an evaluation reflex, which would enable a project to be adjusted during its life, 
and therefore the experience gained from the project could be put to better use in the 
future (Sec (89) 1575). Consequently, an increasing number of NGOs began to 
include a section on self-evaluation in their budget operations. Thus it can be seen that 
the criticism of NGO financial affairs, begun at the end of the 1970s, continued into 
the 1980s and resulted in them being gradually coerced into ensuring that their 
financial and reporting systems conformed to the pattern laid down by the 
Commission (Corn (86) 403). This was despite the fact that the Commission had 
recognized that in order to achieve their results, NGOs needed to be free from any 
external influences, which could inhibit their performance -
'success due to independence from any external conditioning' (Corn (83) 297:2). 
This aspect received further emphasis at the end of the decade when the Commission 
indicated that its role was to focus on the financial input to projects, however it also 
mentioned 'minimal input' outside this role (Corn (91) 52). This could be interpreted 
as an intrusion into the sphere of NGOs' activities, as previously there had been no 
indication of any additional input from the Commission, which merely saw its role to 
be the offer of financial support. In line with the Ulburgh Report, the Commission 
indicated that it could act as catalyst between NGOs, and between the NGOs and 
Community instruments, in order to avoid any wasteful duplication of effort (Courier, 
1985). However both Commissioner Natali and the NGOs recognized that 
deficiencies in the administrative procedures were impeding the flow of rescue and 
rehabilitation aid, and needed to be addressed (Courier, 1985). 
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During this period of development in the relations between the EC and NGOs, 
CLONG also underwent change. In response to pressure exerted on it by those 
attending the Annual Assembly, democratic elections were held in 1980 to elect NGO 
representatives to become members of CLONG, and to attend the annual General 
Assembly (Corn (80) 98; Corn (81) 220). CLONG, therefore, became a democratic 
and representative association with a Secretariat and an increased budget from the 
Commission, which would facilitate the expansion of its role and associated activities 
(Dreesmann, 1987; Bossuyt & De Belder, 1996). The proximity of CLONG to the 
Commission had enabled it to assume the role of lobbyist for the interests of the 
Developing Countries (Dreesmann, 1987) - at times focusing on the contradictions 
between the Common Agriculture Policy and the EEC Development Policy. CLONG 
had, at this stage, also become sufficiently assured to be able to offer an increasing 
number of working papers to the Commission for discussion. At the 1985 NGO 
General Assembly, discussion focused on the close links between emergency food aid 
and long-term development aid and resulted in the production of the Natali Plan, 
which was largely financed and implemented by NGOs (Courier, 1985; Courier, 
1986). At this stage in the relationship, the Commission seemed willing to listen to 
and appreciate NGOs' experience, and thus they moved from a place on the outer 
fringes to one of being actively sought for its views of political problems-
'NGOs of Europe .... have left the 'border of irrelevance' behind them some years ago' 
(NGO viewpoint) (Dreesman 1987:53). 
CLONG felt that it had gained a greater understanding of the role it was to play in the 
development process, and yet, nonetheless, had refused to become an instrument of 
Community development policy (Galand, 1987). CLONG considered itself to be a 
valuable partner for the EU in its development policy (Dreesman, 1987). Nevertheless 
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by 1988 CLONG was finding it increasing difficult to gain a consensus from its 
members on current issues because, with more than 650 individual European NGOs, 
they represented an extremely diverse set of opinions (Courier, 1988). It was easier for 
specialist NGOs to take a stance on a particular issue and consequently gain higher 
media profile (Dreesman, 1987). Thus, the increase in the membership of CLONG 
had a two-fold impact on the significance of CLONG. On the one hand as a 
representative of a larger group of NGOs, it had gained more authority, but, on the 
other hand, the increased diversity of views had undermined CLONG's ability to offer 
a united opinion in development policy discussions. 
Throughout the 1980s the issue of genuine partnership was discussed in relation to the 
Commission and NGOs, and Southern NGOs and Northern NGOs. The Commission 
identified a regular partner as one that showed a 
'genuine commitment to development assistance' and 'a bona-fide European identity' 
(Corn (81) 220:7). 
The Commission used the term 'indispensable partners' to describe those NGOs that 
distributed food aid through EuroAid (Courier, 1983:ix).The application of the term 
partnership to the relations with NGOs is more complicated with the issue of financial 
dependency. Dreesman (1987) suggested that the idea of development co-operation 
presupposed the existence of a partnership, which in turn required parity and equality 
of rights. However, while this was difficult in a financially dependent relationship, it 
was felt that European NGOs had achieved a balance between being financially 
dependent on donors and at the same time using the relationship to move the donor in 
the desired direction -
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'NGOs have developed an effective balance between the system of a paying pocket' 
and the instrument ofthe 'prodding' (Dreesman, 1987:54). 
One complication to be avoided was the position of being in the donor's pocket 
(Dreesman, 1987). On the other hand, NGOs needed to allow donors to 'use' them 
otherwise they could lose out to the governments or prompt the emergence of 
QUANGOs (Courier, 1987). 
The development of relations between the Commission and the European NGOs 
certainly progressed throughout the 1980s, with both sides actively participating, 
although the overall level of influence was unequal. According to the 
Commission, it had close and dependable relations with NGOs based on a sound 
working relationship (Courier, 1981; Courier, 1987). The NGOs felt that relations 
had matured into one of excellent co-operation (Courier, 1983), based on frank 
and fruitful discussions (Courier, 1988) and mutual confidence (Courier, 1987). 
They were in agreement over the value of small-scale participatory development 
projects, which focused on meeting the basic needs of the local population 
(Courier, 1983). Nevertheless NGOs had attempted to shift EC policy towards 
recognition of the existence of a spectrum of need stretching from emergency aid, 
through the rehabilitation process, to longer-term development aid. At the same 
time the Commission and NGOs were in mutual agreement about the 
inadequacies of the administrative procedure for the assessment and dispersal of 
monies to aid projects (Courier, 1985). However, while CLONG identified NGOs 
as valuable partners in EU Development Policy, this was never openly recognised 
by the Commission (Courier, 1987). Throughout the 1980s, therefore, although 
Bossuy! & de Belder (1996:4) indicated that CLONG had managed to promote the 
'role and place of NGOs in European Development co-operation' and 'ensure 
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close dialogue with EU institutions', the NGOs did not feel that they had achieved 
true recognition of their position as partners of the Commission. NGOs were wary 
of the possibility of losing their independence and autonomy, and were emphatic 
in their refusal to become instruments ofEC Development Policy (Courier, 1987). 
At the centre of this problem was their obvious financial relationship with the 
Commission, but their independence was to some extent assured by the adherence 
to their 'right of initiative' for the introduction of projects under the B7-6000 
budget line. It meant that this budget-line was essentially demand-led and not 
obviously constrained by the policy directives of the Commission. In the future, 
this characteristic was to prove difficult for the Commission to reconcile with its 
policy objectives. 
A new Partnership? 
The late 1980s seemed to indicate a rising trend in the relations between the 
Commission and the NGOs, but in retrospect they had achieved a zenith, and were 
increasingly to be put under pressure in the following decade. An examination of 
the developments in their relationship can be closely correlated with the response 
elicited from each of the players to both changing external conditions and the 
internal pressures for reforms. As the level of conflict increased, so the relations 
reached an apparent nadir by the end of the decade - only to be surpassed by the 
downsizing of CLONG in 2002. With hindsight, it can be suggested that the 
developing crisis was fueled by a number of contributory factors. These include: 
the changes taking place in the focus of EC development co-operation policy and 
its position within the portfolio of Community policies; the increase in the 
opportunities available to NGOs for the distribution of both emergency and 
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development co-operation aid; the mounting tensions within the NGO movement; 
and the escalation of bureaucratic problems in the Commission. These problems 
did not abruptly emerge, but in fact had been gradually building up over a period 
of years. 
At the start of the decade, the Commission- which 
'recognised (the) ability ofNGDOs to involve grassroots organisations in projects 
because they are central to their viability' (Courier, 1992:VI) 
was not the only BD institution to indicate a favourable opinion of European 
NGOs-
'Community has found NGDOs to be efficient and reliable partners of the 
Community' (European Council, 1991: I) 
'major contribution to development aid by co-operation between NGDOs and the 
Community' (European Parliament in: OJ C150 15-6-92: 273). 
However, while NGOs had gained an enhanced profile with ED institutions, 
tensions had begun to appear within the NGO movement, as a result of both 
internal and external pressures. The increased funding available to NGOs and the 
proliferation of budget-lines had precipitated a growth in the emergence and 
evolution of new NGOs. At the same time the developments in the aid 
environment had heightened the feeling of insecurity among NGOs and they 
became increasingly aware of the need to guard against the erosion of their unique 
status, in particular their independence and 'right of initiative'. Despite benefiting 
from the new policy emphasis therefore, the NGOs were critical of what they felt 
was the encroachment of foreign policy upon the sphere of development co-
operation, and the apparent preference for emergency aid over development aid, 
which virtually reduced the role for NGOs to one of executing agents-
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'More and more often, NGOs are being approached to act as the instruments of 
European Development Policy' (Dumon, 1993:84). 
As a consequence of these trends, the NGOs began to question the ability of 
CLONG to represent their interests at EU level, as it struggled to obtain a 
consensus of opinion from the increasingly disparate views of its members-
'broad and heterogeneous membership ... .led to a dilution of the European 
Mandate and focus of work' (Bossuyt and de Belder, 1996:7). 
CLONG's inability to obtain a swift response to current issues and the existence 
of alternative voices for NGO opinions left it in an insecure position 
'lost part of its dynamism and relevance' (South Research, 2000:21). 
'no longer monopoly interlocuter' (Bossuyt and de Belder, 1996:6). 
Small NGOs felt marginalised, and others found it more advantageous to join a 
more homogeneous group, while the larger NGOs acted alone (CLONG, 1995a). 
Therefore CLONG began a process of self-examination in 1992, in an attempt to 
address criticisms, which compared the intensity of its involvement with the 
Commission, to its apparently tenuous links with NGO members and the national 
platforms (CLONG, 1995a; Ambrogetti, 1996; Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996) 
'Brussels oriented lobbying club (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996:8). 
Unfortunately, while the subsequent review of its structure enabled CLONG to 
produce a faster response to current issues and debates, it did little to reduce the 
disenchantment among its members (Ambrogetti, 1996; Bossuyt & de Belder, 
1996; CLONG, 1995a); and CLONG then had to work hard to nurture a 'culture 
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of commitment', which would ensure the involvement of the national platfonns 
(CLONG, 1995a). With the publication of its Mission Statement (J 995), the 
importance ofCLONG's position as the representative of the NGO movement in 
policy dialogue, with not only the Connnission but also other EU and 
international institutions, was identified 
'to provide a link and facilitate in policy dialogue between the European Civil 
Society and the European Union by representing European NGOs to the 
Commission, the European Council and other appropriate international 
conferences and for a' NGO Handbook (CLONG, 1998a:6). 
However, its monopoly position as sole representative of NGOs' interests in 
financial matters with the Commission had come under threat with the emergence 
of VOICE (1992) and the Dialogue group as well as the independent status of 
NGOs working on the PHARE and TACIS programmes (Ambrogetti, 1996; 
Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996). These other representative bodies found it easier to 
achieve an accord among their members and CLONG recognized the need to 
review its position. Thus, in order to build on the diversity of its members' 
interests and produce a unique identity for itself, it was agreed that the focus for 
CLONG's lobbying activities would be cross cutting issues (CLONG, 1998a). 
In retrospect therefore the early 1990s had seen an attempt by NGOs to put their 
own affairs in order, with CLONG exerting a positive response to its changing 
environment -
'willingness to critically review its roles, structures and procedures' (Bossuyt 
and de Belder, 1996:6) 
While transfonnation in the aid environment had affected the NGO sector, it had 
also impacted on relations between the Commission and NGOs. Things came to a 
head in 1994, when Commissioner Marin invited CLONG to take part in a 
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dialogue aimed at improving the organisation of relations between the 
Commission and NGOs 
'to identify the problems that were hindering an effective partnership' (CLONG, 
1997a). 
Launched in September 1995 as the Elewijt process, the dialogue attempted to 
clarify the autonomous and complementary roles of both the Commission and 
NGOs-
, the identification of NGOs, the complementarity of NGOs' and the 
Commission's work, policy dialogue, and scope for standardizing procedures in 
the Commission' (CLONG, 1997b: 3). 
Throughout the rest of the decade and into the next century, the dialogue 
continued in an attempt to establish a code of conduct for their relations. 
Although a number of issues combined to complicate relations between the 
Commission and NGOs, a common element was identified as the bureaucratic 
problems at the Commission, which had previously been revealed in the mid 
1980s. 
As a result of the proliferation of budget lines and the significant growth of 
NGOs, the workload of the Commission had increased, but with no accompanying 
increase in staffing levels (Cox & Koning, 1997; CLONG, 1997d; Van Reisen, 
1999). European NGOs for their part were appreciative of the support they 
received from the European Community, which did not constrain their activities 
, the EC has often been prepared to fund projects other donors will not consider, 
allowing NGOs to support a greater variety of innovative development initiatives 
and key organisations in the South' Executive Summary p. 3 (CLONG, 1996 ). 
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However the NGDOs were affected by the resulting delays in decision- making 
associated with the backlog of work built up by the overloaded staff (European 
Commission, 2001; South Research, 2000). It was not until the introduction ofthe 
Commission's Sound and Efficient Management programme in 1998, that these 
problems were finally identified and subsequent action initiated to address them 
(CLONG, 1998a). 
Furthermore, the Commission had become increasingly fragmented and this made 
it difficult for the NGOs to achieve an authentic policy dialogue. Although the 
staff of DG VID appreciated the work of NGOs and CLONG, DG I was not only 
unaware of CLONG and its activities, but also lacked familiarity with the scope of 
work performed by NGOs (Aaronson, 1995; CLONG, 1996; Cox & Koning, 
1997; CLONG, 1997a; CLONG, 1999b). Consequently it was generally 
acknowledged that the division of responsibilities between the different sections 
of the Commission had led to inconsistencies in the approaches adopted towards 
NGOs (Aaronson, 1995; Cox & Koning, 1997). However, it was also recognized 
that the increased availability of funding opportunities had attracted a new breed 
ofNGOs, who showed an apparent lack of professionalism and little concern for 
development results -
'(aimed) solely to raise their own profile and attract funding' (Aaronson, 1995: 
4); 
'Some NGOs seem ready to 'sell their souls' (Gregoire, 1995: 83); 
'behave more like consultancy offices conducting research into the availability of 
contracts' (Ryelandt,1995: 65). 
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This further complicated the EU institutions' ability to understand and appreciate 
the role of NGOs (Ryelandt, 1995). Similarly, in response to the changing geo-
politics of aid, and international aid fatigue, Commission staff came under 
increasing pressure to improve their accountability and effectiveness in the use of 
funds (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996; Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997). A further 
complication was the desire by Coreper and the European Parliament to be 
involved in considerations of the allocation of finance to geographical and sectoral 
policy (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996). This new climate of accountability and the 
emergence of additional constraints on the flexibility ofNGDOs' activities fueled 
NGOs' fears that the Commission may in the future adopt a more control-oriented 
stance towards them -
'become more professional as regards the nature and formulation of their 
objectives and their financial management, which should be sound and 
transparent' (Com(94)468: 16). 
In response to the mounting problems, therefore the Commission set about reform 
of its own structure and procedures. 
In 1998 the SCR was set up to reform the management of development co-
operation programmes, and, in particular, to reduce the administrative burden of 
co-financing projects (CLONG, 2000). But the administrative problems were not 
immediately resolved partly due to the introduction of new personnel, who were 
unfamiliar with NGOs, but also because the division of responsibilities between 
DG DEV and SCRf5 was not clarified 
'It has to be admitted that the 1998 reorganization of the Commission's external 
services made matters worse in two ways: 
* it did not always make clear to staff adapting to new duties what were their 
responsibilities and what were those of their colleagues; 
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* it severely handicapped the provision of external assistance by failing to resolve 
certain fundamental staffing problems which came on top of the confusion and 
delay created by the streamlining of procedures. (European Commission, 2001: 
146) 
The lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities between the two departments 
manifested itself in a waiting time of 13.5 months for any decisions on the 
acceptability of projects (South Research, 2000). More changes were considered 
in September 2000, which would make the SCR responsible for the entire project 
cycle, with DEV A14 dealing with the policy-making and the annual guidelines, 
although both departments would be involved in drawing up the guidelines (South 
Research, 2000). 
Of particular concern to the Commission was the administrative burden of the B7-
6000 budget line, which, being demand-led, produced a wide spectrum of projects 
often accompanied by poorly prepared paperwork from NGOs (CLONG, 1997d; 
South Research, 2000). Furthermore its popUlarity among NGOs led to it being 
oversubscribed and umnanageable, with the result that a high proportion of the 
proposals were carried over to the subsequent year (CLONG, 1996; CLONG, 
1998a; South Research, 2000). Accordingly, it was acknowledged not only by the 
Commission and NGOs but also the European Parliament, that a revision of the 
B7-6000 line was urgently needed (CLONG, 1996; South Research, 2000). This 
was not before it had become apparent to critics that the European system of co-
financing the activities of NGOs was outmoded and had failed to respond to 
changing circumstances-
'the European system stuck to a 'classic' and uniform project-by-project approach 
whose intrinsic limits were increasingly known' (South Research, 2000:33). 
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By allowing the prolonged extension of this fonn of co-financing for NGO 
activities, it was thought that NGOs might have been, to some extent, protected 
from the real world of development co-operation (South Research, 2000). 
However it was also acknowledged that the needs of the target group should be 
reflected in the use of the budget line -
'It is important that European NGDOs strengthen their links with NGOs and 
grassroots organisations in the South so that they are more receptive to new 
initiatives from the South' (Corn (94) 468:16). 
The Way Forward? 
Change was therefore needed to the B7-6000 budget line but here, there was a 
divergence of opinion between the Commission and NGOs as to the rationale for 
the changes. The Commission wanted a system put in place to filter the 
presentation of funding applications, whereas NGOs wanted a simpler more 
accessible system (CLONG, 1998b; Houtman, 1998). CLONG also criticized the 
Commission for its emission of apparently conflicting signals (CLONG, 1998b). 
On the one hand it professed the need to tighten up its administrative and financial 
controls, while on the other it appeared to be keen to devolve some responsibility 
for the budget line. In fact DGVIIIIB2 wanted to delegate managerial 
responsibilities on the basis of a real partnership (CLONG, 1998b). 
One of the problems faced by the Commission was the quality of the project 
proposals submitted by the NGOs for consideration under the budget line. 
Therefore as a result of a joint initiative by the Commission and CLONG, the Co-
financing Support Programme (CSP) was inaugurated in July 1997 (terminated 
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June 1999) to improve the quality ofNGO project proposals, and to offer training 
and advice to member NGDOs (South Research, 2000; CLONG, 1998b). The 
CSP was to relieve the Commission of some of its administrative pressures, by 
shifting the responsibility for the processing of project proposals onto CLONG. 
The Commission was stilI to retain responsibility for the final decisions but NGOs 
were concerned that it could lead to CLONG screening its members' applications 
(Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997; CLONG, 1997d). Similarly, disquiet was expressed 
about the possible impact of this departure on the division of responsibilities 
between the Commission and CLONG, and particularly the position of CSP vis-a-
vis SCOOP - 'the CSP is in danger of coming between the grinding stones of 
DGVIIIIB2 and SCOOP' (CLONG, 1998c). According to the Annual Report 
(CLONG, 1998b), NGOs felt that the Commission had attempted to thwart or 
delay the establishment of the CSP. In fact affairs did not run smoothly because 
there was found to be no legal basis for the operation of the budget lines and 
approximately 100 budget lines worth more than 920 MECU were suspended 
between June and August 1998, which had a significant impact on relations 
between the northern NGOs and their southern partners (CLONG, 
1998b;CLONG, 1999b). This was then followed by a period of "crisis 
management", which included the introduction of a bank guarantee clause as a 
result of pressure from the Court of Auditors, the European Parliament's 
Budgetary Control Committee and the SCR (CLONG, 1999b). The introduction 
of the clause came as a complete surprise to NGOs and in many cases was 
umealistic, which further aggravated relations between the NGOs and the 
Commission. 
The administration of the B7-6000 budget line came under the General 
Conditions, which were last revised in 1988, and did not achieve a legal basis 
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until the Council regulation 1659/98 was passed. Therefore a revision of the 
general conditions applicable to the B7-6000 budget line was overdue, as they did 
not reflect current conditions in the fast changing aid environment. Although both 
parties took part in the discussion of the revision, NGOs were disappointed with 
the speed of the proceedings -
, review process of the general conditions of co-financing (has) been going on for 
too long' (Aaronson, 1995:2). 
Further time was to elapse because, though the revised conditions were due to be 
introduced in 1998, circnmstances at the Commission led to a delay until 2000. 
From the Commission's point of view the aim of the revision was to reduce the 
administrative burden of the B7-6000 line, through the promotion of programmes, 
rather than projects, and joint undertakings by network NGOs (South Research, 
2000). The increased emphasis on the use of programmes met with varied 
response by NGOs, with larger NGOs positively favouring programme contracts, 
while small ones expressed a fear of becoming marginalized. NGOs responded to 
the promotion of joint undertakings with the fear that the collaborative contracts 
could lead to an additional bureaucratic layer (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997; 
CLONG, 1997d). In 2000, the SOUTH group argued that the new general 
conditions would do little to reduce the unmanageable state of the budget line. It 
stated that the B7-6000 should not be 'an open and unfocused budget line', and 
recommended that a review should be made of the right of initiative and 
independence of NGOs and access to the budget-line. It suggested that the 
Commission should be more proactive in its management of the line. CLONG 
expressed concern that the increased emphasis by the Commission on sectoral and 
geographical priorities could ultimately stifle the right of initiative ofNGOs under 
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B7-6000 (CLONG, 2000). From 2000, the NGOs had to respond to calls for their 
proposals rather than as in the past submit their proposals whenever it suited them 
(European Commission, 2001). This new system could enable the Commission to 
gain some control over the NGOs' affairs. 
CLONG queried the proactive approach advocated by the EC to achieve better 
results. It asserted that the heterogeneity of NGOs reflected and ensured a 
pluralistic approach and response to the diverse and changing conditions. It 
considered that it was important for there to be a critical and independent 
NGO/civil society, which would ensure that the government was accountable and 
also lobby for any change in the policy focus. 
Concurrently, in order to simplify administrative procedures, the development of a 
standard contract was set in motion. This was to be prepared by legal experts in 
DGVrn and based on those for technical assistance. Initially the B7 -6000 budget 
line was to be excluded but, to the surprise of the NGO movement, it was applied 
to all the budget lines available to NGOs, including B7-6000, from 111199 
(CLONG, 1998b). CLONG considered the standardised form did not suit the 
diverse nature of the co-financing budget line and furthermore reminded the 
Commission that a decision had been taken to consult NGOs about the content 
before putting it into practice (CLONG, 1997d). But while the objective was to 
simplify and harmonise procedures into a single standard contract for all budget 
lines, the Commission was aware of the need to consider the possible 
repercussions on Commission-NGO relations -
103 
'This is a delicate exercise which seeks to harmonise the different budget-line 
rules for NGO financing, while making sure that the Commission's relations with 
NGOs are not reduced to a purely commercial contract with a service provider' 
(Houtman 1998: 5). 
The issue of relations between the Commission and the NGOs has always been 
the subject of conjecture on both sides. There have been an increasing number of 
occasions when NGOs have felt wary ofthe EU's dominance and insecure in their 
own position. In 1993 Dumon noted that NGOs were gradually being drawn in to 
act as agents of the EC -
'More and more often, NGOs are being approached to act as instruments of 
European Development policy'-
'We get the impression, in fact, that EC policy makers want to set hard and fast 
lines and then look for organisations to carry out their objectives' (Courier, 1993: 
85). 
This anxiety again surfaced in 1995, when NGOs expressed concern that they 
were seen as contractors by the authorities -
'some authorities view NGOs rather simplistically as little more than contractors. 
There seems to be a trend in this direction in some parts of the Commission' 
(Aaronson, 1995: 3). 
This apprehension was confirmed in a Commission Report on decentralized co-
operation -
'EC increasingly involving NGOs as contractors' (COM (96) 433). 
It highlighted the dilemma for NGOs. On the one hand they were reluctant to be 
drawn into being part of the official aid programme but, on the other hand, they 
did not want to pass up the opportunity to extend their work (COM (96) 433). In 
contrast Commissioner Ryelandt refuted the idea .:. 
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'NGOs are never simply treated as executive agencies' (Courier, 1995: 64). 
Therefore NGDOs were unsure ofthe role they were playing for the Commission 
At the same time as the changes in the administration procedures the Commission 
proposed that NGOs engage in mesa level policy dialogue, which would enable 
the Commission to draw on the experience of NGOs while expanding their 
horizons (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997; CLONG, 1997a). NGOs need to play a 
part in redefining co-operation policies ' NGOs refuse to be mere onlookers' 
(Courier, 1995). 
However this dialogue needs to be viewed in the light of their relative views of 
development policy and the extent to which the Commission would be receptive 
to input from the NGOs. Since the mid 1990s, NGOs have emphasised how 
disparate their views are from those of the EC regarding policy focus and strategy. 
They have advocated a focus on poverty eradication (previously alleviation), using 
a people-centred approach and a concern for progress made and results achieved 
(CLONG, 1996; CLONG, 1997c; Courier, 1997b). In contrast the EC has focused 
on integration into the world economy, but NGOs argue for the need to address 
the 'terms of engagement' for developing countries, as they are already members 
of the world economy (CLONG, 2000). 
The EC advocates using a market-centred approach to reduce poverty and a 
concern with the means employed (CLONG, 1996; CLONG, 1997c; Courier, 
1997b). However, NGOs are unconvinced that the benefits of this approach 
always reach the most deprived and are concerned it would over-ride the people-
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centred model (Courier, 1997c; CLONG, 1996). NGOs feel that EC aid should be 
accountable to recipients. A further criticism by CLONG reveals that the EC has 
promoted two contradictory decision-making models, namely a co-operation 
model, which is based on the participatory approach, and the competitive model, 
which is based on the survival of the fittest (Courier,1998b). 
The publication of the EC's Development Policy (2000) has since similarly met with 
critical response from the NGOs. They expressed concern about the apparent absence 
of strategy to achieve poverty reduction, the lack of clarity concerning civil society 
involvement and the relation with other EC policies (Kinnock, 2000). Criticism was 
levelled at the EC's policy performance on poverty impact and it was suggested that 
DAC targets should be used to monitor EC aid and a rights-based approach taken in 
acknowledgement of the close association between poverty and social injustice 
(Kinnock, 2000; CLONG, 2000). From the document it is apparent that the EC has 
not focused on poverty eradication. NGOs have also expressed concern about the 
focus and strategy of the EC policy, as development co-operation has now become 
linked with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and emergency relief has been 
seen to have a greater media appeal (CLONG, 1995a;CLONG, 2000). It was felt that 
aid did not reach the poor, especially women, and that the private sector could be 
eclipsing human priority areas (CLONG, 1996). Consequently CLONG called for a 
strengthening of gender awareness and the promotion of production that would be 
socially, ecologically and environmentally sustainable (CLONG, 1996). NGOs were 
also concemed that EC policy did not realistically meet the recommendations of the 
various UN summits (Courier, 1997a). 
The NGOs lacked conviction that the Commission would be overtly receptive to 
their views and opinions. In fact NGOs were reticent in their support of the 
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discourse, having experienced the Commission's indifference to such interaction 
on previous occasions-
'NGO scepticism at the level of Commission commitment to a balanced dialogue, 
which fully respects each other's role and autonomy' (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 
1997: ch 2,p2) 
'Commission has all too often been reluctant to relinquish its position of 
dominance' (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2, p3). 
It was feared that the close relations with the Commission could lead to a position 
of 'instrurnentalism' i.e. more funds attached to special budget lines or 
programmes with conditions attached to their use, whereas those funds to support 
the NGOs own initiatives would receive less funding. The Commission's view 
was that NGOs activities would be affected as they became more dependent on 
the Commission for funds -
'more they have to accept negotiation, compromise and joint action' (Bossuyt & 
Wilkinson,1997: ch.2 p 4). 
The Commission pointed out that NGOs need to fit into the new strategic 
management approach adopted by the EC towards development co-operation, 
rather than the Commission reacting to NGOs-
'it is time to adopt a more voluntaristic and proactive approach to European 
NGOs- as opposed to the purely responsive attitude that has prevailed until now' 
(Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2 p 5) 
The majority ofNGOs interviewed supported the idea of deepening their relations 
with the Commission, but felt that the culture for dialogue at the Commission was 
not encouraging -
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'Several examples were given of the Commission failing to respond to European 
ngo network initiatives and/or to adopt a rather "arrogant" attitudes towards 
European NGOs' (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2 pll). 
NGOs also complained about the lack of information sharing by the Commission 
(Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997). 
As a result of the Elewijt process (launched 1995), broad lines of a potential new 
relationship between the Commission and NGOs started to emerge in the late 
1990s. It appeared that changes to be made within the Commission would 
determine its relations with NGOs-
'growing realization in the Commission that a substantive change was needed in 
the way it worked and, within that, the way it worked with NGOs' (CLONG, 
1990a: 2). 
In the new relationship the emphasis would be on policy dialogue and the co-
ordination of NGO and EC programmes, underpinned by a rationalized funding 
programme, which was desired by the Commission. 
1998 was to prove to be a significant year for NGOs and CLONG (CLONG, 
1999a). NGO frustrations over the 
'procedures which grow ever more complicated (and) criteria which deserved to 
be discussed' (CLONG 1998b:2), 
and the blockage of the budget lines built up to such a pitch that NGOs demanded 
that CLONG take a more forceful stance in its dealings with the Commission 
(CLONG, 1998b; CLONG, 1999b) 
'past 12 - 19 months have witnessed some of the most strained relations between 
NGOs and the Commission' (CLONG, 1999b: 1). 
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Therefore, at this phase in relations, much energy was spent on dealing with the 
management of the immediate crisis and consequently the larger picture of 
development policy was ignored (South Research, 2000). In 1999, matters 
appeared to have reached a crucial point 
, the low level to which NGO-Commission relations have sunk' (CLONG, 
1999b:l) 
with the letter sent to the President of the Commission, Jacques Santer, by the 
Secretary General of CLONG in which he identified the sources of the problem, 
namely 
'the arguments over the continuation of the CSP .... 
the blockage of the budget lines ... 
the appearance of non-specialist officials in charge of specialist budget lines ... 
NGOs forced to form project consortia led by NGOs chosen by the Commission ... 
an obligation to produce bank guarantees for projects under certain budget lines' 
(CLONG, 1999b:l). 
Meanwhile the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, necessitated the 
establishment of a dialogue with new discussion partners, such as the European 
Parliament, and a redefinition of aid (CLONG, 1999a). Likewise, personnel 
changes at the Commission and the reorganisation of the foreign relations 
directorate were all pertinent factors (CLONG, 1999b). NGOs were aware of the 
need to work together and co-ordinate their action to gain extra presence in 
exchanges with working partners in the EU especially the Commission (CLONG, 
1999b). This was substantiated by the theme of their 1999 Annual Conference 
"the evolving role of NGOs in development". At the end of 1999, much 
discussion was undertaken within the NGO sector and between representatives of 
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NGOs and the Commission on the draft text of a Communication to the Council 
on strengthening co-operation between NGOs and the Commission (CLONG, 
1999b). Officially published the following year, it reviewed relations between the 
two sides 
'over the last two decades, the partnership between the European Commission and 
NGOs has expanded on all fronts' (COM (2000) 11 : 2) 
and laid out some ideas on how to ensure positive developments in the future. It 
identified good practices and recognized the partnership was able to benefit both 
parties-
'dialogue and co-operation between Commission and NGOs are working well in 
certain areas' (COM(2000) 11 :3) 
'strengthening the relationship between Commission and NGOs can help both 
parties to be more successful in achieving their respective goals' 'Their (NGO) 
involvement in policy shaping & policy implementation helps to win public 
acceptance for the BU' (COM (2000) 11 : 5). 
The Commission also emphasized that NGOs had earned the title of partner-
'The expertise and dedication of NGO staff and their willingness to work under 
difficult operational conditions mean that NGOs are vital partners for the 
Commission both within the EU and beyond' (COM (2000) 11 :5) 
'NGOs have been chosen as partners because of their specificity coupled with 
their expertise and technical capacity' (COM(2000) 11 : 6). 
The idea/concept of a partnership between the Commission and the NGDOs 
received further review at the General Assembly (GA) 2000.The President of 
CLONG felt that only lip-service was being paid to the idea of partnership by the 
Commission-
'we appear not to be valued or respected as equal partners and all too often 
unreasonable demands are made ofus' (CLONG, 2000 : 2) 
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'The expressed desire for a meaningful partnership with NGOs is not being 
translated into practical procedures that are needed to facilitate such a 
relationship' (CLONG, 2000: 2). 
It was felt that the increasing fragmentation and bureaucracy at the Commission, 
has jeopardized the development of relations between NGOs and individual 
officials and therefore the partnership has become more nebulous/tenuous-
'partnership that is defined judicially and administratively as well as politically' 
(CLONG, 2000:4). 
At the GA, Commissioner Nielson recognized that in certain circumstances, the 
relationship between the Commission and NGOs has to be of a contractual form 
but there was a need to guard against stifling NGOs' initiatives-
'Streamlining procedures is a worthy and necessary task but it must not do 
anything to reduce or straitjacket your diversity' (Nielson 2000: 3). 
Nielson was of the opinion that the situation called for a change in strategy so 
that the activities of NGOs better reflected the new paradigms for development, 
particularly in the area of enabling the development of the capacity of Southern 
partners. 
CLONG ICommission relations 
With hindsight, the 1990s can be described as the most traumatic in the history of 
CLONG as it has come under increasing pressure from both its members and the 
Commission over its very existence and position. But this did not materialize until 
the final years of the 90s. By the middle of the decade, CLONG felt it had 
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achieved recognition for its ability to play a role in debates at European level 
based on its experience and knowledge-
'a privileged partner in dialogue with European institutions' (Courier, 1995: 73) 
'full discussion partner in the European debate/dialogue' ( CLONG, 1995a: 2) 
To ensure that its members were made fully aware of the state of its discussions 
with EU institutions, CLONG set up its Policy & Information department in 1997 
(CLONG, 1998a). CLONG was considered to be one of the best-prepared and 
equipped partners of the Commission (CLONG, 1998b) and this received further 
recognition with the instigation of the meso level dialogne, which was seen by the 
President of CLONG as a 'visible symbol of a true, concrete partnership' 
(CLONG, 1998c). Yet on another level, CLONG found itself increasingly put 
under strain as it struggled to cope with developments in relations 
'a series of unexpected shocks, growing tensions and frustrations in the 
relationship between NGOs and the European Commission': James Mackie 
(CLONG,1999a:l). 
The President of CLONG suggested that there existed 'within DGVIII a Unit 
charged with deepening and supporting' the permanent relationship between 
CLONG and the Commission. But new 'challenges, realities and problems' needed 
to be faced and both sides were forced to review their internal affairs as well as 
the terms of their collaboration (CLONG, 1998b). 
The funding of CLONG has emerged as a significant issue. Both 1993 and 1994 were 
identified as financial deficit years (CLONG, 1995a), and the evaluation report (1996) 
mooted the idea that it would be healthier for CLONG to reduce its almost exclusive 
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financial dependence on contribution from the EU's budget. The Commission voiced 
its support for the introduction of a membership fee, although at present CLONG's 
members work voluntarily for the committees. Aaronson (CLONG, 2000) felt that 
CLONG needed to demonstrate that it was financially independent of the Commission 
but was unable to do so. CLONG has found it difficult to raise even the 15% 
demanded by the current arrangement with the Commission. 
Into the 21 st Century 
CLONG expressed a wish to move to a better relationship, which reflected the 
'spirit of real partnership', but felt that this was thwarted on two fronts. Firstly, it 
regarded the time allowed by the Commission for the consultation process to be 
insufficient and therefore the Commission retained its dominant position. 
Secondly CLONG was aware of the disquiet about its close relations with the 
Commission-
We have to understand that (CLONG'S) own relationship with the Commission is 
increasingly challenged from within the Commission. There are many who feel it 
is too close, too uncritical and too comfortable for both parties to be in the public 
interest'. (Aaronson) (CLONG, 2000: 3)' 
'Though we may deny it we know that our relationship with the Commission is 
close, at times perhaps too close and far too cosy: and as much as we resist it, we 
know that ultimately there is truth in the dictum: it is hard for anyone to bite the 
hand that feeds it'. (Aaranson, 2000: 3). 
The SCR had audited CLONG, and queried the level of independence of CLONG 
from the Commission. The two sides then became embroiled in a battle of words. 
The dispute was grounded in a claim by the Commission that there had been a 
mismanagement of funds at CLONG, which came to light when it was audited. 
Consequently the Commission suspended payments to CLONG (Infonet news, 
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2002). At this point CLONG was representing 930 (Infonet news, 2000) members 
but felt it should consider winding down its affairs. At the same time it lodged an 
action against the Commission in the Belgium courts. The outcome is muddled 
but at this time it appears that CLONG is now a smaller unit with a smaller role to 
play. (It has been difficult to find out the true picture as different sources give 
conflicting information.) 
The information presented on the evolution of relations from 1976 until 2002, 
between the Commission and the NG(D)Os can now be reviewed in the light of 
the academic discourse presented in chapter 2 on the changing NGO scene. In the 
early days during the latter part of the 1970s, relations were essentially in an 
embryonic stage, with the Commission taking on the role of facilitation 
(Farrington & Bebbington, 1993), where the Commission allowed the NGOs to 
pursue their own agenda with little interference at this stage other than in matters 
relating to procedures. In fact the Commission appeared to take into account the 
wishes of the NGOs wherever they identified an inadequacy in the regulations 
pertaining to the execution of the co-financing budget line. Throughout the period 
under review the B7-6000 budget line has been based on the 'right of initiative' by 
northern NGOs. The progress of time into the 1980s, however, brought with it a 
subtle attempt by the Commission to steer the allocation of funds used for the B7-
6000 line by the identification of special focus groups that would be a favoured 
theme for the particular year's budget. This can be identified as the Commission 
exerting a constructive (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993) influence over the use of 
the funds. This constructive influence was extended when the Commission 
introduced a number of situation specific budget lines at the request of the NGOs. 
Further use can be made of Farrington and Bebbington's classification, by stating 
114 
that distortion has occurred in the later stages of the relationship when the 
Commission pushed for the use of funds for market-centred activities rather than 
the people-centred activities favoured by NGOs. 
As the degree of influence exerted by the Commission has increased so NGOs 
have become more anxious about their role in the development process. They feel 
that their position is compromised and that they are being forced to carry out 
contracts issued by the Commission (Pratt & Stone, 1994; Hulme & Edwards, 
1997; Smillie, 1997; Wallace, 1998; Fowler, 2000; Hailey, 2000). However while 
they are aware of the position they have been put in, they fear that they may lose 
out to DONGOs (Dichter, 1997) and other opportunist NGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996) unless they agree to accept the funding opportunities offered by the 
Commission. As the funding opportunities have expanded so the diversity of 
interests represented by the NGO sector can be seen to encompass the whole 
spectrum of NGO activities (Korten, 1987; SmiIlie, 1995). One criticism of some 
emerging NGOs is that they are funding led and do not show the same ethical 
approach as the more established NGOs (Pronk, 1998). However it can also be 
stated that some of the more mature NGOs have similarly been seduced by the 
appearance of new funded opportunities (Smillie, 1995) especially in the area of 
emergency work as opposed to development activities. In many cases the positive 
response by NGOs to the new funding windows has meant that the NGOs could 
be acting in direct conflict with their own values (Van der Heijden, 1987; Smillie, 
1995; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Dichter, 1997; Tvedt, 1998). The Commission 
has been keen to use NGOs to provide a better image of EU policies to the EU 
and the South (Twose, 1987; Fowler, 1998). 
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After the initial nascent phase in relations, the Commission developed a critical 
awareness of the deficiencies ofNGOs (Annis, 1987; Smith, 1987; Twose, 1987; 
Bratton, 1989; Edwards & Hulme, 1992). This has resulted in the Commission 
promoting itself to act as co-ordinator and catalyst of NGOs' work in order to 
improve the impact of their activities and the return from the use of EC funds 
(Robinson, 1992; Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995). At the same time 
the focus on a market system along with the push for efficiency and effectiveness 
resulted in a discernable shift towards the call to show value for money. NGOs 
were therefore directed to become more accountable to the Commission. 
Furthermore the EC is concerned with short-term functional accountability 
(Edwards & Hulme, 1996), which impacts negatively on NGOs' work, which is 
qualitative and contingent. This has overshadowed their accountability to other 
stakeholders not least of which are the indigenous people/poorest of the poor 
(Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Smillie, 1995; Najam, 1996). NGOs have thus come 
under increasing pressure to conform to the Commission's administrative 
approach (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Tvedt, 1998), especially the focus on 
quantifiable goals (ElIiott, 1987; Pearce, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). 
Therefore it appears that over time the language, values and systems of the 
Commission are being absorbed by NGOs to become second nature (Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Wallace, 1998; Fowler, 2000). In contrast, while transparency has 
been called for from the NGOs, it has not been forthcoming from the Commission 
(Fowler, 1998). 
The more powerful position of the Commission is dependent upon the role as 
financial provider (Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Pearce, 1993; Tandon, 1994; 
Fowler, 1998). The Commission is moving towards a more strategic approach to 
116 
development co-operation, where the use of funds and the outcomes are more 
quantifiable and predictable. This approach is associated with Fowler's 
classification as functional co-optation (1998) and is reflected in the skew towards 
a programme basis. It also indicates that there has been a move along the 
conservative-progressive partnership continuum with the delegation of some 
responsibility towards the CSP and consortia (Fowler, 1998). 
The position of CLONG throughout the period under review has evolved in 
response to the pressure exerted on it by both the NGOs and the Commission. In 
the early stages of its relations with the Commission, the situation was one of 
operational collaboration (Covey, 1998), where they were concerned with the 
identification, design and implementation ofthe projects, which had been initiated 
by the NGOs. At the same time CLONG and NGOs have been involved in critical 
dialogue with the Commission (Hellinger, 1987; Prat! & Stone, 1994; Covey, 
1998). In the early days of these dialogues, CLONG was involved in low conflict 
and high co-operation relations (Covey, 1998). As CLONG gained confidence 
and recognition for its worth in the 1 980s, it began to develop a more critical 
position while still co-operating with the Commission, and in the 1990s it could 
be identified as insider advocacy (Covey, 1998). But more recently it has been 
criticized as being too close (Tvedt, 1998). 
The promotion of the dialogue approach requires an efficient and effective 
interface between the Commission and NGOs but this is not in place. The 
Commission finds it is difficult to obtain interlocutors for policy dialogue for 
programme funding because there is mutual distrust between NGOs and 
competition for funds in the current climate. Differences in ideology and project 
focus do not lend themselves to the formation of a cohesive network ofNGOs. 
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In the reassessment of development co-operation a review of the EC macro level 
programmes and NGO micro level projects identified a grey area - the meso level. 
In other words the concern was for an integrative approach to cover sectors, 
themes, and geographical areas. This meso dialogue required intra-NGO 
cooperation, closer links between the Commission and NGOs and new 
performance criteria. But the problem remained- would the meso dialogue be 
balanced respecting roles and autonomy? 
Evolution of Relations 
Throughout the period under review, relations between the European Commission 
and European NGOs have evolved in response to the complex interaction of 
factors, which have affected them either individually or jointly. The desire of 
NGOs to classify their relationship with the European Commission as one of 
'partner' has at times eluded them. The imbalance of power and access to 
information has meant that the normative definition of partnership has not been 
achieved. Despite the recurrent attempts by NGOs to increase their engagement in 
the pursuit of a more equal partnership, the balance of power has always favoured 
the EC, giving support to the view that the provider of resources calls the tune 
(Hulme & Edwards, 1997). NGOs have found themselves to be increasingly 
subject to donor conditionality and drawn into EC policy to play a role within that 
framework. At times they have been praised for the input and critical role they 
have played in the development of EC policy. However they have been frustrated 
by the lack of transparency shown by the Commission. 
As the representative body of the European NGO sector, CLONG fared in a 
different way. From the very beginning, once it was financially dependent on the 
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Commission, it found itself in a subservient role. With the progression of time, its 
position became more fraught as it was caught between the rapid expansion of an 
increasingly heterogeneous group of NGOs and the Commission, which found 
itself under pressure from other EU institutions to sort out its bureaucratic 
problems and produce a coherent set of policies. Over time as the EC sought to 
deliver a well-defined external affairs approach and to tighten its control over its 
policies, NGOs found themselves to be drawn in to play a part in the realization of 
the political and economic aspirations of the European Community. Therefore, 
whether a 'partnership' was ever really in place between the NGOsICLONG and 
the Commission/EC is debatable. It has certainly been subject to change, which 
has reflected the trend in the 'partnership' between the EC and the ACPs. In order 
to examine the application of EC Development policy to one particular region, the 
next chapter will review the state of affairs in SADC(C) since 1980. 
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Chapter 5: The EC and SADC(C): an example ofEC 
Development Co-operation Policy in Practice 
This chapter focuses on Southern Africa to show the EC approach to a specific region 
and its changing dynamics. Within Southern Africa, the Southern Africa 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) group has been chosen as the case 
study; therefore the period under review commences from 1980 when SADCC was 
formed. The European Community has periodically reassessed its policy approach 
towards the region, in the light of both its own evolution and that of the region itself. 
An analysis of the application of EC Development Co-operation Policy to the region 
requires an understanding of the dynamics of relations between the EC and 
SADCC/SADC, and a discussion of the influence exerted by South Africa on these 
relations. Throughout the period 1980 to 1999, the situation in South Africa has 
impacted on the lives of the population in the SADCC/SADC countries and 
consequently the region's development aid requirements. 
The aim of the chapter, therefore, is to 
I) examine the evolution ofEU/SADC(C)/South Africa relations, and 
2) identify the impact ofthis evolution on the pattern of EU aid flows to the 
SADCC/SADC region. 
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The period under review (1980 -1999) can justifiably be divided into two, on the 
basis of the change in the circumstances in South Africa and the associated 
repercussions for the SADCC/SADC group. 
The Period of Apartheid: 
The Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC) 
SADCC was set up in 1980 in direct response to the policy of apartheid in South 
Africa, and the desire of the countries to rid themselves of economic dependence on 
South Africa (War on Want, 1984; Lee, 1989; Tostensen, 1993; Sidaway, 1998). This 
dependence was not considered to be a natural phenomenon but was partly a direct 
consequence of the previous colonial presence in the countries of SAD CC and South 
Africa (Makoni, 1987; Ibeanu, 1990; Gibb, 1998). The region had become dominated 
by South Africa, particularly with respect to trade flows, transport systems and labour 
movements (Barren, 1981; Makoni, 1987; CEC, 1996). The configuration of the rail 
transport networks had meant that trade flows from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
were dependant upon the port facilities of South Africa. Labour opportunities in 
South African mines had ensured a steady flow of migrant workers from Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and even Tanzania, although 
this had recently begun to decline with the exception of Lesotho and Mozambique 
(Lee, 1989; Cobbe, 1990; Thede, 1993; Adedeji, 1996). 
South Africa was also a significant supplier of power and a source ofFDI (Lee, 1989; 
Hawkins, 1992). Therefore, SADCC was created not only in response to the apartheid 
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situation, but also to develop a regionally integrated group of countries, which would 
exclude the common enemy, South Africa (Oyowe, 1981). The group was determined 
to break the regional dominance of South Africa, which they considered to be a 
hindrance to their development (Cobbe, 1990; Pisani, 1992; Smidt, 1996). 
South Africa 
In response to the severance of ties by the SADCC countries, South Africa embarked 
upon a policy of destabilization in an attempt to both sabotage the development of the 
new regional grouping and to ensure the situation retained international attention 
(War on Want 1987; Ibeanu, 1990). South Africa saw SADCC as a threat to its 
regional dominance, which was dependent upon a constellation of nation-states 
(Thompson, 1986; Makoni, 1987). Gibb (1987) identified South Africa's regional 
dominance as being to some extent spatially determined. Those countries, which were 
members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), were the most 
inextricably tied to SA due to their location and lack of port facilities, whereas 
geographically distanced Tanzania was one of the least affected. The programme of 
destabilisation invoked by South Africa against the members of SADCC manifested 
itself essentially in one of three forms; namely economic siege, military attack or 
subversive activities (Ibeanu, 1990; Patel, 1992; Adedeji, 1996). The method used 
depended upon the target country and thus the repercussions of the South African 
strategy varied with the country concerned. For instance military destabilization 
tactics were employed against Mozambique and Angola but were also seen to affect 
Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe (War on Want, 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986; 
1987). 
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The European Community 
The European Community's response to the situation in Southern Africa was two-
fold, taking a positive approach towards SADCC and an isolationist stance against 
South Africa (War on Want, 1988; Holland, 1995a; CEC, 1996) Its offer of full 
support for the formation of SAD CC was partly to show the Community's abhorrence 
of apartheid policy, but was also, - with the second objective of SAD CC being 
'to create a genuinely equitably regional integrated economy (Makoni, 1987: 30) 
in keeping with the Community's desire to support the creation of regionally 
integrated associations (Oyowe, 1981; Holland, 1995a; Schmidt, 1996). The DG for 
Development, C.Cheysson (1981) indicated that SADCC was in harmony with the 
approach to regional integration used by Europe, although he emphasised that 
, ... every people has the right to its own model of development. The identity of one 
must be respected, and each country must have the right to choose its political 
system, its economic system and its alliances' (Oyowe, 1981:xiii). 
Thus closer examination of the Lusaka agreement indicated that the traditional 
customs union model used by the European Community had been rejected in favour 
of a system of cooperation and co-ordination, with the focus on a pragmatic approach 
to development (Thompson, 1986; Makoni, 1987; Tostensen, 1993; Holland, 1995a; 
Gibb, 1998). The object of SADCC was to unite a group of countries, that covered 
the whole political spectrum from socialism to free enterprise. The development 
model used by SADCC, therefore, did not follow the current neo-liberal approach as 
advocated by the international organisations, such as the World Bank and the 
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International Monetary Fund, but attempted to ensure it did not exclude any potential 
members. Amin (1987) suggested that Community support for SADCC was an 
example of 'assertive European diplomacy' that, while attempting to prevent the front 
line states from offering support to the ANC and SWAPO, was bent on creating a 
diversion away from the South Africa situation. The European Community's strategy 
can therefore be seen to have primarily a political motive rather than an economic 
one. 
The isolationist policy approach taken by the Community to South Africa resulted in 
the imposition of economic sanctions and the severance of general aid flows (CEC, 
1996; CEC, 1999). Holland (1998) declared that the list of economic sanctions 
imposed was too little, too late and was the result of a division of views among the 
European Union Member States on a policy that called for a unanimous agreement by 
them. Individually, members of the European Union displayed different attitudes 
towards South Africa as a result of their historical and current links with the region. 
South Africa was seen to be important in terms of its resources and its location, and 
thus, Europe was concerned to ensure the long-term stability of the region (Oyowe, 
1981; lbeanu, 1990; Matambalya, 1998). 
For SADCC, the 1980s has been described as a 'nightmare decade' (Van de Velde, 
1990) dominated by the fight against apartheid rather than the promotion of economic 
development in the region (Holland 1995a). Consequently SADCC failed not only to 
reduce its members' economic dependence on South Africa but also failed to reduce 
their external dependence generally (Lee, 1989; Hawkins, 1992; Tostensen, 1993; 
Sidaway & Gibb, 1998). 
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Post-Apartheid Period 
The ending of the policy of apartheid in South Africa essentially nullified the raison 
d' etre for the existence of SADCC in its original state, and it was now at a 'turning 
point' (Courier, 1990; Van De Velde, 1990; Gibb, 1998). SADCC had to reassess its 
fonn and function, in response to the changing circumstances in South Africa, which 
heralded in a new multi -racial and democratic society (Van De Velde, 1990; Gibb, 
1998). The repositioning of SADCC also needed to take into account possible future 
decisions ofthe European Community, the WTO and other Southern African regional 
groupings. Each of these bodies went through a period of reassessment of their 
approach towards the new South Africa. SADCC was aware that it was not the only 
option open to South Africa, which was intent on re-integration into the World 
economy and at the same time the promotion of its own development within the 
Southern African region. The region offered three feasible alternatives to South 
Africa for its re-emergence, namely the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 
SADCC or the Common Market of Eastern and Southern African Countries 
(COMESA) (Hawkins, 1992; Maasdorp, 1992). SACU, which had continued to 
function during the apartheid period, was small in tenns of market size. Except for 
South Africa, the countries were all members of SADCC and it could be argued that 
this could pose a threat to SADCC's existence. As an alternative, COMESA, which 
also included members of SADCC with the exception of Botswana, offered a much 
larger market. Consequently the region was seen to be fraught with rivalry and 
overlapping membership (Gibb, 1998). 
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South Africa had always been an important item on the European Community's 
foreign policy agenda, and at this stage, the Community was keen to ensure that the 
region remained stable and that the economic power of South Africa was tied in with 
the promotion of development in the Southern African region (Courier, 1995; 
Holland, 1995a; Holland, 1998; MatarnbaJya, 1998). From 1990, funding from the 
European Community to Southern Africa had a wider remit than just SAD CC and 
anti-apartheid support. Finance was available for regional trade agreements, which 
put SADCC in competition with COMESA This, along with the rulings of the WTO, 
promoted the move by SAD CC towards a specific form of regional integrated 
agreement. 
Southern African Development Community 
As a result of the Windhoek Declaration in 1992, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) was set up to pursue 'deeper economic co-operation and 
development' (Windhoek, 1996:1). Its direction had turned towards neo-liberal 
objectives with the private sector seen as the engine of economic growth (Tsie, 1996), 
but with an emphasis on the role of government. This decade was to focus on the 
development of human resources, particularly entrepreneurial skills (Windhoek, 
1996). Despite an initial reticence, SADC became intent on attracting South Africa to 
become one of its members (Gibb, 1998). This move was supported by the European 
Community's approach to the region when, in 1993, one of the first joint action 
projects under the new Common Foreign and Security Policy was the promotion of 
peace and stability for South Africa within the framework of SADC (Holland, 
1995a). At the EU/SADC Berlin Conference 1994, South Africa was declared the 
eleventh member of SADC, with the full support of the EU, which was keen to 
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increase the participation of South Africa in regional co-operation projects (Holland, 
1995a; CEC, 1999). According to DG Smidt (1996), the resultant Berlin Declaration 
set out a commitment to a 
'comprehensive dialogue involving political dialogue, human rights, trade and 
economic co-operation and development co-operation' (Smidt, 1996:2). 
The Community's policy towards Southern Africa had three complementary 
objectives: to support the political co-operation within SADC and regional economic 
integration through the liberalisation of trade, but also, at the same time, to promote 
trade and economic co-operation between Southern Africa and the ED (Smidt, 1996: 
CEC,1999). 
From its position, SADC was keen to extend the Lome Convention approach to 
increase its access to the European market. All the countries of SADC, with the 
exception of South Africa, were members of the ACP group. South Africa was 
willing to join, but was unable to in recognition of its more developed status 
(Rurnney, 1995; Gibb, 1998). This meant that the Community needed to treat South 
Africa as a special case and, in October 1995, it proposed a trade and co-operation 
agreement with the Republic of South Africa (CEC, 1996). However this was a 
bilateral agreement and therefore was inconsistent with the EC's stated preference for 
region-to-region, or multilateral, agreements. According to Holland (1995a) there 
have been 
'significant contradictions and inconsistencies between and within the ED's variety of 
Southern African policies'(Holland, 1995a: 282). 
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In part, this could be explained as the result of the division of administrative 
responsibility between DGI and DGVIII; with DGI dealing with South Africa and 
DGVIII dealing with developing countries. At the same time, the EC was in the 
process of seeking a replacement for the Lome Convention, as it was considered to 
lack conformity with WTO non-discrimination regulations. The European 
Community saw SADC as a way to move on from Lome IV and develop multilateral 
relations aimed at regional integration. However the EC's move, to promote its own 
trade interests with South Africa to the exclusion of SADC, was viewed as divisive 
and, in August 1996, SADC responded by proposing to become a Free Trade Area 
(FTA) in a decade (Gibb, 1998). This would guarantee that SADC was compatible 
with WTO rulings. DG Smidt (1996) responded with support for the regional 
initiative and a pronouncement that it was congruent with the EC's proposed future 
FTA with the SADC region. According to Keet (1997), the move by SADC was 
essentially an attempt to pre-empt the EC trade strategy and ensure that any 
developments in the EC-SA relations would be unable to take precedence over a prior 
trade agreement. 
As a result of discussions between the European Community and South Africa, the 
latter was offered qualified membership of the ACP group and the Lome Convention 
(Smidt, 1996; Pinheira, 1997). In March 1999, the 'Trade, Development & Co-
operation Agreement' between the EC and South Africa was concluded. This 
agreement, with its focus on the transition towards a Free Trade Area (FTA) between 
the two, also covered human rights issues and the establishment of a political 
dialogue (Pinheira, 1997; CEC, 1999). According to DG Smidt (1996), the bilateral 
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agreement should be viewed as part of the EC strategy to advance the level of 
prosperity and development in the region. 
It can be seen therefore, that in the 1990s, Community relations with SADC and 
South Africa have again been a source of division in Southern Africa. The 
termination of the policy of apartheid in South Africa enabled each of them to 
reassess their relative position. The European Community was presented with the 
opportunity to safeguard its interests and investments in the region. The dilemma was 
how to ensure stability in the region, rein in the strength of South Africa and at the 
same time nurture the development of the Southern African region. EC/SADC 
relations therefore changed from one of unification against a common enemy to one 
of political partnership based on conflict prevention and the promotion of peace 
(Courier, 1997). EC relations with South Africa were now geared towards making 
certain that the strength of South Africa was inextricably bound up with the 
development of the Southern African region. Fortunately for SADC, this move, while 
initially appearing to be bilateral in emphasis, should in the long run result in the 
unification of the area in a Free Trade Agreement between the EC and a SADC, 
inclusive of South Africa. 
EC Development Co-operation Policy and SADC(C) 
The pattern of EC aid to SADC(C) has been determined by a number of factors in 
addition to the evolution of the tri-partite relations as discussed above. The ACP 
members in Southern Africa have received support from the EC under the Lome 
Conventions since 1976. The countries of SADC(C) expected development aid from 
the EC on the basis of their ACP membership and the status of some of their 
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members as the poorest and most aid dependent countries in the World (Appendix A). 
However they also needed EC support to make the break away from South Africa 
work (Holland, 1995a). Therefore the flow of aid to Southern Africa was partly 
determined by the EC's anti-apartheid stance, but was also a response to the 
repercussions of the aggressive policy carried out by South Africa on its neighbours. 
The consequence of the South African military activity in SAD CC (table 5.1) was 
reflected in the number of people dead, those displaced internally or internationally, 
and the destruction of the infrastructure (South, 1981; Thompson, 1986). The cost of 
the policy of destabilization has impacted unevenly across the region, with those 
countries most affected being Angola and Mozambique, both directly and as a result 
of apartheid debt (table 5.2). 
TABLE 5.1 Displaced persons in Southern Africa 1989 
To From Angola Mozambique S.A. Other 
Angola 10,000 12,500 
Botswana 900 500 
Lesotho 4,500 
Malawi 720,000 
SA 200,000 
Swaziland 64,000 6,700 
Tanzania 72,000 192,200 
Zambia 97,000 20,000 3,200 11,500 
Zimbabwe 176,500 500 
Other 298,700 
Total 395,700 1,252,500 25,800 216,700 
Source: Economist 23 Dec / 4 Jan 1990 
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Table 5.2 DestabiJization in Southern Africa 
Country Cost of Apartheid * 
destabilization Debt 
£million £ million 
Angola 22,727 6,432 
Botswana 379 152 
Lesotho 227 91 
Malawi 1,629 724 
Mozambique 11,364 4,545 
Swaziland 152 0 
Tanzania 985 492 
Zambia 3,788 1,905 
Zimbabwe 6,061 2,273 
Sub total 47,311 16,614 
SA 11,345 
Total 47,311 27,959 
Source: ACTSA, 1998 (* Apartheid Debt -loans and mterest payments) 
With the ending of apartheid, EC decisions to provide aid to the region had to be 
reassessed, as it could no longer be seen as part of an BC anti-apartheid policy. 
According to Oden (1993), SADC now had to compete on equal terms with the other 
demands for financial resources in the region, particularly a post apartheid South 
Africa, which needed aid for the development of physical infrastructure as well as to 
meet the needs ofthe population. 
Financial assistance to the region of SADC( C) has included both development aid 
and emergency aid given to counteract the repercussions of civil unrest and natural 
disasters (CEC, 1994). In addition, the European Community has taken a particular 
interest in SADC(C)'s pursuit of regional co-operation, which, while not exactly 
replicating its own model, has promoted collaboration. There has been a small shift 
towards regional programme funding over time, but in absolute terms the national 
programmes have received the greater support (table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 EU Financial Assistance (EDF + EIB + EC budget) to SADC(C) states 
Lomel LomeII Lome III LomelV Total 
1975-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95* 
National Programme 267.5 371.7 824.6 905.6 2369.4 
Regional Programme 30.0 70 141.0 121.0 362.0 
EIB loans 66.1 152.9 201.2 230.1 650.3 
Interest subsidies 6.2 17.4 19.2 21.7 64.5 
Stabex 33.9 35.1 56.4 68.1 193.5 
Sysmin - 82.3 21.6 1000.0 203.9 
Emergency aid 44.5 33.0 86.5 83.0 247.0 
Food aid 81.7 147.5 246.4 250.9 726.5 
Other (eg NGOs) 26.0 42.2 47.2 41.5 156.9 
PreLome aid 25.0 26.5 51.5 
Total 580.9 978.6 1644.1 1821.9 5025.5 
.. 
millions ECU * data to 1993 
Source: CEC (1994) Southern Africa and the European Union plO. 
The increase in BC funding for regional programmes was in line with its desire to 
promote region-to-region co-operation (European Commission, 1996). In 1986, an 
agreement between the two regions resulted in EC aid for RIPs being directed to 
SADCC for dispersal rather than to the individual countries (CEC, 1996). This was 
the first EC agreement of its kind, between itself and a group of ACP countries 
(Thompson, 1986). A regional focus of assistance was considered to be especially 
necessary in the light of the region's problems and the level of interdependence 
between the countries. The state of the transport infrastructure had been a cause for 
concern, not only as a result of the destabilization policy of South Africa, but also due 
to the fact that six of the countries are land-locked and rely on the transport system 
for their trading activities. Consequently funding initially focused on rehabilitation 
and the transport infrastructure (table 5.4), although financial support was also 
available for food production, partly in response to the region's drought problems but 
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also due to the problems of inadequate marketing, distribution and storage facilities 
(EC, 1994). In the late 1980s, SADCC was ready to respond to international pressure 
and focus on the growth of enterprise, and investment in production (Makoni, 1987; 
Thede, 1987; Van De Ve1de, 1990». 
Table 5.4 Southeru African regional programmes by sector 
LomeI LomeII Lome III Lome IV 
Allocations 30 70 141 121 
Transport & 20 (67%) 23.1 (34%) 91 (65%) 60 (49.5%) 
Communications 
Food Security, 0.8 (3%) 23 (34%) 27 (19%) 18 (15%) 
Agriculture & 
natural resources 
Human Resources 8.8 (30%) 13.8 (20%) 14 (10%) 21 (17.5%) 
Development 
Other areas - 7.9 (12%) 9(6%) 22 (18%) 
Total 29.6 67.8 141 121 
.. Source: CEC (1994) Southern Afnca and the European Umon p 12. (mllhon ecu) 
In the 1990s the focus was on economic, social and political issues with the objective 
of improving the standard ofliving of the people through sustainable socio-economic 
development (CEC, 1998). Since 1992, biannual ministerial conferences have been 
held between SADC and the EC, which have resulted in the identification a range of 
issues for collective action. At Windhoek (1992) the emphasis was on neo-liberal 
principles and the development of the private sector and entrepreneurial skills. The 
second EC/SADC conference (1994), agreed to 'consolidate and strengthen 
democratic institutions', and supported the move towards globalisation (CEC, 1998). 
The Regional Indicative Programme for SADC (1996), drawn up by the Commission 
and representatives of SADC, recognised the region's economic and political 
priorities and the need to ensure peace and stability in the region, but considered the 
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development of human resources to be a crucial factor, along with gender issues and 
environmental concerns (Windhoek, 1996). In the latter half of the 1990s, according 
to Liebaert (1997b), there was a need to regionally deal with the management of 
water resources, if the region was to avoid any more confrontation and concentrate on 
social and economic development. At the 3rd EU/SADC conference (Vienna, 1998), 
agreement was reached on the importance of strongly supporting democracy and 
peace in the region, combating social problems - crime, AIDS -, resource 
management, regional integration and sound economic policies-
'support SADC in the adaptation of their economic structures towards globalisation' 
(CEC,1998:1). 
National Indicative Programmes of the SADC(C) countries come under the objectives 
of the Lome Conventions. Under Lome I and Lome II the focus was on rural 
development projects with a particular emphasis on health, transport and agriculture, 
and thus reflected the dominant problems in the SADC(C) region (CEC, 1994). Lome 
III emphasised water supply and sanitation, transport and agriculture, and allowed the 
inclusion of country specific issues e.g. Angola (private sector); Botswana 
(environment/conservation, education/training) (CEC, 1994). Lome IV stressed its 
support for democratic society, sustainable economic and social development, and the 
ability to compete in the world economy (CEC, 1994). All the countries were keen to 
promote the alleviation of poverty. 
The countries of Southern Africa have suffered from both natural and human-made 
disasters e.g. drought, civil unrest, AIDSIHIV, and therefore have received 
humanitarian relief from the EC through NGOs e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania. 
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In Namibia, in the period leading up to its independence from South Africa, most EC 
aid was channelled through NGOs (Conrier, 1995d). Performance criteria have been 
used as can be seen in the case of the suspension of aid to Malawi in 1994 due to their 
violation of human rights (Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997). 
The 'other assistance' category (table 5.3), which includes NGO co-financed 
operations, has seen its relative proportion of funds deteriorate from 4.5% (Lome 1) to 
2.3% (Lome IV) of the total financial assistance to SADC(C) from the EC (CEC, 
1994). NGOs have been able to access a number of budget lines for their projects in 
Southern and South Africa according to sectoral criteria (table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Budget Lines open to NGOs according to sectoral criteria 
Southern Africa South Africa 
Direct Aid EDF B7-320 
All sectors NGO B&-6000 B7-6000 
actions 
Food Aid B7-2000,2010, B7-2000, 
2020 2010,2020 
Emergency B7-210,217, B7-21O,217, 
humanitarian aid 219, Art 254 219, Art 254 
Rehabilitation B7-641, B7-321 B7-320 
Refugees (after Art 255 Art 255 
emergencies) 
Training B7-61O B7-61O 
Women & development B7-611 B7-611 
Environment B7-6200,6201 B7-6200, 
6201 
Health B7-6211, B7- B7-6211, B7-
631 631 
Drugs B7-6210 B7-6210 
Population/demography B7-631 B7-631 
Decentralised co- B7-643 B7-643 
operation 
Human Rights B7-702, B7- B7-702, B7-
7040, B7-709 7040, B7-709 
Source: CLONG (1998a) NGO handbook 
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Two budget lines have been set up by the EC to deal exclusively with the problems of 
Southern Africa. In 1988 the budget line, B7-9531 Support for Front Line States 
and SADC(C), was set up initially in response to the South African destabilization 
policy in the region and was directed towards disadvantaged people. It was the first 
example of a budget line with 
'an overtly political agenda' (APT Consult, 2001 :32). 
It provided training, education and health care for refugees and displaced persons. In 
1993 the EC recognised the need for the aid to cover the transition from emergency to 
development aid and therefore the focus changed to rehabilitation and included land 
mine clearance operations (B7-5071 Assistance for rehabilitation programmes in 
Southern Africa). NGOs were considered to be appropriate agents, able to attain the 
trust of the government and thus contribute to the process of democratisation (Corn 
(94) 468). In 1993 the budget line became known as the 'Special Initiative for 
Africa'. Under rehabilitation operations, repair to productive plant and infrastructure, 
and the rebuilding of institutional capacity were emphasised. Prior to 1995 the budget 
line played a significant role in the process of recovery in Angola and Mozambique, 
before the NIPs began to focus on rehabilitation (APT Consult, 2001). Over time the 
use of the line changed from a focus on humanitarian (1989 = 72%) to rehabilitation 
issues (1995 = 90.4%) but it has been constrained by EC management of the line 
'flexibility marred by a degree of procedural sclerosis' (APT Consult, 2001 : 15). 
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In 1986 the EC set up a budget line (B7-5070 Special Programme for Apartheid 
victims) to aid victims of apartheid and counter the negative effects of sanctions 
(Thompson 1996). 
Table 5.6 B7-5070 Special Aid Programme for Apartheid Victims 
Year Euro 
million 
1986 10.0 
1987 20.0 
1988 25.5 
1989 25.0 
1990 30.0 
1991 60.0 
1992 80.0 
1993 90.0 
1994 66.7 
1995 125.0 
1996 13.6 
1997 21.0 
Source: vanous annual budget returns of the B7-6000 budget line 
Initially assistance was channelled through non-violent organisations such as 
churches (Corn (94) 468). In 1995, when funding reached a peak (table 5.6), there 
was a shift from supporting numerous NGO projects to a dialogue between the 
European Commission and the government of South Africa on development policy. 
As the situation changed in South Africa, the budget line was renamed the European 
Programme for Reconstruction and Development B7-32000 (1996) and offered EC 
support for the move to democracy and reconstruction taking place in the country 
(Corn (96) 32). The EC policy towards South Africa was now closer to the ACP 
system and in 1997 a Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) was drawn up for 
1997-1999. NGOs were therefore no longer the sole implementers of the aid funds 
but were either to be in a direct contractual relationship with the Commission and 
carry out projects consistent with the SA government policies or to be subcontracted 
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by the government (Corn (98) 127). Funding provided under the Special programme 
for South Africa since 1991 has drawn financial support away from the other 
countries ofthe SADC region (CEC, 1994). 
The EC has taken an interest in the SADCCc) region due to the historical and cultural 
links between the two regions and the associated current economic and political ties. 
This bond has been more recently overshadowed by the implications and 
repercussions of the apartheid regime of South Africa. In view of the differing 
political systems in place in the region, it has not been strategicany acceptable for the 
EC to engage in overt development activities therefore this has enabled European 
NGOs to play a more prominent part. The pattern of assistance to the region has been 
the result of the interplay between directives of the Lome conventions and the 
inclusion of very poor countries in the SADCCC) region, but the over riding factor has 
been the EC's particular strategy towards South Africa. Once the policy of apartheid 
was rescinded in South Africa, the European Community focused on a policy of 
growth and stabilisation in the region based on the inclusion of SA into agreements to 
avoid any future fragmentation. In order to see how the policy advocated was played 
out in practice, the co-financing of NGO operations under budget line B7-6000 will 
be examined in the subsequent chapter. 
138 
Chapter 6 
The UK NGOs' projects co-financed by the European 
Commission under the B7-6000 budget line 
The object of this chapter is to provide an example of EC Development Co-operation 
policy in practice in a particular region, as played out through the UK NGO projects 
co-financed by the European Commission. SADC(C) was chosen because it 
comprises a group of countries unified by a common local factor, South Africa. It is a 
region, which is economically and politically important to the EC, not least because of 
its chequered relationship with South Africa. 
In order to obtain sufficient time series data to be able to identify and examine trends 
in the use of the co-financed budget line, only the ten countries with the longest 
membership of SADC(C) were included. Initially it seemed feasible to expect to use a 
time period of at least twenty years but due to ·the lack of a complete database from 
the Commission, the period was then reduced to 1980 to 1996. The decision to focus 
down onto UK NGOs active in the region was partly based on the fact that the author 
is British, and is more familiar with, and able to access additional information about, 
UK NGOs. Furthermore seven of the member states share a colonial past with Britain: 
namely Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
These countries did not gain their independence until the second half of the twentieth 
century and are members of the Commonwealth. Consequently UK NGOs are 
expected to have an interest and a significant presence in these countries. 
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This chapter will, therefore 
i) identify the limitations of the data base and justify the methodology, 
ii) examine the pattern of activities co-financed by UK NGOs under the B7-
6000 budget line ofthe EC, 
iii) investigate the extent ofUK NGO commitment to the region, and 
iv) assess the value ofthe case study as an example ofthe EC policy. 
The Data Base 
Initially there is a need to establish the limitations of using the B7-6000 budget line. It 
a demand-led budget line based on the NGOs' right of initiative and therefore it is to 
be expected that the use of the line will reflect the needs and aspirations of the poorest 
of the poor in the recipient countries (COM (83) 297). However the extent to which 
the projects accepted for co-financing by the Commission truly reflect their needs can 
be questioned. Initially the project proposed by the Southern group must be 
acceptable to the European 'partner' NGO, which may seek to exert a high degree of 
'control' over the final form (Fowler, 1991; Fowler, 1998). It can be stated that 
European NGOs are often attracted to those projects, which are focused, self-
contained, visible and small, but also fit in with their normal sphere of activity 
(Fowler, 1991). In addition the proposal needs to conform to the specific criteria and 
guidelines laid down by the Commission, to receive funding. It has already been 
identified that the level of rejected submissions is high (Table 3:2), and therefore the 
project has a greater chance of acceptance if it conforms to not only the official EC 
policy approach but also the covert influence exerted by the Commission (Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997). By virtue of their close proximity to the Commission and the 
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dynamics of donor funding, it can be argued that European NGOs will have a greater 
understanding of the fonnal and infonnal systems and procedures favoured by the 
Commission (Smillie, 1995; Tvedt, 1998). This in turn is then used to authenticate 
their position of power and authority over the final presentation of the proposal. At 
the same time, it must be remembered that, the Commission is concerned with the 
visibility and impact of its funding, and thus tends to favour those projects where the 
results are easy to identifY and are quantifiable, rather than those with long-tenn, 
intangible results (Elliott, 1987; Pearce, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Thus the 
pursuit of a positive response from the Commission to the project proposal may well 
result in the original needs of the Southern group being transfonned into a different 
project, biased towards the views and official language of the donor (Tvedt, 1998). On 
reflection therefore, it becomes difficult to establish the extent to which the use of the 
line is a true expression ofthe needs of the 'target' population and the extent to which 
it is the result of stakeholders' influence. 
Secondly the decision to focus on UK NGOs to illustrate the practice of EC policy in 
the SADC(C) area needs to be authenticated. An initial review of the data indicates 
that UK NGOs show a relatively high level of funded activity in all countries, with the 
exception of Mozambique. Thus for the period 1980 - 1996, the total amount of EC 
co-financing funds (ecus) allocated to UK NGO projects as a percentage of all EC co-
financed projects in the SADC(C) region reveals a range between 24.9% and 66.5% 
of the total EC funded activities, the exception being Mozambique with 9.9% (Table 
6:1). 
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Table 6.1: Cumulative funds for the region through EU and UK 
NGOs 1980 -1996 (ecus) 
EUNGOs UKNGOs UKlEUas% 
Angola 3,759,497 1,585,857 
Botswana 3,857,693 1,837,306 
Lesotho 2,489,730 883,466 
Malawi 7,587,548 4,609,707 
Mozambique 19,543,730 1,930,834 
Namibia 10,494,879 3,845,660 
Swaziland 2,356,484 1,566,218 
Tanzania 25,770,914 6,405,580 
Zambia 9,134,038 2,334,893 
Zimbabwe 19,128,300 5,811,039 
Totals 104,122,813 30,810,577 
Figure 6.1 UK NGOs in SADC(C) 
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.Total EU projects 
Drotal UK projects 
Table 6.2: UK NGOs finance as a percentage ofEU NGOs 
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Namibia Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
1980 7.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.24 
19810.00' ·0.00 0.00 88.96 ·····213:04 0.00 62.43 
~ _____ .. ____ "" __ • __ '.m. ______ .• ~_" _________ ", ______ • ________________ • __ . __ • _____ .. ____ • __ ,. ____ .• _______ , _______ ~"_ .• ______ ." __ 
\ __ 1~82.0:00 100.0q .. 0.00 0.00 100.00 .................................................. 24.21 2.44 72.55 
1983 11.10 21.84 0.00 0.00 15.72 0.00 0.00 
1984 51.78 100.0074.74 ... 100.00 . -----0:00 100.00 100.00 1.71 16.93 11.17 
\ ................ .......... ............ . ............. . .... 1.............. ..... ..... .. .......... .. .. ___ ... _.._. 
1985 63.12 99.21 0.00 100.00 1.51 56.80 100.00 8.35 3.45 37.21 
.............. 1986 59.02 100.00 40.05100:00 ' 4.82 69.03 100.00 35.02 54.53 40.64 
1987-46.-17-68.49 ---131:19· 91.28 2.02"--1:44---100.00 ----f8.91-T70----44.20 
."-- ....... , ..... " .•.• 
1988 77.37 0.00 100.00 10.76 6.69 70.11 23.19 19.80 0.71 0.38 
... 1989---18.05 --72.33-86:29 -100.00-- 15.17 ·-13.00 -100.00--25:89 -16:84 ---43.28 
.......... 1990 65.0133:7843.8332:37 3.21 49.81 98.82 38.80 0.00 57.17 
......... 1991 100.00 2,8714.39 .......... 90.93 3.81 56.99 100.00 22.09 66.01 34.98 
1992-45:-75---100:00 -- 28:23-70.07- 10.94 --31.93 ----6.14--28.84 -52:96--'74.89 
I. 199350:78--"'0.0014:12 17.36 22.53 45.34 100.00 15.51 39.32 26.44 
1994--0:00 ---0.00 --100:00 -83:114---- 1.66 --6.96 ---1 00.00 -~6.50 -lT13 ---1B.94 
I 
1995 0.79 0.00 100.00 50.53 3.46 56.40 2.08 30.40 76.80 4.72 
' 1996 2.84 34.75 13.47 52.26 23.76 27.45 100.00 26.11 30.49 53.70 
Mearro/.;T;·--34:8 ··7-·];r42~3 ~ITfT4{1~~']52~911Iii;ii: .r5.9-~·45.5N~60:6 r-;r:m7W~i2.3 cI\T:"wn72 
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In addition, the number of DK projects in relation to the total NGO projects in the 
recipient countries similarly reflects the relatively high level of interest and activity of 
UK NGOs (figure 6:1). 
On a country basis, using the annual distribution of EC funding to UK NGOs as a 
percentage of the total annual funding to ED NGOs, the data shows that UK NGOs 
were responsible for 100% of the EC co-financing received by specific countries on 
several occasions (Table 6:2). This may be interpreted as the UK taking a leadership 
role in EC co-financing operations in the region, for example, particularly in the case 
of Swaziland. 
It could also be suggested that the high level of UK NGO activity in the area may 
have exerted a significant influence over the relative cumulative country totals for ED 
NGOs. The ranking of the recipient countries of SADC(C) using the cumulative gross 
totals of the co-financing activities of all ED NGOs, and comparing them with a 
ranking according to corresponding totals from UK NGO activities (Table 6:3) 
produces an almost identical pattern, when ranked in descending order of value. When 
the data is produced in its per capita fonnat, they are also almost identical lists. The 
anomalies reflect the UK's distinction in relations towards Malawi as opposed to 
Mozambique. 
Finally, for the most part, the extraction of the relevant UK NGO data for SADC(C) 
countries was a simple, albeit time-consuming, procedure, except in the case of the 
allocation of funded projects that spread over several countries. These projects were 
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Table 6.3: Ranking ofSADC(C) countries 1980-1996 
EUNGO UKNGO 
cumulative cumulative EU NGO per capita UKNGO per 
Rank total total ranking capita ranking 
1 Tanzania Tanzania Namibia Namibia 
2 Mozambique Zimbabwe Swaziland Swaziland 
3 Zimbabwe Malawi Botswana Botswana 
4 Namibia Namibia Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
5 Zambia Zambia Lesotho-Mozambique Lesotho-Malawi 
6 Malawi Mozambique 
7 Botswana Botswana Zambia Zambia 
8 Angola Angola Tanzania Tanzania 
9 Lesotho Swaziland Malawi Angola 
10 Swaziland Lesotho Angola Mozambique 
to be found under regional headings - Afrique Subsaharienne, Region Afrique 
Australe, Region Afrique Subsaharienne, and Tous Pays. The decision was made to 
divide the total amounts equally between the countries indicated, and, subsequently, 
include them in both country totals and NGO totals. Where it was rather obscure as to 
which countries were the recipients, those allocations have been excluded. Once the 
relevant UK NGO data for each SADC(C) country for the years from 1980 to 1996 
(inclusive) had been extracted from the documents, the next step was to reorganise it 
according to sector or group focus. The headings used were those approved by the 
Commission in its discussion of the use of the budget line. One complication that 
arose concerned the identification of the most appropriate category under which to 
allocate certain funded project. For example, the projects allocated to the category 
disabled could equally have been allocated to education/training or health, but were 
put under disabled as this was in line with the Commission's desire to ensure support 
for certain special groups. Similarly a problem occurred with the allocation of 
activities relating to women. Projects that indicated the positive promotion of the 
position of women, such as specific education/training, the development of civil 
society groups or the introduction of revolving funds, were included under women, 
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whereas those that dealt with family planning were included under health. The 
justification for the allocation according to group was based on the use of language in 
the presentation of the project infonnation. 
Examination of Results 
Analysis of sectors and population groups 
The UK NGO funds from the EC allocated to sectors or specific sections of the 
population, presented according to country and year, are to be found in Appendix B. 
The Commission has identified three sectors: education/training, health, and rural 
development: as having the most concentrations of funded projects (Corn (81) 220; 
Com (82) 157). The cumulative total of these sectors for UK NGO projects between 
1980 and 1996 substantiates that trend with a figure of 52.4% of the total EC 
allocations to UK projects (Table 6.4). (Rural development was taken to include both 
agriculturelforestry and integrated rural development). 
If a further adjustment is made to incorporate water into the calculations so that then 
the cluster could represent basic needs of the popUlation, the figure rises to 62%. 
However it can be seen that civil society achieved third place in the ranking, which 
was a reflection of the changing political environment in the region. 
While the data so far have been cumulative totals for the region as a whole, the 
pattern of projects across the region is not identical for each individual country (Table 
6.5). For instance, health was the top category in 4 countries (Lesotho, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe), yet gained no support in Botswana. Agriculture (Zambia, 
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Table 6.4: UK NGO projects co-financed by the EC: 1980-1996 
% total 
Sector Euros fund 
Health 5,560,406 18.1 
Education & training 4,329,418 14.1 
Civil Society 3,346,498 10.9 
Agriculture 3,313,419 10.8 
Integrated rural development 2,888,387 9.4 
Water 2,967,266 9.6 
Disabled 2,809,605 9.1 
Productive activities 1,558,234 5.1 
Community development 1,183,689 3.8 
Elderly 982,596 3.2 
Refugees & rehabitation 882,346 3.0 
Revolving funds 639,968 2.1 
Women 348,742 1.1 
Total 30,810,574 100.0 
Angola) and civil society (Nambia, Swaziland) reach top in two countries, whereas 
IRD (Mozambique) and training (Botswana) only achieved the top position in one. 
Furthermore the majority of countries had at least one category, which received no 
support from UK NGOs during the period under review, the exceptions being Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
An examination of the detail underlying the gross figures (Table 6.5) reveals certain 
trends. The information will be dealt with in the following sequence: firstly those 
sectors that offer support for the provision of basic needs, secondly those that reflect 
the support for political change and the move to the market, and finally the focus is on 
the categories of special groups in the population. A review of the distribution of 
funds between education as opposed to training projects indicates that for only four 
countries - namely Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Tanzania- financial support for 
education was greater than training, for the rest the reverse was true (Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5 Cumulative totals for UK NGOs by sector and country (ecus) 
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Namibia Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe TOTAL 
Agriculture 473,894 288,903 158,934 79,612 429,987 4,635 0 440,830 537,546 899,078 3,313,419 
Civil Society 299,331 113,678 118,963 92,108 164,302 1,170,057 535,368 92,054 104,580 656,057 3,346,498 
Community 
Development 300,664 3,085 11,600 376,215 51,119 119,481 264,703 0 14,697 42,126 1,183,689 
Disabled 1,060 300,000 11,323 479,515 0 15,000 186,700 856,006 303,955 656,046 2,809,605 
Education 0 803 171,267 92,823 73,104 110,391 4,842 599,605 74,903 179,134 1,306,872 
Elderly 0 0 0 5,770 322,902 0 0 596,402 3,668 53,854 982,596 
Health 279,296 0 238,300 1,894,136 131,331 78,182 35,978 1,609,520 78,313 1,215,350 5,560,406 
IRD 12,264 0 0 825,160 504,063 0 498,165 248,455 467,088 333,192 2,888,387 
Productive acts 0 494,017 158,250 30,392 79,280 13,879 27,970 435,399 22,350 296,697 1,558,234 
Refugees/Rehab 153,619 120,403 0 30,803 0 84,373 0 69,975 51,252 371,921 882,346 
Revolving funds 0 0 0 55,324 0 517,558 5,615 25,601 4,463 31,407 639,968 
Training 29,484 515,673 4,566 0 97,753 869,507 0 306,730 448,567 750,266 3,022,546 
Water 29,884 0 9,541 459,252 61,993 846,120 6,135 1,075,569 216,076 262,696 2,967,266 
Women 6,361 742 742 188,597 15,000 16,477 742 49,434 7,432 63,215 348,742 
TOTAL 1,585,857 1,837,304 883,486 4,609,707 1,930,834 3,845,660 1,566,218 6,405,580 2,334,890 5,811,039 30,810,574 
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Financial allocations to training were cumulatively more than double that of 
education, with a concentration on the provision of training programmes for 
indigenous teachers in the 1990s. Training provision reflected the desire to improve 
standards of human resources e.g. literacy levels, in the region and to produce 
indigenous professionals/skilled workers rather than rely on foreign labour imports 
(Windhoek, 1992; OECD, 1995; CEC, 1996). 
The pattern of the relative levels of funded health projects between the countries 
reflects the significance of large projects i.e. over 100,000 ecus. Malawi and Tanzania 
each had five large projects, with Zimbabwe close behind with four. Support for 
health projects in Tanzania was continuous from 1982 although total funding was 
greater in Malawi. In addition to the focus on two of the poorer countries in the 
region, projects came on stream in Namibia after independence and Mozambique 
following the end of the civil war. Initially the large projects focused on setting up 
health services (Zimbabwe: 1980, 1981; Tanzania: 1983, 1986) or vaccination 
programmes (Malawi, 1984 & 1987), followed by Family Planning (Zimbabwe: 1987, 
1991 and Tanzania: 1989, 1994), but in the 1990s projects began to also focus on 
training programmes e.g. Malawi (1990- private health care; 1994- nurses; 1995-
sight savers) and Lesotho (1990 - training centre). The level of expenditure on health 
projects draws attention to region-specific problems, such as the impact of local 
environmental standards (climatic hazards, location-specific disease), and socially 
transmitted diseases (e.g. RIV / AIDS). There has also been a perceptive change from 
basic provision of services through preventive medicine and health education matters 
to investment in health human resource assets, again reflecting the push for 
sustainable systems (Korten, 1987; Windhoek, 1992). 
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In keeping with the NGOs' broad, all-encompassing approach to development and 
underlining the fact that many of their projects incorporated aspects from more than 
one sector, integrated rural development (IRD) projects appeared in the region as 
large allocations. Prior to 1990 there were only 4 projects in 3 countries whereas after 
1990 there were 12 projects in 6 countries, reaching a peak value in 1996. These were 
differentiated from agricultural/forestry projects, which had a narrower focus and 
dealt with equipment, crop/animal husbandry and reforestation. Much of the region 
contains a significant rural population (c. 70% - Namibia, Swaziland), with a high 
incidence of rural poverty and a problem of food security. In 1985 expenditure on 
agriculture peaked but 1993 showed the largest spread across the region covering 7 
countries and highlighted the extent of the problem. More recently the EC has 
concentrated on the plight of hunger in the region. 
Water was taken as a separate category of specifically focused projects although a 
proportion of the proj ects could have fitted into the rural development sector. The 
population suffers from a lack of access to safe drinking water, and the area was 
subsequently identified as one prone to drought conditions (EC, 1994). The earliest 
project occurred in 1985, and thereafter projects appeared in all countries with the 
exception of Botswana. The greater frequency of water projects favoured Namibia, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, although Malawi benefited from a single large 
project in 1995. The infrastructure projects were needed for both agricultural activities 
and personal consumption, and in the 1990s included response to the problem of 
drought (Malawi: 1992; Namibia: 1993). In 1992 projects spread across 5 countries 
but 1995 showed the widest spread (across 6 countries) and achieved the highest total 
- more than 1 million euros. It is, however, impossible to state whether the projects 
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sprang solely from the initiative of the indigenous population or were significantly 
influenced by the decisions of the EU/SADC biannual conferences. 
Apart from the significant sectors identified above, there were four other sector 
categories. The promotion of (urban) Community development activities received 
support from UK NGOs from 1986 onwards, and the gross expenditure figures 
showed a significant skew towards Angola, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland. Similar 
to IRD projects identified above, these projects either took an integrated approach to 
development or provided capital equipment for community use. However it was some 
time before the Commission included mention of the urban poor and did not directly 
focus on street kids until 1993 (Corn (94) 468) or marginalized urban populations 
until 1995 (Corn (97) 427). 
Civil society was used to promote the ability of indigenous groups to take an active 
role in society and attempt to influence community decisions (Corn (94) 468; Hulme 
& Edwards, 1997). The EU/SADC conference (1994) was keen to support moves 
towards the promotion of democracy, but the incidence of projects very much 
depended on the emergence of embryonic GROs, the degree of active participation by 
the population, and the prevalent political climate. Thus support was low in Malawi 
and Tanzania, although more consistent support was offered to the latter. Significantly 
Namibia received support both before and after its independence from South Africa. 
There was a similar concentration in Zimbabwe after its independence from Britain. 
Taking the category as a whole, in the early years emphasis was on training in the 
field of legal matters (Zimbabwe: 1980; Namibia: 1986; Mozambique: 1987) and 
journalism (Zimbabwe: 1981, 1984). Support to local groups initially focused on 
151 
Trade Unions (Botswana: 1986; Zimbabwe: 1987) and Church groups (Namibia: 
1988, 1989) but the 1990s saw the growth of support for SNGO, GROs and CBOs, 
which started in Mozambique (1989) and Zimbabwe (1989), then spread to other 
countries (Angola: 1991; Tanzania: 1991; Namibia: 1992; Lesotho: 1993; Zambia: 
1993; Malawi: 1995; Swaziland: 1996). In the early period the support was invariably 
for the local representative group of the Northern NGO (Action Aid: Mozambique; 
SCF: Angola) but later local groups emerged with their own names/identities (e.g. 
ORAP: Zimbabwe; ADRA: Angola; NANGOF: Namibia; CONGOMA: Malawi). 
Allocations to UK projects increased from 6.6% in the 1980s to 10.1% in the 1990s, 
with Namibia receiving both the highest gross expenditure and per capita amounts. 
At the same time the EC was keen to promote the move to the market (Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997; Tsie, 1997), which would incorporate both productive activities and 
revolving funds. The projects would support the development of emerging enterprises 
and SMEs, and reinforce the current ethos of self-propelled development and the 
reintegration into the world economy (Makoni, 1987; Thede, 1987; Van de Welde, 
1990; Windhoek, 1992). UK NGO support for productive activities appeared in 1983 
in Tanzania, before spreading to the rest of the region, excluding Angola (Table 6.5). 
The total value of the productive activities registered 5.3% in both the 19805 and the 
1990s. 
The final sector focus identified was that of revolving funds, which did not receive 
UK NGO support until Malawi in 1990 (Table 6.5). Only six SADC(C) countries 
appeared on the list and the allocations represented 3.2% ofUK funding in the 1990s. 
Namibia received the greatest gross amount and per capita value. While the existence 
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of revolving funds offers credit facilities, it is difficult to establish which groups in 
society benefit from these projects. It can be argued that in order to participate in 
these schemes the local group has to show a certain level of skills and accumulation 
of assets but this may exclude the poorest of the poor. 
In addition to the identification of specific sectors, the Commission also emphasised 
the importance of funding certain groups in society. Four such groups were identified 
- refugees, the disabled, the elderly and women. Allocations to the refugee group 
dealt with both health and education/training issues relating to their rehabilitation 
(South, 1981; Thompson, 1986). The greater emphasis in the 1980s related to the 
conditions in the region at that time but also in 1986 a new budget line was introduced 
which dealt with rehabilitation, and therefore probably attracted project proposals 
away from this budget line. The disabled group included those with general or 
specific handicaps i.e. blind people, lepers. The funds were used for their 
rehabilitation into society and essentially focused on their education and support 
facilities. However 1992 can be identified as a significant year in Tanzania when 
funds supported not only teacher training, but also the development of local 
representative organisations. This put emphasis on the move from support for the 
development of human resources to that of civil society. Projects supporting the 
elderly were concentrated in four countries in the region - namely Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe - with the poorest two receiving the greatest 
funding and reflected the impact of war and HIV/AIDS on the structure of society 
(Table 6.5). Essentially the support took the form of the provision of accommodation 
and age-specific health care (ophthalmic). The support reflected the changing 
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structure of society brought about by the incidence of war and AIDS as well as the 
state of poverty. 
Finally the category of women has to be viewed in the knowledge that women's health 
(Family Planning) care was also included under health. It is hardly surprising 
therefore that women received the lowest total allocated funding for UK NGDO 
projects. The projects indicated the specific intention of promoting the status of 
women in society in the way they were presented. Projects included training (Malawi: 
1986; Zimbabwe: 1986), support for women's groups (Namibia: 1987; Mozambique: 
1988; Zimbabwe: 1989; Zambia: 1993), and those dealing with violence against 
women (Zimbabwe: 1990). In 1994 attention turned to income generating activities 
(Malawi; Tanzania; Zimbabwe) and revolving funds (Malawi). 
Concern about the environment is also usually indicated as a cross cutting theme, but 
the lack of particular focus on this in the area meant that the relevant information was 
included under the categories of Community development and agriculture and 
resources. It was supported, in particular, by the UK NGO Co-operation for 
Development, which was active in Lesotho (1988, 1989, 1992, 1995) in reforestation, 
but also in Zambia (1993) and Namibia (1993). It also supported renewable energies 
in Zimbabwe (1989). 
Thus it can be argued that the spread of funds across the sectors and recipient groups 
has reflected not only the general considerations ofthe EC Development Co-operation 
policy but also the specific problems of the SADC(C) region, and the interests of the 
UK NGOs. Although the EC moved on to an emphasis on market-based and political 
developments, the majority of projects fell within the definition of basic needs. It is 
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difficult to establish whether this was a reflection of the desire of the indigenous 
population to achieve an acceptable level of basic needs and move out of poverty, or 
these projects received more support from UK NGOs because they were in keeping 
with their raison d'etre. Alternately perhaps it reflected the inability of the 
Commission to impose its own preference on the demand-led budget line. However 
even under the umbrella of basic needs, there is a discernable shift towards the 
involvement of the indigenous population and sustainability through the development 
of human resources and the promotion of civil society (Elliott, 1987; Pearce, 1993). 
While trends have appeared over time, it is difficult to identify the main determinant. 
Obviously the priorities have been shaped by the problems of the region and this is 
reflected in the demand-led projects and the RIPs arrived at hy joint consultation 
between the Commission and SADC representatives. 
Data analysis on an annual basis 
The data can also be reviewed across the region on an annual basis. For anyone year 
it is then possible to identify the relative significance of the categories of expenditure. 
The funds received from the EC by UK NGOs each year, presented by country and 
sector/population group, are located in Appendix C. An initial examination revealed 
health to be the most frequent recipient ofthe highest funding each year -1980, 1983, 
1987 and 1994; followed by disabled- 1986, 1989 and 1993. If disabled is added to 
health, the relative importance of the category is underlined, being related to not only 
civil unrest but also the level of poverty and the prevalence of disease in the region. 
Agriculture (1985, 1991), water (1992, 1995) and civil society (1981, 1996) each 
achieved first place on two occasions. The problem of food security and the high 
incidence of a rural population reflected the relative importance of agriculture. While 
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1981 to 1990 was identified as the water decade, it did not feature significantly in the 
funding until the 1990s. Water projects first appeared in 1985, had only intennittent 
incidence until 1992, were then established in four countries across the region, and 
reached a peak in 1995 (6 countries). This reflected the growing realisation of the 
severity of drought conditions in the region (CEC, 1996; Liebaert, 1997). 
The importance of civil society initially reflected the post-independence situation in 
Zimbabwe. 1984 was significant because these projects had spread over 6 countries 
with it being the sole expenditure category in Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
Education (1984) community development (1988) refugees (1982) and training (1990) 
gained that position once. It is significant that refugees achieved first place in 1982 
during the height of the fight against civil unrest instigated by SA as part of its 
destabilization programme in the region. Soon after the Commission introduced a new 
budget line to support the rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons. 
Those categories that did not achieve the highest level of funding were invariably late 
starters in the distribution of projects. Thus productive activities appeared in 1985 in 
two poor countries- Malawi and Mozambique, and only achieved a peak spread across 
four countries in 1992. Similarly women appeared later (1986) also in two countries 
concurrently- Malawi and Zimbabwe, but achieved a peak spread across 6 countries 
in 1987. Again the Commission introduced a specific budget line to accommodate 
women's issues. The elderly as a category did not make an appearance until 1983 and 
thereafter never succeeded in gaining a significant spread across the region in anyone 
year. In fact only Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, (and Zambia once), were 
seen to support the group, despite EC encouragement. Therefore the annual detail of 
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UK NGO activity in the region can be said to reflect the problems of the region as 
well as those of the individual countries, which suggests that the NGOs were 
responding to some extent to local demand. 
UK NGOs & SADC(C) 
UK NGOs have been active in their pursuit of EC B7-6000 co-financing for their 
projects since the inauguration of SADC(C). From 1980 onwards there has been a 
rising annual trend of activity by UK NGOs in the region, and their numbers reached 
a peak in 1993 of29 before levelling off at 24 in both 1995 and 1996 (figure 6:2). The 
annual rate of increase in the number of individual UK NGOs entering SADC(C) 
achieved a peak of 8 in 1991 but then settled at a lower level. By 1996, a total of 60 
UK NGOs had made an appearance in the region. It is suggested that the appearance 
and frequency of individual UK. NGO activity in the region could be the result of a 
number of factors: (i) the administrative system of the Commission, (ii) the level of 
competition for funds, (iii) the formal and the informal system used by the 
Commission to determine the allocation of funds, (iv) the relative attractiveness of 
obtaining funds from the UK equivalent system or elsewhere. It could be argued that 
the lower proportion of new entrants after 1992 to some extent reflects the 
management problems at the Commission and the shift of activities to another region. 
NGO activity in the region can also be analysed to establish the degree of 
commitment to the region or to a specific country/sector/group. Thus according to 
figure 6.3, 18 UK NGOs had only one year of activity in the region during the 
period1980 - 1996. A closer examination of these NGOs (Table 6.6) indicates that a 
slightly higher number appeared in the 1990s as opposed to the 1980s, perhaps 
157 
Figure 6.2 UK NGOs in SADC(C) 
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reflecting the level of opportunities in the region and the change in BC/SA relations. 
In the 1980s Botswana appeared to be attractive to UK NOOs entering the region but 
was overshadowed by opportunities in Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania in the 
1990s. Zimbabwe, however, proved attractive during both periods. 
Table 6.6 UK NGOs with only one year's appearance 
Country NGO Year 
Botswana Quaker Peace & Service 1982 
Boiswana----- s-c,-S-Cii-ildre-ri'S-village---------- ----------1984 
Boiswan-a----- WWF --------- -- ------------------- ----------1985· 
Boiswan-,:;---·- Melhociis-icii-u;ch--·--------··--·- ----------1989 
Lesotho------- B"ritrshRe,fcross····--·--··-·--· ------·---1993 
i\Xafawf""'--""'" ·Hom'el'es's-'-Internaiion~ii···-·-'-'--·'··--·" -.. ·· .. ····--····1·992 fi.falawi············· S·ue·R;;de·r············ ................ - ................. ·······1992 
fV1oz'':;mbique'' A·PTI~Tri.isi····································· ····················19"94 
Moz'':;mbique'' AHRTAG································ """""'-'1991'1 
Ta,,-iiiriia""'" EcHO·········-·································-· . ············1988 
Tan'zanfa-"'--"" "Harolcfrv'-ac'K;"Hian-Trust"'---"-"'--" -""---"------1"99"1"" 
Tanzania·········· Ran' FUrlY' i.ibra;Y·S·er;;·ce············ . ·····-········1993 
Taiiz an fa··········· Action' Heaiih2000········ ........... ....... . ............ "'1995 
zarrlbiii-·-·-··- v'oiurita;Y'&Chris'tiiiri's'er;;-c;;" '-"--"'-1986 
Zim·ti;'-bwe· -.... A-iff;:;'-ii' E-dllcaiiCin'ai-i'rus'j ... -.... . ... --··--1 ~18 1-
Z;m-babwe·-·-- 21mbabwe-Trusr-------·-· __ ··--· ·_-------·1985' 
Z;m-babwe---- Famfiy .. ofthe-F·Uiur"Ei-----·----- ._--------1990 
Zim-babwe----- A-frfca--Now-------------------- ----------1996 
It can also be stated that seven UK NOOs achieved between ten and fourteen years of 
activity in the region, indicating a high level of commitment and ability to develop 
relations within the region by some UK NOOs (fig 6.3). On the other hand, a review 
of the presence of UK NOOs in the individual countries shows that the majority were 
active in only one country (fig 6.4). In contrast three UK NOOs were present in 
between eight and ten countries in the region. Furthennore, an identification of the 
attractiveness of countries to UK NOOs indicates that Tanzania heads the list with 31 
NOOs, followed by Zimbabwe with 29 (Table 6.7). All but two of the countries 
enjoyed their maximum level of UK NOO support in the 1990s, which could have 
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been a reflection of the increased funding available and the changes to the political 
environment in the region. 
Figure 6.4 Presence of UK NGOs in one country or more 
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Table 6.7 Total number of UK NGOs active in each country 1980 -
1996 
Total no. UK Highest no. of Year(s) when highest no. of 
NGOs active NGOs/year NGOsactive 
Angola 7 4 1987 
Botswana 9 3 1989 
Lesotho 8 3 1990,1992,1993,1995 
Malawi 17 7 1991, 1992 
Mozambique 12 6 1993, 1996 
Namibia 11 6 1994, 1995, 1996 
Swaziland 8 3 1996 
Tanzania 31 13 1995 
Zambia 18 9 1993 
Zimbabwe 29 9 1994, 1995, 1996 
Table 6.8 Total value of EC co-financed activities in SADC(C) region 
by individual UK NGOs 1980 -1996 (ecus) 
UKNGO Value of EC co-financing Main recipient country or 
of countries 
B7-6000 projects 
Oxfam 2,965,885 Malawi & Zimbabwe 
Co-operation for 2,911,609 Namibia & Botswana 
Development 
Concern Universal 2,330,955 Malawi & Mozambique 
War on Want 1,566,881 Angola & Zimbabwe 
Water Aid 1,313,342 Tanzania 
Christian Aid 1,308,696 Namibia 
MSI 1,297,427 Zimbabwe & Tanzania 
ACORD 1,295,872 Namibia & Mozambique 
VSO 1,063,450 Tanzania & Zambia 
HelpAge 1,040,659 Tanzania 
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At NGO level, the amount of EC funds drawn into the SADC(C) region by some 
individual UK NGOs was greater than the total allocations through all UK NGOs to 
individual countries over the whole period from 1980 to 1996 (Table 6.8 compared 
with Table 6.1). It can be seen therefore that specific UK NGOs have had a 
considerable presence in the region, and even a significant presence in certain 
countries. A comparison between the first three in the list was undertaken to see 
whether their projects conformed to a set pattern. 
Using the annual reports of the B7-6000 budget line showed that Oxfam was active in 
the region for thirteen years between 1982 and 1995 (excluding 1988) and had a 
presence in seven out of the ten SADC(C) countries (Appendix D). (In reality, as it is 
a member of ACORD, it could be argued that it has continued its activities in the area 
in 1996 as well.) Although it is difficult to discern a clear-cut pattern to Oxfam's 
activities, it is possible to state that its projects do seem to reflect the needs of the 
individual country, and thus its pattern of projects is not the same in each country. 
While in the main the projects in the years prior to 1988 concentrated on the 
alleviation of basic needs, from 1989 onwards there was a trend towards productive 
activities (Tanzania, Namibia), support for the development of civil society (Angola, 
Zimbabwe) and revolving funds (Tanzania). However the severity of the region's 
water problem was underlined by the strength of support given by Oxfam from 1992 
onwards, covering 5 countries in the region. Therefore Oxfam has supported a spread 
of projects in the region, which not only reflect country and regional needs but also 
could be said to incorporate the shift towards the market and the pursuit of 
democracy. Whether this reflected the needs of the individual target group or was 
prompted by Oxfam or the policy approach of the EC is impossible to ascertain. By 
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way of comparison with Oxfam, SCF also had a presence in 7 countries between 1982 
and 1996, but its total EC co-financing was only approximately 8% of Oxfam's total 
(Appendix D). 
Co-operation for Development also showed a significant presence in the region, and 
has been active since 1985, with at least one project in each country (Appendix E). 
Unlike Oxfam, Co-operation for Development has tended to support activities that 
relate to the market (training human resources, revolving funds, the development of 
productive activities) and civil society (NGO support and Human rights). At the same 
time though it also supported integrated community development projects, which can 
cover a range of issues (Angola, Swaziland), and environmental concerns. It is 
interesting to note that it offered most support to Namibia and Botswana, in contrast 
to Oxfam, which focused on Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
The third UK NGO, Concern Universal, showed a different presence in the region 
(Appendix F). It first appeared in 1990 in Malawi, which has since received 
approximately half Concern Universal's total allocation of EC funding. It was only 
active in three other countries in the region. Yet again it is difficult to distinguish a 
specific pattern to its activities, which reflect basic needs, market activities and the 
development of civil society and the pursuit of democracy. 
While development theory has moved on, the basic needs of the indigenous 
population have still to be met. In those countries, which have very recently emerged 
from a period of civil unrest, the NGOs have supported the provision of capital 
equipment and premises as well as vocational training schemes. There is also some 
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evidence of the substitution of the state by UK NGOs, when HelpAge provided 
support for the Social Welfare department in Mozambique in 1993. NGOs may feel 
that the move to the market is not in keeping with their approach to development but 
nevertheless they appear to some extent to have incorporated this approach into their 
own affairs (van der Heijden, 1987; Smillie, 1995; Tvedt, 1998). The increase in the 
level of support for productive activities and the more recent introduction of revolving 
credit funds indicates a move towards poverty reduction by promotion (Huhne & 
Edwards, 1997). The NGOs are aware of the need for some element of stability in the 
countries, and look for the emergence of embryonic civil movements in the regions 
before they enter otherwise they feel their efforts will not produce desirable results 
(Sahley, 1995). However, in order to promote the emergence of civil society in the 
period before and after its independence from South Africa, social mobilisation forces 
in Namibia have been favoured. A glance at the data pertaining to Namibia shows that 
a pattern emerged such that from an initial focus on support offered by the Church on 
legal matters and housing advice (Pearce, 1993), from 1992, there emerged support 
for the nurture of local NGOs (CIIR and ACORD). This raises the question of 
whether NGOs are being used as part ofthe EC's foreign policy (i.e. to counteract the 
influence of SA in the region) rather than positively favouring intangible activities 
(pearce, 1993; Smillie, 1995; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). 
The use of the B7-6000 budget line by UK NGOs shows that to some extent it 
reflected the needs of the local population, but as a demand-led budget line that was to 
be expected. However, it could also be suggested that the desire of the EC to play out 
a policy against the destabilizing tactics of South Africa in the region, meant that the 
Commission looked upon the project proposals, which were in response to the plight 
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of the refugees and those seeking rehabilitation, more favourably. Thus in the 1980s, 
War on Want received a significant level of funding for these projects (Appendix G). 
As a result of both the periods of civil unrest and the regional characteristics, e.g. 
drought, local diseases, the indigenous population continued to need support to attain 
their basic needs, as indicated in the data above. The situation was not helped by the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment programmes. However over time the presence 
of UK. NGO projects in the region came to cover the whole spectrum of NGO 
activities from relief through development to empowerment (Elliott, 1987; Korten, 
1987; Thomas, 1992; Smillie, 1995). The revised General Conditions (1988) 
governing the B7 -600 budget line laid emphasis on participation of the people and 
sustainability. It therefore indicated its preference for the support of GROs (SEC (89) 
1575), which has been evident in the region since 1989. Sustainability was to be 
through the boost to employment. Although the introduction of revolving funds 
through UK NGOs did not enter the region until 1990, thereby possibly responding to 
the EC lead, the same was not true of productive activities. These first appeared in 
1983 and thus were in advance of the BC approach. The shift towards the market 
focus and sustainability was further borne out by the emphasis on income-generating 
projects for women and the elderly. However, although the EC proposed a move 
towards an increased focus on these market-based activities in the mid 1990s, UK. 
NGOs did not reflect it in their use of the line. In recognition of the high number of 
NGO that have had a very limited presence in the region, it could be argued that they 
were attracted by the funding opportunities available rather than a commitment to the 
population. Similarly as the focus of BC policy has turned from the fight against the 
apartheid regime of South Africa, to one of the rebuilding of relations with South 
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Africa, so this may have affected the apparent relative attractiveness of SADC for UK 
NGOs. 
As an example ofEC policy in practice, the use of the B7-6000 budget line has been 
the result of a number of factors. These have included not only the EC policy to 
counter balance the destabilisation activities of South Africa but also the social and 
economic profile of the region. While the focus ofEC policy moved from SADC(C) 
to South Africa in the 1990s, this was not reflected in the UK NGO activities. There 
was an increased interest in the plight of the poorer countries particularly after the 
civil disturbances had died down. However if the EC policy was to focus on the 
reduction of poverty then a continued presence in the region was needed. 
Nevertheless there was some evidence of a move to the market reflected in the UK 
NGO projects in the region. The number of projects active in both Namibia and 
Botswana lead one to assume that there is a degree of economic interest behind these 
by both the EC and the UK. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
European NGOs find themselves located between a number of stakeholders, who hold 
divergent views concerning their function and direction of accountability. While it is 
appreciated that the stakeholders include organisations from the North and the South, 
the review of the literature identified the donorlNGO relationship as central to the 
changes that have taken place in the NGOs' environment. DonorlNGO relations have 
been little researched partly due to the difficulty of identifying and isolating the 
significant causal factors (Hulme & Edwards, 1997) but also because there is a dearth 
of material available to the researcher. As such, therefore, the promotion of 
transparency has not progressed far enough nor been in place long enough. 
DonorlNGOs relations are highly complex and determined by the extent to which 
there is equality in the relationship, concerning the share of power, access to 
information, decision-making, and the design and implementation of policy (Clark, 
1997; Commins, 1997). It is difficult to identify hard and fast rules for the 
relationship, and the normative view may well differ in each case. The relative 
position of each player at any time is the product of contemporary as well as past 
events. Thus the study of the evolution of relations between northern donors and 
northern NGOs is the consequence of a number of interwoven, constantly changing 
factors. These include the aspirations of and decisions taken by each group, as well as 
variables both within and external to the organisations. 
This research into donorlNGO relations has focused on an examination of the relative 
position of the European (development) NGOs in the context of the dynamics of the 
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Development Co-operation policy of the European Community. An attempt has been 
made to examine the dynamics of the EC Development Co-operation policy both 
through Community documentation and its application to a specific region, SADC(C). 
At the same time a detailed study was carried out into the evolution of relations over 
time between the European Commission and NGOs and their representative body, 
CLONG. 
EC / Commission / Donor 
The European Commission represents the interest of the EC as a donor, although it is 
to be appreciated that it is only one of the EU institutions, and that these in turn may 
reflect the views of the (currently) fifteen Member States. As such therefore the EC as 
a donor is a special/extreme case. 
It has been shown that the approach to NGOs by the Commission has changed over 
time in response to changes in the aid envirournent and its impact on the 
characteristics and internal organisation of both NGOs and the Commission. Initially, 
the Commission was seeking to expand its operations (Com (75) 504) but recognised 
the limitations of its own approach to development (Riddell & Robinson, 1995). It 
saw the NGOs as agents of an alternative means of generating development (Korten, 
1987; Fowler & James, 1994; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Tvedt, 1998; Cameron, 2000; 
Thorbecke, 2000), which would extend the Community's ability to reach the poorest 
groups in society (Fowler & James, 1994). At this early stage it was appreciative of 
their attributes (Korten, 1987; Smith, 1987; Bratton, 1989; Fowler & James, 1994; 
Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Robinson, 1997; Smillie, 1997) and the associated benefits 
to be gained by the Community (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993; Pratt & Stone, 
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1994; Edwards & Hulme, 1996), while being conscious that its role was to offer little 
more than financial support (Corn (77) 83). It was also aware of the enhancement to 
its public image resulting from NGOs' education projects. However as the 
Commission gained an insight into the operations and organisational set-up ofNGOs, 
it became critical of their level of efficiency (Annis, 1987; Smith, 1987; Bratton, 
1989; Robinson, 1992; Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995) and their lack of 
professionalism (Korten, 1987; Bratton, 1989). In the general climate of the push for 
increased accountability and efficiency, the Commission sought to encourage NGOs 
to raise their performance and their transparency, so that it would be easier to identify 
the return for the EC from the co-financed projects (Corn (80) 98). Gradually the 
degree of control wielded by the Commission over the internal organisation ofNGOs 
and their activities began to increase, for instance, through the revised General 
Conditions and the introduction of the evaluation reflex and LFA. Thus the 
Commission's own value system and approach to development was beginning to be 
formally imposed on those NGOs wishing to participate in activities co-financed by 
the EC (Tvedt, 1998). This was further extended by the introduction of economic and 
political conditionality into EC policy and seen to provide an enhanced role for 
NGOs, which would enable them to promote empowerment of their target groups 
(Bratton, 1989; Pearce, 1993; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). In spite of the fact that the 
Commission had become increasingly critical of NGOs, it also still appeared to 
respect their opinion and encouraged their critical comments on EC policy initiatives 
and documents. This was taken a step further when NGOs were invited to take part in 
the proposed meso-level dialogue. It can be argued that while the NGOs have been 
aware of the official, overt EC policy (the promotion of development via the market 
and the pursuit of democracy), they have also become increasingly conscious of a 
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covert agenda (export markets, business interests). The absorption of the NOOs into 
the formal setting of EC policy has meant that they are now part of the CFSP 
(Edwards, 1994). 
In retrospect therefore it can be argued that the Commission saw the NOOs as 'magic 
bullets' (Vivian, 1994), and were content to allow NOOs to pursue their activities in 
their own way. According to Farrington and Bebbington (1993) the Commission was 
initially acting in a facilitative manner, which gradually moved though a period of 
constructive influence, when the Commission attempted to influence the use of the 
budget line by the promotion of certain issues. More recently the introduction of 
economic and political conditionality has in fact distorted relations for the NOOs who 
have had to focus on objectives, which could be argued as the antithesis of their 
values (Van der Heijden, 1987; Dichter, 1997). A further problem for NOOs is their 
incorporation into the EC's foreign policy (Edwards, 1994). The dominance and 
power of the EC has not only been worked through the refocusing of its external 
affairs policy but also in the imposition of its values and procedures on the 
organisational affairs of the NOOs (Tvedt, 1998). NOOs have therefore been forced to 
absorb the EC's practices as their own, which has reduced their degree of 
accountability towards their target groups (Fowler, 1991; Smillie, 1995; Fowler, 
1998). At the same time the emphasis on short- term projects was seen to be out of 
step with the push for sustainability and the desire to reduce administrative costs 
(Edwards & Hulme, 1996). 
It can be stated that the role of the EC/Commission as donor has changed over time to 
incorporate an increased number of formal procedures and impose constraints on the 
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ability of NOOs to carry out their activities in accordance with their original values 
and objectives. The Commission has used both formal and informal methods to exert 
pressure on NOOs to conform- recognised list of NOOs (based on three years 
acceptable experience); formal procedures for acceptance of proposals; threat and 
actuality of tennination of financial support e.g. CLONO; withdrawal of funding 
midstream (1998); time delays in decisions and payments; additional administrative 
burdens; insecurity of tenure; a state of flux in its own systems and staffing of 
departments. 
European NGOs 
In the early stages of relations with the Commission, the NOOs engaged in emergency 
and food aid, and were keen to expand their operations with the Commission. They 
saw it as a way to widen their financial base and establish a people-centred approach 
to development with the help of a major provider of aid (Pratt & Stone, 1994; 
Thorbecke, 2000). European NOOs wished to be seen as 'partners' of the European 
Commission and from the start attempted to establish their position by proposing 
refinements to the general conditions governing the co-financing of NOO activities. 
Then, with the support of the European Parliament, NOOs began to offer a critical 
voice in discussions of EC policy matters. The development of relations with the 
European Parliament was important because it strengthened the position of NO Os vis-
a-vis the Commission (Covey, 1998). NOOs were also able to 'use' their influence 
with the European Parliament to establish additional budget lines to support issues 
they were particularly concerned with e.g. women, the environment, human rights 
(Weiss & Oordenker, 1996; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). The expansion offunds, either 
through co-financing lines or through NIPs, encouraged the emergence of new NOOs, 
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which extended the heterogeneity of the group (RiddelI & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 
1995; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Hodson, 1997). It is not possible to state whether 
these emergent NGOs had a firm commitment to development or could be identified 
as opportunists (Hodson, 1997; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Tvedt, 1998), nor identify 
the extent to which existing NGOs were affected by the extra funds (Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997; Pronk, 1998). 
Despite these new opportunities NGOs have had to deal with a number of problematic 
issues. NGOs have felt uneasy about the direction that EC policy has taken with the 
focus on a market-centred, competitive approach to development (Dichter, 1997; 
Hulme & Edwards, 1997). This was difficult to reconcile with their preferred people-
centred approach, although they have managed to accommodate moves along the 
welfare/empowerment spectrum e.g. Oxfam (EIIiott, 1987; Korten, 1987; Smillie, 
1995). Over time the pressure has grown for them to be accountable upwards (Hulme 
& Edwards, 1997) to the Commission, and this has resulted in NGOs adopting a 
working environment and manner closer to that of the Commission, which in turn 
they have imposed on their Southern partners (Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Thomas, 
1992; Smillie, 1995; Bebbington & RiddelI, 1997; Dichter, 1997; WalIace, 1997; 
Wood, 1997; Tvedt, 1998). However the rise of Southern NGOs as a recognised 
presence precipitated an identity crisis for the Northern NGOs (Pratt & Stone, 1994; 
Bebbington & RiddelI, 1997), as they now found that on the one hand their status as a 
link with target groups had been compromised and on the other the Commission was 
now eager to deal directly with SNGOs (Najam, 1996: Hulme & Edwards, 1997; 
Smillie, 1997). In the 1990s NGOs have made use of the move towards a more 'open' 
Commission to engage in the proffered periods of consultation and thus influence the 
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general direction of, or specific issues in, EC policy (Hellinger, 1987; Pratt & Stone, 
1994; Commins, 1997; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Covey, 1998). NGOs have been 
keen to promote sustainable development but this was incompatible with the 
Commission's focus on short-term functional accountability (Elliott, 1987; Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997). The Commission has attempted to control and constrain the activities 
of the NGOs in line with its official external policy framework through their 
engagement in humanitarian aid and contracts to meet EC policy provision (Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997; SmilIie, 1997; Twose, 1987: Fowler, 1998). Under the B7-6000 
budget line, European NGOs have the right of initiative for the presentation of project 
proposals to the Commission, which they have staunchly defended and which ensures 
they act in response to the demand of the indigenous population. In fact a number of 
changes have been made to the B7·6000 line, such: as the promotion of programmes 
rather than projects, which would allow a longer-term approach to development to 
ensue (Dichter, 1997) and the focus on the use of consortia, which it could be argued 
dilutes and homogenises the NGO world (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). A number of 
evaluations of NGO co-financed activities have been carried out, but it is suggested 
that these may have missed possible considerable, but probably immeasurable, 
spilIover benefits and a revised approach should be taken (Biggs & Neame, 1995; 
Fowler, 1995; Uphoff, 1995). Similarly while the focus has been on the degree and 
direction of accountability ofNGOs, very little has been achieved in the transparency 
and accountability ofthe Commission (Bebbington & Riddell, 1997). 
CLONG 
The position held by CLONG has been subject to tremendous strains and pressures as 
a result of its location at the interface between (development) NGOs and the 
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Commission. As soon as it became financially dependent on the Commission (1978), 
CLONG found itself being increasingly drawn into the Commission's sphere of 
influence, although at times the role it played was identified as an informed, critical 
voice (Commins, 1997). CLONG has engaged in policy dialogue (HeJlinger, 1987; 
Pratt & Stone, 1994; Covey, 1998), but while it has lobbied on aid policies, it has 
found it difficult to actually change the EC's strategy (Commins, 1997). CLONG has 
sought to influence the Commission by engaging with the European Parliament and 
other bodies representing NGO interests, and producing independent reports (Princen 
& Finger, 1994; Covey, 1998). It can be said to have engaged in critical co-operation 
and insider advocacy (Covey, 1998). 
As a consequence of its close relations with the Commission, it has assimilated the 
values, language and systems of the Commission (Tvedt, 1998). The escalating 
bureaucratic problems at the Commission impacted on NGOs and their activities, with 
the result that CLONG stepped in to oversee the project proposals before they reached 
the Commission. From the Commission's viewpoint, this was an attempt to reduce 
administrative costs. On the other hand, NGOs saw this as a further extension of the 
absorption ofCLONG into the realm of the Commission, and as a move by CLONG 
to screen their project proposals (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997). NGOs felt that 
CLONG no longer represented their interests. For CLONG that role had become 
increasingly more difficult as the NGOs it represented grew in number and diversity 
(Riddell & Robinson, 1995). As CLONG sought to restructure itself and promote 
solidarity with its members, it found its position increasingly a tenuous one, under fire 
from both sides. 
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CLONG's relations with the Commission have progressively declined. In the early 
days the scale of things enabled personal contact to establish the working 
environment, particularly with DG VIII. Consequently the development of trust and 
understanding for the work of NGOs was built up with the staff of DG VIII 
(Commins, 1997). However these close relations have been lost as a result of the 
structural and staffing changes at the Commission, and the assumption, that it had 
achieved good relations with the Commission, was proved to be seriously awry with 
the events at the turn of the century. The impetus for independent financial support 
has become of paramount importance. 
Final Reflections 
The relations between the EC/Commission and Northern NGOs reviewed here have 
been played out against a backdrop of turmoil and consequent change both within the 
European Community and in the wider world. These factors have impacted on the 
concept of partnership and the evolution of relations. While NGOs and CLONG 
considered that they were part of a partnership with the Commission, that concept has 
undergone change as can be seen in the case of the ACPs. The imbalance of power 
and authority, and the lack of reciprocal accountability and transparency have become 
increasingly apparent over time. The independence ofNGOs has been questioned and 
their plurality may have been lost as they become drawn into acting out the EC's 
Development Co-operation policy, which is fast being incorporated into its foreign 
policy domain. CLONG allowed itselfto get too close to the Commission. The NGOs 
now have to consider whether they should review their position and specialise to 
achieve their objectives. 
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This thesis has shown that the power exerted by the EC, as a donor, has increased 
during the time under review. The NGOs found themselves to be in a progressively 
more competitive market for funds. This has impacted on their integrity to varying 
degrees, and many have assimilated donor values and language. It has also shown that 
the application of EC policy to a specific region has provided the NGOs with support 
for their work while also influencing it. There is still much research to be done into 
donorlNGO relations to see whether the form of relations varies significantly with the 
donor. The EC is a multilateral organisation, therefore there is scope for analysis of 
relations between a bilateral donor and NGOs over time. Similarly the degree of 
financial dependence of CLONG on the European Commission has identified the 
problem of the lack ofaltemative sources of finance. Future research into the possible 
replacements for donor financing for NGO representative bodies may, of course, also 
involve them in a closer relationship with their members, who in turn may have 
increased their links with the private sector. The repercussions of such a move for the 
integrity of and role played by NGOs and their representative body remains uncertain. 
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Appendix A 
Source: African Dev. Report 2000, OUP Oxford 
Country Area 1999 pop GNPlhd Life Infant Infant Adult 
('000 sq US($) expectancy mortality mortality literacy 
Km) 1998 1998 rate (per rate (per rate % 
1000) 1000) 1998 
1980 1998 
Angola 1,247 12.5 350 48 149 117 -
Botswana 600 1.6 3,070 44 67 59 25 
Congo DR 2,345 50.3 110 52 109 82 
-
Lesotho 30 2.1 570 54 117 90 17 
Malawi 118 10.6 200 40 164 131 41 
Mozambique 802 19.3 200 41 135 115 58 
Namibia 824 1.7 1,940 45 84 71 19 
S. Africa 1,221 39.9 3,310 50 67 62 16 
Swaziland 17 1.0 1,390 62 94 60 22 
Tanzania 945 32.8 210 48 98 78 27 
Zambia 753 9.0? 330 41 88 77 24 
Zimbabwe 391 11.5 620 42 76 68 9 
Access to (% pop) 
Sanitation Safe water Health services 
1985 1994195 1985 1994195 1985 1994195 
Angola 18 16 33 32 70 -
Botswana 36 55 54 70 
- -
Congo DR 23 18 33 25 33 26 
Lesotho 22 38 36 57 50 80 
Malawi 60 63 55 54 54 35 
Mozambique 20 54 IS 28 40 39 
Namibia 14 34 52 57 72 59 
S. Africa 
- 53 - - - -
Swaziland 
- 70 21 60 - -
Tanzania 64 86 49 49 73 42 
Zambia 47 64 58 59 70 -
Zimbabwe 26 58 52 74 71 85 
Education: School enrolment ratio (GROSS) 
Primary Secondary 
1980 1996 1980 1996 
Total FIM Total F/M Total FIM Total FIM 
Angola 174 0.87 74 0.92 21 0.29 12 0.66 
Botswana 91 1.20 112 1.01 19 U8 66 1.10 
Congo DR 92 0.71 70 0.69 24 0.37 30 0.62 
Lesotho 102 1.43 87 1.31 18 1.50 29 1.46 
Malawi 60 0.67 133 0.91 3 0040 5 1.88 
Mozambique 99 0.73 62 0.72 5 0.38 7 0.63 
Namibia 128 UO 131 1.01 38 1.26 61 1.18 
S. Africa 85 1.01 116 0.98 45 0.98 84 1.l9 
Swaziland 103 0.98 129 0.95 38 0.95 52 0.99 
Tanzania 93 0.87 66 0.98 3 0.53 5 0.82 
Zambia 90 0.85 88 0.94 16 0.50 29 0.63 
Zimbabwe 85 0.86 113 0.97 8 0.78 48 0.85 
Appendix B 
Sector and Population group 
Agriculture (ecus) 
Civil Society (ecus) 
Community Development (ecus) 
-~-~-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabled (ecus) 
• Education and Training (ecus) 
1980 
: 1981 
: 19821 
19 
19 
19 
19 
1987 
: ~:: 
: 1990 
: 1991 
I 19: 
1993 
1994 
".g~':.,., •• ~ Tral.I.g 
9,003 
6,548 
9,935 27,830 
10.387 2.847 
1,546 
.9,5651 
1,45 
5:',1' 
1'1,47 
4.566 . 1,060 
=:~lfa 0.0031 0.397 0.097 0.009 
.72,4], 
23,552 25,282 
0.012 
1 343.22C 
1,31: 
91,9501 
1 :,128 
0.754 
.4,842 
5,400 
77,270 
12,1ee 24,003 
11,851 2,BSC 4,: 
_ 12,600 9,328 
8,703 534. 
15, 32,38, 
131,644 41,346 4,146 6,94C 
0.006 0.035 0.064 0.094 
Elderly (ecus) 
Health (ecus) 
Integrated Rural Development (ecus) 
Productive activities (ecus) 
Refugees and Rehabitation (ecus) 
Revolving Funds (ecus) 
- ----._-
Water (ecus) 
Women 
Appendix C 
Annual Data 
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Concern Universal 
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